Relations between the communist and social democratic parties in Hungary in 1945

East European Quarterly

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 95-130

  Felak, James ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

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EID: 33748166572     PISSN: 00128449     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (140)

1. Charles Gati, "From Liberation to Revolution, 1945-1956," in Peter F. Sugar, ed., A History of Hungary (Bloomington, IN, 1990), p. 370.
2. In April 1945, the SDP estimated its membership in Budapest at 50,000, the Communists at the same time estimated their membership at around 20,000; see Sándor Balogh, Parlamenti és pártharcok Magyarországon, 1945-1947 (Budapest, 1975), p. 21.
3. Erzsébet Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt együttmuködése a felszabadulás után," Párttörténeti közlemények, XVIX, 2 (June, 1973), p. 57; United States National Archives, Department of State, RG84, Post Files, Hungary, Budapest Legation (hereafter referred to as DOS, Post Files), General Records, 1945, Box 61, situation report on Budapest from April 1 to May 15, 1945.
4. Szakasits told the U.S. representative in Budapest that the SDP had lost 60% of its leadership by death or deportation during 1944; United States National Archives, Department of State, Decimal Files, 864.00, Hungary (hereafter referred to as DOS), 3-1645.
5. George Schöpflin, "Hungary," in Martin McCauley, Communist Power in Europe, 1944-1949 (New York, 1977), p. 106.
6. Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain (New York, 1948), pp. 84-85.
7. DOS, 3-1645.
8. DOS, 4-2045; see also DOS, 4-1945.
9. Schöpflin, "Hungary," p. 106.
10. Antal Bán, "Hungary," in Denis Healey, ed., The Curtain Falls: The Story of Socialism in Eastern Europe (London, 1951); other Social Democrats were also alleged to be potential targets of Soviet blackmail. According to a research and analysis report produced by the Americans in 1946, the Russians possessed evidence that Antal Bán had worked for the Nazis in German-occupied Yugoslavia, and that István Ries had engaged in some shady financial deals; see DOS, Research and Analysis Report No. 4528.
11. For the text of the unity document of October 10, 1944, see A Magyar Kommunista Párt és a Szocialdemokrata Párt határozatai 1944-1948 (Budapest, 1967) (hereafter referred to as Határozatai), pp. 30-33.
12. For a discussion of the various political parties in post-War Hungary, see István Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, 1944-1948 (Budapest, 1986), pp. 85-105,
13. and Balogh, Parlamenti, pp. 16-36.
14. Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (London, 1950), p. 191;
15. Nagy, Struggle, p. 77.
16. Határozatai, p. 53.
17. Határozatai, Ibid., p. 54.
18. DOS, 4-1345; DOS, 3-1645.
19. Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," p. 56;
20. (Rákosi quoted from Tisztantul népszava).
21. Bennett Kovrig, Communism in Hungary from Kun to Kádár (Stanford, CA, 1979), p. 66.
22. Paul Ignotus, "The First Two Communist Takeovers of Hungary: 1919 and 1948," in Thomas T. Hammond, ed.. The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven, CT, 1975), p. 392; Kun's reputation was not helped by the fact that he was a victim of Stalin's purges in the 1930s.
23. Great Britain Foreign Office, Weekly Political Intelligence Reports, Vol. XII, July 1945-December 1945 (Millwood, NY, 1983)
24. (hereafter referred to as GBFO)Weekly Political Intelligence Reports, Vol. , No. 274, January 3, 1945;
25. and GBFO, Weekly Political Intelligence Reports, Vol. No. 290, April 25, 1945.
26. Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," pp. 65-66.
27. See Határozatai, pp. 77-79, for the text of this letter.
28. Határozatai, Ibid., p.78.
29. Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," p. 65; an American situation report on Hungary at this time states that "Although May Day in the city was quiet, the populace was ordered to join in the parades and the 'trustees' of each apartment house, usually a Communist or a Social Democrat, were instructed to take note of those who did not participate," DOS, Post Files, RG84, Box 61, report on situation in Budapest from April lto May 15, 1945.
30. Schöpflin, "Hungary," pp. 104-105.
31. "Hungary," pp. Ibid., p. 104.
32. GBFO, No. 290, April 25, 1945; DOS, 3-1645.
33. DOS, Research and Analysis Report No. 3191, October 20, 1945.
34. Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, p. 96.
35. Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, p. 161; of the 230 delegates to the provisional parliament, the MKP had 71 and the SDP 38, to give the Marxist parties 109 seats; the non-Marxist parties had 83 seats between them. In his memoirs, Smallholder leader Ferenc Nagy recalls that the SHP was promised that their Peasant Alliance would also be accorded equal status with the political parties. The promise was not kept;
36. see Nagy, Struggle, pp. 98-99.
37. Seton-Watson, East European Revolution, p. 192.
38. Balogh, Parlamenti, pp. 42-43.
39. DOS, Research and Analysis Report No. 3191; Balogh, Parlamenti, p. 43.
40. Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, p. 96;
41. see also Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," p. 59.
42. Schöpflin, "Hungary," p. 104.
43. Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity (New York, 1989), p. 98.
44. Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, p. 161.
45. Seton-Watson, East European Revolution, p. 192.
46. Schöpflin, "Hungary," p. 104.
47. DOS, 3-1645.
48. Ignotus, Anatomy, pp. 394-395.
49. Schöpflin, p. 104.
50. DOS, 4-1945.
51. DOS, 7-2645.
52. DOS, 6-245.
53. DOS, Post Files, RG84, Box 61, File 1945, "Review of events in Hungary during First Phase of Armistice, February-June, 1945"; DOS, 3-1645.
54. Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," p. 62; see DOS, 7-2645 for Szakasits' reference to "overzealous Communist activity," especially in the provinces, which sometimes caused friction between members of the two parties.
55. "A két munkáspárt," p. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
56. DOS, 5-2845; see DOS 10-545 for a copy of the form that ex-Arrow Cross members filled out when joining the MKP; see also Nagy, Struggle, p. 87.
57. Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, p. 27.
58. The most important works on BeIa Kun and his regime include Ivan Völgyes, Hungary in Revolution, 1918-1919 (Lincoln, NE, 1971);
59. Rudolf L. Tökés, Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic (New York, 1967);
60. and György Borsányi, Kun Béla, Politikai életrajz (Budapest, 1979).
61. Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," p. 57.
62. It should be noted that the Hungarian Soviet Republic, despite its internationalist ideological basis, was able to win the support of many patriotic Hungarians who, in their desperation, regarded Communism as a means by which Hungary's historic borders could be protected. Such support was conditional upon Kun's successful defense of Hungary. When his regime ceased to fulfill that function, this support evaporated.
63. Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, p. 65;
64. Tökés, Béla Kun, p. 219.
65. Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, p. 31.
66. Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle, 1974), p. 160.
67. Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, pp. 90, 93.
68. GBFO, No. 286, March 28, 1945; DOS, 5-2945; GBFO, No. 197, June 13, 1945.
69. Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," p. 67,
70. citing the MKP's report on the party conference, entitled "Harc az újjáépítésért!" Mihály Farkas, the Communist leader responsible for the police who was the real power behind the Interior Ministry of Erdei, reached out to the Social Democrats by claiming that the MKP did not wish to monopolize the police, but rather build it together with the other parties, especially the SDP.
71. "Harc az újjáépítésért!" Ibid., p. 61.
72. "Harc az újjáépítésért!" Ibid., pp. 61-62.
73. Schöpflin, "Hungary," p. 105.
74. Bán, The Curtain Falls, p. 72; Rónai, as a Social Democrat, became a cabinet minister in July 1945, in a move that gave the Left a majority of seats in the government.
75. Though Bán is sometimes regarded as a centrist, in the early months of 1945 he consistently defended the SDP's cooperation with the MKP and attacked the Social Democratic right-wing for its anti-Communism; by 1947, events would have turned him into the chief representative of what remained of his party's right-wing; see Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok,
76. and Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," p. 58.
77. DOS, 4-1945; DOS, 6-245; Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, p. 94.
78. Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," p. 69.
79. "A két munkáspárt," p. Ibid., p. 68.
80. Határozatai, p. 94.
81. The Social Democrat Vilmos Böhm alleges in his memoirs that the Communists used incriminating evidence they possessed about the financial speculations of Tildy's son-in-law to extort compliance from Tildy; see Schöpflin, "Hungary," p. 105.
82. See, for example, Szakasits' speech of February 28, 1945 in Debrecen; DOS, 3-1345.
83. Chief party ideologist Józef Révai credited the MKP's "decisive control of the police forces," along with the presence of the Red Army, with being the main reasons why the Communists were able to seize power in Hungary; see DOS, Office of Intelligence Research Report No. IR-5882, April 22, 1952.
84. Balogh, Parlamenti, p. 38.
85. GBFO. No. 298, June 20, 1945.
86. DOS, 7-1045.
87. Rákosi himself used the analogy of a salami in a famous speech he gave at the MKP high school in Budapest in 1952; see Schöpflin, "Hungary," p. 98
88. and Ignotus, Anatomy, p. 394.
89. Nagy, Struggle, p. 287.
90. Nagy, Struggle, pp. 116-117;
91. Seton-Watson, East European Revolution, pp. 192-193.
92. Balogh, Parlamenti, p. 39.
93. DOS, 7-1045; DOS, 7-345; DOS, 7-645.
94. DOS, 7-1045.
95. DOS, 7-1045.
96. Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, p. 120.
97. DOS, 7-1245.
98. DOS, 7-1045; Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, p. 120.
99. GBFO, No. 307, August 22, 1945.
100. GBFO, No. 304, August 1, 1945.
101. Seton-Watson, East European Revolution, p. 196.
102. Interestingly, it appears that the Communists themselves tried to play on Hungarian fears of the Red Army. During the election campaign of September 1945, it was reported that the campaign slogans of Communists in the rural districts asserted that an electoral defeat for the Communists would mean a prolonged Soviet occupation. Peasants were urged to vote for the Communists so that the Red Army, seeing that Hungary was in reliable hands, would withdraw; see DOS, 9-2645.
103. DOS, 9-1445, No. 581.
104. DOS, 8-2145, No. 454.
105. DOS, 7-3145, No. MS-1586.
106. Stephen D. Kertész, Diplomacy in a Whirlpool (Notre Dame, IN, 1953).
107. See GBFO, No. 314, October 10, 1945; American intelligence officer James M. McCarger, writing under the pen name Christopher Felix, recounts a conversation he had with two SDP members in the spring of 1947, in which the latter expressed their disappointment in British policy toward Hungary in the post-war period; see Christopher Felix, A Short Course in the Secret War, p. 196.
108. DOS, 8-1545, No. A-459.
109. Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," p. 73; DOS, 7-2645.
110. Nagy, Struggle, pp. 138-139;
111. Balogh, Parlamenti, p. 39.
112. DOS, 8-2245, No. 465.
113. DOS, 8-2145, No. 455.
114. Balogh, Parlamenti, p. 23.
115. See DOS, Post Files, RG84, Box 101, USMR-ACC H#96 for speculation that it was Russian pressure that ultimately convinced the majority of the SDP leadership to accept the common list.
116. DOS, Post Files, RG84, Box 101, No. 124.
117. Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," pp. 75-76.
118. DOS, 8-2745.
119. DOS, 9-1345.
120. DOS, 9-2645; DOS, 10-845; Nagy, Struggle, p. 147.
121. DOS, 9-1845.
122. GBFO, No. 312, September 26, 1945.
123. DOS, 9-2945; DOS, 10-245.
124. Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, p. 134.
125. DOS, 10-1545.
126. Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," p. 77.
127. DOS. 10-2945.
128. GBFO, No. 309, September 5, 1945; Strassenreiter, "A két munkáspárt," p. 77.
129. DOS, 10-2945.
130. DOS, 10-1545.
131. DOS, 10-1745; GBFO, No. 316, October 24, 1945.
132. Ibid.
133. DOS, 10-1745, No. JJ-1601-W.
134. Kertész, Diplomacy, pp. 112-113.
135. Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, p. 140.
136. Ignotus. Anatomy, p. 394.
137. GBFO, No. 320, November 21, 1945.
138. Bán later became, in the words of an American intelligence report, "the principal skeptic as to [the] advisability of close cooperation with the Communists." The same document goes on to assert that various sources have reported that the Soviets have a file on Bán's wartime activities that indicates he was working for the Nazis in Germanoccupied Yugoslavia; see DOS, Research and Analysis Report No. 4528, October 6, 1947.
139. Nagy, Struggle, pp. 160-164.
140. A similar situation availed on a different level in the MKP's relationship toward the multi-party coalition as a whole and its numerically strongest component, the SHP. The official Communist line was to support the multi-party coalition government, while in practice the SHP became the target of harsh Communist attacks. Such a two-track policy was a fundamental part of salami tactics, which tried to exploit existing cleavages in non-Communist parties and organizations. A policy that could potentially woo a party's left-wing while attacking its right-wing served Communist objectives well. It should be noted that Communist attacks on the SHP were much more open and aggressive than Communist attacks on the SDP's right-wing. This is because the MKP, correctly, believed that the Social Democratic left-wing itself would deal with its own right-wing harshly enough; see Balogh, Parlamenti, p. 43.