Truels, or survival of the weakest

Computing in Science and Engineering

Volumn 8, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 88-95

  Amengual, Pau ^a   Toral, Raúl ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; COMPUTER SYSTEMS PROGRAMMING; OPTIMIZATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; RESPONSE TIME (COMPUTER SYSTEMS);

OPINION SPREADING; PEDAGOGICAL VIEWPOINT; PLAYERS' STRATEGIES; TRUELS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33748325898     PISSN: 15219615     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/MCSE.2006.99     Document Type: Review

References (22)

1. D.M. Kilgour and S.J. Brams, "TheTruel," Mathematics Magazine, vol. 70, no. 5, 1997, pp. 315-326.
2. M. Shubik, Game Theory in the Social Sciences, MIT Press, 1982.
3. M. Shubik, "Does the Fittest Necessarily Survive?" Heading in Game Theory and Political Behavior, M. Shubik, ed., Doubleday, 1954, pp. 43-46.
4. C. Kinnaird, Encyclopedia of Puzzles and Pastimes, Citadel, 1946.
5. D.M. Kilgour, "The Simultaneous Truel," Int'l J. Game Theory, vol. 1, no. 4, 1972, pp. 229-242.
6. R. Toral and P. Amengual, "Distribution of Winners in Truel Games," Modelling Cooperative Behavior in the Social Sciences, vol. 779 of AIP Conf. Proc., P.L. Garrido, J. Marro, and M.A. Munoz, eds., Am. Inst. of Physics, 2005, pp. 128-141.
7. S. Karlin, A First Course in Stochastic Processes, Academic Press, 1973.
8. G.P. Harmer and D. Abbott, "A Review of Parrondo's Paradox," Fluctuation and Noise Letters, vol. 2, no. 2, 2002, pp. R71-R107.
9. M.V. Smoluchowski, "Experimentell nachweishare, der ublichen thermodynamik widersprechende molekilarphanomene" [in German], Physikalische Zeitschrift, vol. 13, 1912, p. 1069.
10. R.P. Feynman, R.B. Leighton, and M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Addison-Wesley, 1963.
11. J.M.R. Parrondo and P. Espanol, "Criticism of Feynman's Analysis of the Ratchet as an Engine," Am. J. Physics, vol. 64, no. 9, 1996, pp. 1125-1130.
12. B. Sinervo and C.M.M. Lively, "The Rock-Scissors-Paper Game and the Evolution of Alternative Male Strategies," Nature, vol. 380, no. 6571, 1996, pp. 240-243.
13. M. Frean and E.R. Abraham, "Rock-Scissors-Paper and the Survival of the Weakest," Proc. Royal Soc, London B, vol. 268, no. 1474, 2001, pp. 1323-1327.
14. K. Tainaka, "Paradoxical Effect in a Three-Candidate Voter Model," Physics Letters A, vol. 176, no. 5, 1993, pp. 303-306.
15. D.M. Kilgour, "The Sequential Truel," Int'l J. Game Theory, vol. 4, no. 3, 1975, pp. 151-174.
16. D.M. Kilgour, "Equilibrium Points of Infinite Sequential Truels," Int'l I. Game Theory, vol. 6, no. 3, 1977, pp. 167-180.
17. W. Bossert, S.J. Brams, and D.M. Kilgour, "Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?" Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 185-202.
18. A.P. Flitney and D. Abbott, "Quantum Two- and Three-Person Duels," J. Optics B: Quantum and Semiclassical Optics, vol. 6, no. 8, 2004, pp. S860-S866.
19. M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, 1997.
20. D.J. Watts and S.H. Strogatz, "Collective Dynamics of Small-World Networks," Nature, vol. 393, no. 6684, 1998, pp. 440-442.
21. S.N. Dorogovtsev and J.F.F. Mendes, "Evolution of Networks," Advances in Physics, vol. 51, no. 4, 2002, pp. 1079-1187.
22. J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998.