Hoxha's class war: The cultural revolution and state reformation, 1961-1971

East European Quarterly

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 303-326

  Blumi, Isa ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 33748054807     PISSN: 00128449     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (72)

1. Quoted from the official newspaper of Enver Hoxha's party, Zëri i Popullit (Tirana), Nov. 2, 1966. Note: all translations are the mine unless noted.
2. The official Albanian representation of this period is reproduced in Historia e Partisë së Punës të Shqiperisë [History of the Workers' Party of Albania] (Tirana: Naïm Frashëri, 1978),
3. henceforth History, pp. 192-509.
4. For more details on the theoretical explanation of the period see Ndreçi Plasari, "Some Features of the Revolution in Albania," in Konferenca Kombëtare e Studimeve Shoqërore [National Conference on Social Studies], Vol. II (Tirana: Naïm Frashëri, 1970), pp. 3-29.
5. I have addressed this issue in detail in Isa Blumi, "The Politics of Culture and Power: The Roots of Hoxha's Postwar State," East European Quarterly, XXXI, No. 3, pp. 409-428. See especially pp. 409-410.
6. Stalin had masterfully used Hoxha as a counter-weight to Tito's growing influence in the Balkans during the 1945-1948 period. See Enver Hoxha, With Stalin: Memoirs (Tirana: 8 Nëntori Pub. House, 1980), pp. 87-126.
7. In a dramatic shift, all loyal purveyors of the Soviet line in Albania, the hundreds of Moscow-trained specialists and party ideologues, became potential agents for the increasingly hostile Moscow regime. Any analysis of the policies in the 1960s must, therefore, take into account Enver Hoxha's concerns about this generation of cadres he himself cultivated during the previous two decades. See Sotir Madhi, "The Struggle of the APL Against Rightist Opportunism," Studime Historike (Tirana), No. 3 (1967), pp. 49-53.
8. Örjan Sjöberg, Rural Change and Development in Albania (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) pp. 81-107;
9. and Besim Bardhoshi and Theodhor Kareco, Zhvillimi Ekonomi ko-shoqëror në Shqipëri, 1944-74 [Economic and social development in Albania, 1944-74] (Tiranë: M. Duri Press, 1974).
10. As noted during the second World War, Enver Hoxha had little sense of ideological loyalty to world Communism or his Western allies. See Great Britain, Public Record Office Foreign Office 371/43553 Major MacLean's report, page 3 and Philip Broad's report in PRO FO 371/43564 f. 55.
11. Despite the fact that the invasion of Hungary in 1956 could have been (and probably was) construed as a sign of the times for problematic clients such Hoxha and his so-called "Stalinist" society, the official Soviet line, that is the Khrushchev line, was wholeheartedly supported by way of public celebration of the attack on Hungarian revisionism and a continued glorification of the Soviet leadership. Such outward support, however, should not determine our understanding of the domestic ramifications of the transitions taking place in the Soviet Union. Compare the enthusiastic support Hoxha gave to the 1956 invasion with the incriminations after the repression of the Prague Spring in 1968. See Zëri i Popullit, August 27, 1968
12. and Information Bulletin of APL-CC (Tirana, 1968), No. 3.
13. During this period repeated suggestions within the Cominform context for the Balkans to become flower gardens of richer Northern socialist countries constantly reminded Hoxha's regime that its individual role in the larger context of Soviet internationalism was inconsequential to seemingly larger agendas. It is helpful to keep this dynamic in mind as one begins to seek to explain the eventual rift between Hoxha and Khrushchev. See Enver Hoxha, Les Khrouchtcheviens [Souvenirs] (Tirana: 8 Nëntori Pub. House, 1980)
14. and Michael Kaser, COMECON: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 64-66.
15. British intelligence, by way of the French Embassy in Tirana, advised the foreign ministry of an imminent coup in Albania in 1960. At the time, the notion that Enver Hoxha would publicly seek assistance from the Chinese and Chairman Mao was an improbable proposition to all observers of Balkan politics. Many within the Western intelligence community subsequently theorized that the anti-Soviet rhetoric coming from Hysni Kapo, number three in Tirana, was a direct challenge to Hoxha who was still, it was assumed, a loyal Soviet ally. PRO FO 371/152804 and PRO FO 371/160177. Both the Daily Telegraph (Dec. 22, 1960)
16. and the Guardian (Jan. 7, 1961) predicted Enver Hoxha would fall from power on account of these apparent challenges to his power coming from pro-Chinese elements. What 1 call the Chinese conversion reveals the fact that Hoxha was actually willing to compromise his ideological position to accommodate a new, far removed ally; this gives the student of Albanian politics an indication just how dangerous the period was for the regime and an opportunity to reinterpret the cultural revolution.
17. See Elez Biberaj, Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance (Boulder: Westview Special Series in International Relations, 1986), pp. 26-29;
18. Enver Hoxha, Vepra [Works] (Tirana: Naïm Frashëri, 1979), Vol. 19, p. 15.
19. The official relationship started as early as October 1956 when Hoxha first visited Beijing. William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1963), p. 28.
20. Kongresi IV i Partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë [The Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor] (Tirana, 1961), p. 148. Emphasis mine. For complete extracts see pp. 13-167. The signs of collaboration between China and Albania during this period are intriguing and should be investigated at some time in the future. As will be evidenced throughout this paper, campaigns both in China and Albania share a general thrust, spirit and stated goals that cannot be discounted as historical coincidence. The Chinese Communist Party for instance, commenced their campaign for a "socialist education" in September 1962, compared to the APL Congress held on February 13-20, 1961.
21. The fact that there was such a campaign did not mean, however, that there existed any uniformity in the actual understanding of what was "pure" doctrine or not.
22. As will be evidenced later, the use of labor in lieu, many times, of education, became the principle means of assuring "doctrinal purity." Of course the extensive labor camps already being used by prominent Ghegs suggest Hoxha's gulag had a capacity to grow in value. For a detailed account of the educational reform program see Hamid Beqja, Riorganizimi i Shkollës në RPSh. [The Reorganization of Schools in the PRA] (Tirana: Naïm Frashëri, 1964).
23. Added to the public condemnation of Liri Belishova, the prominent pro-Soviet cultural minister, which caused a great deal of speculation among citizens and the small diplomatic community in Albania, the visible departure of Soviet specialists, including the architects of the most prominent modern building in Tirana, the Hall of the People, gave Tirana the air of impending doom. A novel by Ismaïl Kadare verifies such an atmosphere enveloped Albanian society in such times of transition. See The Concert (New York: William Morrow and Company Inc. 1994). Interview, January 1995, Tirana. Please note, interviews cited were conducted in a considerably different political environment in Albania. It is my intention to maintain the anonymity of my friends and colleagues both because it was requested from most and it is the only responsible thing I can do at this uncertain period in Albania.
24. See W.E. Griffith, Albania, pp. 168-176.
25. See Drita (Tirana), May 7, 1963
26. and Zëri i Popullit, May 9, 1963.
27. There is evidence that the state saw its influence in rural areas diminish, particularly in the South, and new measures were needed to ensure absolute stability. Zëri i Popullit, June 9, 1963.
28. See Arshi Pipa, "Albanian Literature: Social Perspectives," Albanische Forschungen, Vol. 19 (Munich: Trofenik, 1978)
29. and Peter Prifti, "The Albanian Party of Labor and the Intelligentsia," East European Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (1974), pp. 307-335. It is by no coincidence that Ismaïl Kadare, Albania's most heralded writer and self-proclaimed father of Albanian democracy, like Hoxha a native of Gjiorkastra, became the state's number one intellectual at this time.
30. Again, in a spat of collaboration, or plagiarism (it is not clear how intensively the Chinese and Albanians actually collaborated on ideas), Hoxha's closing remarks at the Plenum outlining Party goals, paralleled the remarks on the issues facing world Communism made in an editorial of a Peking newspaper on July 14, 1964, five days before Hoxha made his. In Albania, Hoxha's remarks were published in Zëri i Popullit, July 19, 1964 and the Chinese editorial that inspired Hoxha appeared on July 24, 1964 in the same publication.
31. Hoxha's remarks are found in Raporte e Fjalime, 1965-1966 [Reports and Speeches, 1965-66] (Tirana, 1971), pp. 134-65.
32. Ramiz Alia's comments are recorded in Zëri i Popullit, October 28, 1965.
33. Information Bulletin of the Central Committee of the PLA, No. 4 (1968), p. 19, emphasis mine.
34. Like Dhimitër Shuteriqi's slavish support of Hoxha's "Toskification," the Gheg parvenu is the ideal candidate for loyalty. See Arshi Pipa, The Politics of Language in Socialist Albania (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1989), pp. 129-131. Nevertheless, Alia's opportunism did not stop him from attempting, in the most discreet of ways, to limit the complete destruction of Gheg culture. Arshi Pipa was one of many Gheg intellectuals aided by Alia and allowed to flee Albania in the 1950s and 1960s.
35. It is probably during this period that Hoxha began to consolidate the regime around his family and allies: "Half or more, of the 53 members of the CC APL are related. First, we have four couples: Enver Hoxha and his wife Nexhmije Hoxha; Mehmet Shehu and his wife Fiqrete Shehu; Hysni Kapo and his wife Vito Kapo; and Josif Pashko with his wife Eleni Terezi. The wives of Manush Myftiu, Politburo member, and of Pilo Peristeri, candidate-member of the Politburo, are sisters. Kadri Habiu, candidate-member of the Politburo and Minister of Internal Affairs is the husband of Mehmet Shehu's sister. The brother of Kapo's wife is Piro Kondi, also a member." W.E. Griffith, Albania, pp. 319-320.
36. The subtlety is fascinating. Of course the party line was followed but it was not at all clear what was the party line. "First the Soviet Union is the guide to prosperity then it is a 'chamber of witches,' then workers and artists alike are questioned for their diligence. What exactly did the plant director think entailed the party line was purposely made unclear." Interview, Tetovë, Macedonia, July 1995.
37. See PPSh Dokumenta kryesore [Major Documents of the PLA] (Tirana: Librit Politik), Vol. 4, pp. 539-57 for the full text.
38. Adi Schnytzer, Stalinist Economic Strategy in Practice: The Case of Albania (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1982), p. 30.
39. Zëri i Popullit, Dec. 26, 1965.
40. For a detailed documentary account of the December 1965 APL directives, see Dokumenta Kryesore të Partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë [Principal Documents of the Albanian Party of Labor], Vol. 4, pp. 602-14.
41. History, pp. 568-9.
42. History, p. 569, emphasis mine.
43. Arshi Pipa, Albanian Stalinism: Ideo-political Aspects (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 35-48.
44. A similar situation with "Status Groups" occurred in China. See Lynn T. White, Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 10-15.
45. See H. Toska, in Information Bulletin of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, No. 1 (1967), p. 188.
46. Kaser was the principle resource for the US State Department and Congress on the Albanian political climate throughout the 70s and 80s. As a result, the US had a poor understanding of political conditions in Albania and were unlikely to take advantage of the many opportunities that materialized later. See Michael Kaser, "Trade and Aid in the Albanian Economy," in Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, East European Economies Post-Helsinki (Washington, D.C., 1977).
47. Nicholas Pano, The People's Republic of Albania (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 175.
48. Rruga e Partisë, No. 3, 1966, p. 2;
49. In History there are extracts, pp. 564-8.
50. Zëri i Popullit, March 6, 1966.
51. Also in History , pp. 564-65.
52. Zëri i Popullit, Nov. 2, 1966. The Congress was held November 1-8, 1966.
53. Rruga e Partisë, No. 12, 1969 pp. 3-37
54. and Zëri i Popullit January 4, 1970.
55. Përmbledhëse e përgjtithshme e legjislacionit në fuqi te RPSh (1945-1971) [General Collection of Legislation in Force in PRA] (Tirana, 1971), p. 89.
56. Enver Hoxha, Speeches, 1967-1968 (Tirana: Naïm Frashëri, 1981), p. 31.
57. Hoxha, Speeches, 1967-1968, pp. 50-51.
58. Hoxha Speeches, 1967-1968, pp. 33-34.
59. Zëri i Popullit, March 18, 1966.
60. The United Trade Unions of Albania (April 24-26), the Union of Albanian Labor Youth (June 26-29), the Democratic Front (September 14-16), and the Union of Albanian Women (October 25-28).
61. Interview, Tirana January, 1995.
62. Hoxha, Speeches, 1967-1968, pp. 3-59.
63. Hoxha, Speeches, 1967-1968, pp. 225-250.
64. A variety of public holidays were introduced to replace religious holidays, churches and mosques were transformed into gymnasiums and Party centers and most of the remaining clergy were removed from their church or mosque and sent to labor camps for "re-education." In 1967 Hoxha officially declared Albania an Atheistic State. See Petro Lalaj et al., eds., Materiale mbi Lëvzjen Revolucionare Kundër Fesë [Material On the Revolutionary Movement Against Religion] (Tirana: Librit Politik, 1973), pp. 29-36
65. and Hulushi Hako, Akuzojmë Fenë [We Accuse Religion] (Tirana: Naïm Frashëri, 1968), pp. 113-21.
66. History, p. 616.
67. "They had endless rows of men, all of us sweating and dirty under the sun, digging endlessly deeper into the side of the mountain. We were supposed to be building terraces in order to plant orange trees, but it was obvious to many of us that when it was our time to return back to our old jobs, we would not be leaving." Interview, Elbasan, Albania. January 1995.
68. Within a record period of time the reorganization of the state and Party apparatus in the center and in the districts on a sounder revolutionary basis was affected. "The administrations of state enterprises and agricultural cooperatives were also reorganized and simplified. The number of ministries were reduced, unnecessary offices and branches were amalgamated." History, p. 568
69. and "democratization of the party took place with an expansion of its base." Kongresi VI i Partisë së Punes të Shqipërisë [The Sixth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor] (Tirana, 1972), pp. 476-480.
70. The slogan of the V Party Congress encouraged activists to "Take to the hills and mountains: make them as beautiful and as fertile as the plains." (History, p. 584)
71. See also Michael Kaser, in Wiles, ed., Prediction of Communist Economic Performance (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
72. This indicates how thorough the cultural revolution was: it not only weeded out dangerous bureaucrats but it repopulated Northern areas with a new type of Albanian. All this has been inexcusably supported in the modernization literature by in large due to the "considerable infrastructural investment and social consumption: every village now has a health center, electricity and the telephone, almost every village is accessible by motorable road." Hans-Herman Höhmann, Michael Kaser, Karl C. Thalheim, eds., The New Economic Systems of Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 262. Such commentary again seems to be driven by a more static notion of what was development and progress. Those same health centers, telephones and electric grids were instruments of a police state, monopolized by the forces of privilege to monitor and silence. Motorable roads serve no purpose for a population denied the right to sell produce or trade nor travel freely but were essential to the efforts to enhance the state's repressive capacity during this period.