Game-theoretic consistency and international relations

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 416-433

  Myerson, Roger B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian model; Common knowledge; Inconsistent beliefs; Self confirming equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748422185     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629806067452     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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2. Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine (1993) 'Self-confirming Equilibrium', Econometrica 61: 523-545.
3. Giraud, Charles (ed.) (1881) 'Memoire de Monsieur de Choiseul au Roi en 1765', Journal de Savants 66: 171-184, 250-257.
4. Hardin, Russell (1989) 'Why a Constitution,' in B. Grofman and D. Wittman (eds) The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism, pp. 100-120. New York: Agathon Press.
5. Harsanyi, John C. (1967-8) 'Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players,' Management Science 14: 159-182, 320-334, 486-502.
6. Myerson, Roger B. (1984) 'Two-person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information', Econometrica 52: 461-487.
7. Myerson, Roger B. (1991) Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
8. Nash, John F. Jr. (1950) 'The Bargaining Problem', Econometrica 18: 155-162.
9. Pearce, David G. (1984) 'Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection', Econometrica 52: 1029-1050.
10. Schelling, Thomas C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.