Sweeping victory, uncertain mandate

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 116-130

  Shikaki, Khalil ^a  

^a Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research   (Palestine)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747072827     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. These figures are based on the proportional-representation vote. Averages of votes across all districts were as follows: Hamas 41 percent, official Fatah candidates 34 percent, Fatah-aligned independents 5 percent, and others 20 percent.
2. See Ziad Abu-Amr, "Pluralism and the Palestinians," Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 83-93.
3. Khalil Shikaki, "Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process," U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report 158, Washington D.C., January 2006, p. 7, Figure 2. The report is available at www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr158.html.
4. For December 2004 figures, see www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2004/p14c.html.
5. For December 2005 figures, see www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p18c.html.
6. One month and again one week before the elections, the PSR's surveys showed Fatah holding a narrowing edge over Hamas, with many voters still undecided. The PSR's January 2006 preelection surveys were close to the actual results except in the case of Hamas, which won 44.4 percent of the popular vote rather than the 35 percent that the PSR had predicted. This disparity may have been caused by Hamas's harsh attacks on pollsters' integrity, which may have led Hamas voters to deceive pollsters whom they did not trust by falsely claiming to be undecided, Another possibility is that the shrinking gap between Fatah and Hamas simply continued to narrow right up to election day. See www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/preelectionsdec05.html and www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006preelectionsjan06.html.
7. For an excellent analysis of the Cairo Declaration, see Graham Usher, "The Calm Before the Storm?" Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), 24-30 March 2005.
8. The PSR conducts each of its polls among a representative sample of the whole population aged 18 years and over. According to estimates by the Palestinian Central Election Commission, registered voters (1,350,655) represent less than 80 percent of the total eligible voters. Therefore, the 77 percent turnout represents less than 62 percent of the population, registered and nonregistered alike.
9. PSR's exit poll surveyed a representative sample of 1,694 voters. The poll data was weighted to reflect the actual outcome of the elections. All findings used in this piece are weighted.
10. In PSR's exit poll, 47 percent of the voters identified themselves as "religious," 48 percent as "somewhat religious," and 5 percent as "not religious."
11. See PSR's postelection survey at www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p19e.pdf.
12. Khalil Shikaki, "Willing to Compromise."
13. See www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/exitplcfulljan06e.pdf.
14. Khalil Shikaki, "Willing to Compromise."
15. In meetings with the author in February and March 2006, several Hamas legislators, including Speaker Aziz Duwaik, reiterated statements made by other leaders of Hamas to the effect that its policy will be "pragmatic." Duwaik insisted that he and his colleagues will neither propose nor consider legislation that would fundamentally alter the current character of the PA. While asserting that legislating such a change was within the mandate of his faction, he made it clear that Hamas leaders were acutely aware of the particular circumstances of the PA as well as the constraints, flowing from the peace process, that preclude turning the PA into an Islamic entity or state.
16. Fatah alone controls 34 percent of parliament - just enough to deny Hamas a two-third majority. Moreover, the number of Hamas legislators who are currently in Israeli jails - and therefore unable to vote - is larger than the number of jailed Fatah legislators.
17. In March 2006, less than two months after the elections, Speaker Duwaik tried to dismiss a Fatah loyalist from his post as secretary-general of parliament, but was stymied when Fatah militiamen surrounded the parliament building and forced a retraction of the firing.
18. The best example is the city of Qalqilia. In the May 2003 round of the local elections, Hamas beat Fatah there by 51 to 30 percent. Eight months later in the January 2006 parliamentary race, Fatah turned the tables by beating Hamas 49 to 36 percent as Hamas saw its vote share dip by IS percentage points.
19. The World Bank estimates that without donor support and Israeli transfers, unemployment could jump in one year from 23 percent to 40 percent, reaching 47 percent by 2008. Likewise, the Bank estimates that poverty levels could soar from the current 44 percent to 67 percent by the end of 2006 and 74 percent by 2008. See "West Bank and Gaza: Economic Update and Potential Outlook," World Bank, Washington, D.C., IS March 2006.
20. See www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p19e.pdf.
21. See www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p19e.pdf.