Elections and representation;Eleições e representação

Lua Nova

Volumn , Issue 67, 2006, Pages 105-138

  Manin, Bernard ^a   Przeworski, Adam ^a   Stokes, Susan C ^b  

^a Universidad de Nueva York   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Accountability; Democratic theory; Responsiveness

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748113824     PISSN: 01026445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1590/S0102-64452006000200005     Document Type: Article

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