Tense and the New B-Theory of language

Philosophy

Volumn 71, Issue 275, 1996, Pages 5-26

  Craig, William Lane ^a  

^a NONE

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Indexed keywords

EID: 33748192525     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819100053237     Document Type: Review

References (26)

1. L. Nathan Oaklander, 'A Defense of the New Tenseless Theory of Time,' Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1991), 26-27
2. D. H. Mellor, Real Time (Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 74
3. Quentin Smith, 'Problems with the New Tenseless Theory of Time,' Philosophical Studies 52 (1987): 371-392
4. cf. his Language and Time: a Defense of Presentism (Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 69-70
5. For a similar point concerning spatial indexicals, see David H. Sanford, critical notice of Real Time, by D. H. Mellor, Philosophical Review 93 (1984): 290-291
6. Oaklander, 'Defense,' 28-31. The Smith-Oaklander Auseinander-setzung has been reprinted in The New Theory of Time, ed. with Introductions by L. Nathan Oaklander and Quentin Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994)
7. Mellor, Real Time, 75-77
8. Smith, 'Problems with the New Tenseless Theory,' 374-384
9. L. Nathan Oaklander, 'The New Tenseless Theory of Time: a Reply to Smith,' Philosophical Studies 58 (1990), 288
10. Oaklander, 'Defense,' 32. On the futility of this escape route, see my 'The New B-Theory's Tu Quoque Argument,' Synthese (forthcoming)
11. Smith, Language and Time, 99. I have altered some of Smith's stylistic conventions expressing tenseless and tensed verbs
12. Graham Priest, 'Tense and Truth Conditions,' Analysis 46 (1986): 162-166
13. D. H. Mellor, 'Tense's Tenseless Truth Conditions,' Analysis 46 (1986): 167-172
14. Graham Priest, 'Tense, Tense, and TENSE,' Analysis 47 (1987): 184-187
15. See Paul Helm, 'Timelessness and Foreknowledge,' Mind 84 (1975): 524-527
16. Smith, Language and Time, 103-105
17. Jeremy Butterfield, 'Indexicals and Tense,' in Exercises in Analysis, ed. Ian Hacking (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 70-74
18. Cf. D. H. Mellor, 'McTaggart, Fixity and Coming True,' in Reduction, Time, and Reality, ed. R. Healey (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1981), 87
19. idem, 'Tense's Tenseless Truth Conditions,' 171; idem, 'I and Now,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1988-89): 81
20. Oaklander, 'Defense,' 27; idem, 'New Tenseless Theory,' 290. Even Priest, zealous to disprove tenseless facts, succumbs to this confusion (Priest, 'Tense and Truth Conditions,' p. 162). That Priest can give tensed truth conditions even to tenseless sentences and thereby eliminate tenseless facts constitutes in my mind a reductio of the conflation of truth conditions and grounds of truth
21. Alvin Plantinga, 'Reply to Robert Adams,' in Alvin Plantinga, ed. James Tomberlin, Profiles 5 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), 378
22. See Nathan Salmon, 'Reference and Information Content: Names and Descriptions,' in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. 4
23. Topics in the Philosophy of Language, ed. D. Gabbay and F. Guenther, Synthese Library 167 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1989), 411-412
24. but especially idem, 'Tense and Singular Propositions,' in Themes from Kaplan, ed. Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 362-366
25. Roger Wertheimer, 'Conditions,' Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 355-364
26. Jaegwon Kim, 'Noncausal Connections,' Nous 8 (1974), 41-52