On enhanced cooperation

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 90, Issue 10-11, 2006, Pages 2063-2090

  Bordignon, Massimo ^a,b   Brusco, Sandro ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE   (Italy)

^b Cesifo ^*  (Germany)

^c STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION   (Spain)

Author keywords

Fiscal federalism; Harmonization; International unions; Treaty of Nice

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748092360     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.02.001     Document Type: Article

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