Taxes, subsidies and equilibrium labor market outcomes

Designing Inclusion: Tools to Raise Low-End Pay and Employment in Private Enterprise

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 44-73

  Mortensen, Dale T ^a   Pissarides, Christopher A ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748472616     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511493447.003     Document Type: Chapter

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