An assessment of the alternative vote system in Fiji

Commonwealth and Comparative Politics

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 382-393

  Stockwell, Robert F ^a  

^a De Anza College   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM; ELECTION; ELECTORAL SYSTEM;

FIJI; MELANESIA; PACIFIC ISLANDS; PACIFIC OCEAN;

EID: 33748346264     PISSN: 14662043     EISSN: 17439094     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14662040500304965     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (52)

1. See J. Fraenkel, 'The Alternative Voting System in Fiji; Electoral Engineering or Ballot-Rigging?', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 39/2 (2001), 1-31
2. Sunil Kumar and Biman C. Prasad, 'Preferential Voting and Political Engineering: The Case of Fiji's 1999 and 2001 General Elections', Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 42/3 (2004), 312-32.
3. A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977)
4. A. Lijphart, 'The Power Sharing Approach', in J. Montville (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, MA: Lexington Press, 1991)
5. A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999)
6. A. Lijphart, 'The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy', in A. Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
7. D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)
8. D. Horowitz, 'Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management', in Montville (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking
9. D. Horowitz, 'Ethnic Conflict Management for Policymakers', in Montville (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking
10. D. Horowitz, 'Democracy in Divided Societies', Journal of Democracy, 4/4 (1993), 18-38
11. D. Horowitz, 'Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes', in Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy.
12. House seats were communal (returned by ethnic constituencies) and national (ethnically reserved seats returned by national constituencies). The 'cross-voting' scheme gave voters four votes - one communal and three (one for each ethnic group) national - based on the formula: Fijian (12 communal, 10 national); Indo-Fijian (12 communal, 10 national); General Elector (3 communal, 5 national).
13. For background on the 1987 coups, see E. Dean and S. Ritova, Rabuka: No Other Way, His Own Story of the Fijian Coup (Sydney: Doubleday, 1988)
14. B. MacDonald, 'The Literature of the Fiji Coups', Contemporary Pacific, 2 (1990), 197-207
15. R. Robertson and A. Tamanisau, Fiji: Shattered Coups (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988).
16. B. Lal, 'Constitutional Engineering in Post-Coup Fiji', in Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy, 269.
17. Lal, 'Constitutional Engineering', 270, 276.
18. This paper does not address the full range of CRC proposals and should not be interpreted as a comprehensive critique. For detailed accounts of the CRC's deliberations, see: P. Reeves, T. Vakatora and B. Lal, The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future (Constitutional Review Commission, Parliamentary Paper 34, Suva, 1996)
19. B. Lal, 'Towards a United Future: Report of the Fiji Constitution Review Commission', Journal of Pacific History, 32/1 (1997), 71-84
20. D. Scarr, 'Constitutional Change in Fiji, 1997', Journal of Pacific History, 32/3 (1997), 44-52.
21. P. Reeves, T. Vakatora and B. Lal, The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future, 278.
22. Reeves et al., The Fiji Islands, 308. Other recommendations included: preserving the Great Council of Chiefs' veto power over legislation affecting Fijian land or customary rights; changing Fiji's name to 'The Republic of the Fiji Islands' and making all citizens 'Fiji Islanders'; according Fijian, Hindi and English equal official status; adopting a Preamble outlining the history of Fiji's multi-ethnic society and its shared beliefs and values; drafting a Compact stating the values and principles that should be taken into account in forming governments; creating a Human Rights Commission charged with educating Fijians about their constitutional rights; and supporting traditional rights to land ownership, a separate Fijian administration, Fijian paramountcy, proportionality in civil service employment, and affirmative action for disadvantaged groups.
23. See Lal, 'Constitutional Engineering', 276-7, 282-7.
24. Lal, 'Constitutional Engineering', 281.
25. Lal, 'Constitutional Engineering', 281-2
26. Reeves et al., Fiji Islands, 307. According to Ben Reilly, the CRC felt '[u]nder [PR] ... ethnic parties could be expected to be represented in the legislature in proportion to their numbers in the community, irrespective of whether they were inclined towards moderation or not. Hence PR, when combined with communal seats, offered "few incentives to parties to become multi-ethnic in their composition and more willing to take account of the interests of all communities"'.
27. B. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 102.
28. A. Reynolds and B. Reilly, The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design (Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA, 1997), 37-8.
29. Lal, 'Constitutional Engineering', 282
30. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies, 101.
31. Lal, 'Constitutional Engineering', 289-90. As Reilly points out, '[t]aken together, these amendments greatly changed the centripetal nature of the CRC's report and undermined future prospects for cross-ethnic behaviour ... [Fiji's 1997 Constitution] included a combination of centripetal electoral institutions ... [AV with open seats] with consociational power sharing ... (the option for all significant parties to take part in a grand coalition executive) - an unusual combination of two previously divergent approaches to constitutional engineering, and not necessarily a coherent one'.
32. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies, 104-5.
33. Lal, 'Constitutional Engineering', 290.
34. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies, 107.
35. J. Fraenkel and B. Grofman, 'Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically-Divided Societies?', Comparative Political Studies (forthcoming, Vol. 39, 2006)
36. Lal, 'Constitutional Engineering', 291-2.
37. B. Lal, 'In George Speight's Shadow: Fiji General Elections of 2001', http://www.gu.edu.au/centre/gapc/act/BrigLalPaperfelections.html, 2004.
38. Fraenkel and Grofman, 'Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation?'.
39. J. Fraenkel. 'Preferential Voting and Electoral Reform', in Election Watch II, A Citizen's Review of the Fiji Islands General Election, 2001 (Suva: Citizen's Constitutional Forum, 2002)
40. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 162.
41. Fraenkel and Grofman, 'Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation'.
42. R. Taagepera, 'Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve', in Reynolds (ed.), Architecture of Democracy, 248.
43. Taagepera, 'Designing Electoral Rules', 259.
44. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies, 109-12.
45. First preference votes are counted and a 'quota' of votes is established for the election of candidates as follows: Quota = (votes/seats + 1) + 1. The first stage of the count determines the total number of first preference votes for each candidate. Candidates with more first preference votes than the quota are elected. If no candidate reaches the quota, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated, and their second preferences are redistributed to the candidates left in the race. Simultaneously, the surplus votes of elected candidates (i.e., those votes above the quota) are redistributed according to the second preferences on the ballot papers. All the candidate's ballot papers are redistributed, but at a fractional percentage of one vote, so that the total redistributed vote equals the candidate's surplus. If a candidate had 100 votes, and their surplus was 10 votes, then each ballot paper would be redistributed at the value of 1/10th of a vote. This process continues until all seats for the constituency are filled. See Reynolds and Reilly, The International IDEA Handbook, 83.
46. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies, 112.
47. Reynolds and Reilly, The International IDEA Handbook, 61.
48. Other advantages of PR include a reduction in 'seat bonuses' for large parties and wasted votes; increased parliamentary access to smaller parties; increased legitimacy of elections; increased probability that women will be elected; and restricted growth of 'regional fiefdoms'. Moreover, the case can be made that PR leads to more efficient and transparent government. Broad coalition governments engender stability and coherence in decision making, which promotes national development. PR makes power sharing between parties and interest groups visible, and by including all interests in parliament, ensures decisions will be made by a broad cross-section of society. Reynolds and Reilly, The International IDEA Handbook, 62-5.
49. For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.
50. S. Lawson, Tradition Versus Democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji, Tonga, and Western Samoa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
51. S. Lawson, The Failure of Democratic Politics in Fiji (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991)
52. R. Premdas, 'Balance and Ethnic Conflict in Fiji', in J. McGarry and B. Leary (eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts (London: Routledge, 1993).