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1
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0003935249
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Stuart Gilbert (trans.) (New York: Random House)
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Albert Camus, The Stranger, Stuart Gilbert (trans.) (New York: Random House, 1942), pp. 129-130.
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(1942)
The Stranger
, pp. 129-130
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Camus, A.1
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2
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84921904940
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Galen Strawson, Freedom and Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
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(1986)
Freedom and Belief
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Strawson, G.1
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3
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33747044461
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The bounds of freedom
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Robert Kane (ed.), (New York: Oxford University Press)
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There is a recent articulation of the argument in Galen Strawson, "The Bounds of Freedom," in Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 441-460.
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(2002)
The Oxford Handbook on Free Will
, pp. 441-460
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Strawson, G.1
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5
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0004260399
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 33-34.
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(1986)
Harm to Self
, pp. 33-34
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Feinberg, J.1
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9
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0016920682
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Autonomy and behavior control
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Gerald Dworkin, "Autonomy and Behavior Control," Hastings Center Report 16 (1976), p. 25.
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(1976)
Hastings Center Report
, vol.16
, pp. 25
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Dworkin, G.1
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10
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0004260399
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Feinberg refers to the Dworkin piece in Feinberg, Harm to Self, p. 35.
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Harm to Self
, pp. 35
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Feinberg1
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13
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33747052085
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note
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Note that terminology such as "ultimately, truly, and without qualification responsible" can have a rhetorical effect that influences one to insist on more rigorous requirements for moral responsibility than are perhaps warranted.
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14
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33747044461
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These follow closely Strawon's presentation in Strawson, "The Bounds of Freedom," pp. 443-444.
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The Bounds of Freedom
, pp. 443-444
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Strawson1
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16
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37549023295
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(Leipzig: Naumann), Section 8. For a discussion of Nietzsche's views on these matters
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The quotation from F. Nietzsche is from F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or: How to Philosophize with a Hammer (Leipzig: Naumann, 1889), Section 8. For a discussion of Nietzsche's views on these matters,
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(1889)
Twilight of the Idols, Or: How to Philosophize with a Hammer
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Nietzsche, F.1
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17
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0040866607
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The paradox of fatalism and self-creation in nietzsche
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C. Janaway (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press
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see Brian Leiter, "The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche," in C. Janaway (ed.), Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 217-257.
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(1998)
Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator
, pp. 217-257
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Leiter, B.1
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18
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33747059374
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Review of Galen Strawson's freedom and belief
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Despite my disagreement with Strawson about ultimacy, I have considerable admiration for his work on free will and moral responsibility [John Martin Fischer, "Review of Galen Strawson's Freedom and Belief," Times Literary Supplement (1987), p. 852].
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(1987)
Times Literary Supplement
, pp. 852
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Fischer, J.M.1
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19
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84921409209
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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For more careful and detailed engagement, see Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 170-176;
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(2003)
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
, pp. 170-176
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Clarke, R.1
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20
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On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility
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Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), (London: Blackwell Publishers)
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and Randolph Clarke, "On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," in Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: Free Will and Moral Responsibility (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2005), pp. 13-24;
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(2005)
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: Free Will and Moral Responsibility
, pp. 13-24
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Clarke, R.1
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note
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Note that I have described the factor in question "negatively:" my not having been dropped on my head. But one could equally describe the relevant causal background condition "positively:" my having been handled carefully and treated well by my parents, and so forth. Nothing in my argument depends on any sort of assumption that "negative" facts can be causal.
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0010060163
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New York: Random House
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In Molly Bloom's soliloquy, she says: "...who was the first person in the universe before there was anybody that made it all who ah that they don't know neither do I so there you are they might as well try to stop the sun from rising tomorrow the sun shines for you he said... " [James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 782].
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(1961)
Ulysses
, pp. 782
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Joyce, J.1
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24
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0004156082
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Princeton: Princeton University Press
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We would typically select from among the various causal contributors to an event and thus highlight some factor or factors in making causal attributions and offering causal explanations. Joel Feinberg's treatment of the considerations that guide such selection is highly illuminating [Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 119-151]. Here Feinberg emphasizes the pragmatic dimensions of causal attributions - their purpose-relativity, and so forth. He identifies various features in virtue of which we pick out or select certain of the causal contributors as "the cause," relative to certain purposes
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(1970)
Doing and Deserving
, pp. 119-151
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Feinberg, J.1
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(See, especially, Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, pp. 143-147). This is, in my view, a brilliant discussion. I should point out that everything Feinberg argues about our practices of making causal attributions and offering (and accepting) causal explanations is compatible with there being an indefinitely large number of causal background conditions or causal contributors to an event, on which the occurrence of the event depends, and which are "external" to the relevant agent. These are the factors from which the pragmatically-informed selection is made in the context of causal explanation. When Meursault says that he killed the Arab "because of the sun," this may have evoked the "tittering" of the jury simply because it was an inappropriate selection of a causal background condition as "the cause." Feinberg's discussion can help to explain why, in a typical context, such a selection would be inappropriate. Camus appears to present "the sun" as more than merely a causal background condition in the following famous and beautiful, but puzzling, passage:I waited. The heat was beginning to scorch my cheeks; beads of sweat were gathering in my eye-brows. It was just the same sort of heat as at my mother's funeral, and I had the same disagreeable sensations - especially in my forehead, where all the veins seemed to be bursting through the skin. I couldn't stand it any longer, and took another step forward. I knew it was a fool thing to do; I wouldn't get out of the sun by moving on a yard or so. But I took that step, just one step, forward. And then the Arab drew his knife and held it up toward me, athwart the sunlight. A shaft of light shot upward from the steel, and I felt as if a long, thin blade transfixed my forehead. At the same moment all the sweat that had accumulated in my eyebrows splashed down on my eye-lids, covering them with a warm film of moisture. Beneath a veil of brine and tears my eyes were blinded; I was conscious only of the cymbals of the sun clashing on my skull, and, less distinctly, of the keen blade of light flashing up from the knife, scarring my eyelashes, and gouging into my eyeballs. Then everything began to reel before my eyes, a fiery gust came from the sea, while the sky cracked in two, from end to end, and a great sheet of flame poured down through the rift. Every nerve in my body was a steel spring, and my grip closed on the revolver. The trigger gave, and the smooth underbelly of the butt jogged my palm. And so, with that crisp, whipcrack sound, it all began. I shook off my sweat and the clinging veil of light. I knew I'd shattered the balance of the day, the spacious calm of this beach on which I had been happy. But I fired four shots more into the inert body, on which they left no visible trace. And each successive shot was another loud, fateful rap on the door of my undoing
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Doing and Deserving
, pp. 143-147
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Feinberg1
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26
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(Camus, The Stranger, pp. 75-76). This passage is puzzling for many reasons. Camus appears to be describing Meursault as experiencing the sun as a "triggering cause," and not a mere background enabling causal factor. And yet this is implausible. Why does Meursault not subject his impressions to critical scrutiny? Does he really suppose that the Arab is attacking him? If the light is "transfixing [his] forehead" and "scarring [his] eyelashes, and gouging into [his] eyeballs," why does he not feel the pain, or notice any blood? Why does he not seek to run away from the Arab, rather than attacking him? Does not everyone have the duty to monitor his perceptions and check for illusions? Of course, these are just a few obvious and perhaps flat-footed questions.
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The Stranger
, pp. 75-76
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Camus1
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0003793334
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Isaiah Berlin writes: I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not other[s'] acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object... I wish to be somebody, not nobody [Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 131]. It is as if I had performed a strategic retreat into an inner citadel - my reason, my soul, my "noumenal" self - which, do what they may, neither external blind force, nor human malice, can touch. I have withdrawn into myself; there, and there alone, I am secure
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(1969)
Four Essays on Liberty
, pp. 131
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Berlin, I.1
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Berlin was not endorsing the Inner Citadel model, but it captures nicely a certain picture of autonomy. As regards the wish to "be somebody," Lily Tomlin says, in her one-person play, The Search for Intelligent Life in the Universe, "I always wanted to be somebody when I grew up. I should have been more specific!"
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The Search for Intelligent Life in the Universe
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Tomlin, L.1
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We are thus even worse off than in Neurath's famous ship, which we must rebuild plank by plank while occupying it; in my view, we are, if I may be allowed to put it this way, in a body of water without (even) a paddle!
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I am indebted to Matt Talbert for this point
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I am indebted to Matt Talbert for this point.
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34
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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and Derk Pereboom. Living Without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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(2001)
Living Without Free Will
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Pereboom, D.1
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35
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33747066484
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Review of Saul Smilansky's Free will and illusion
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For a preliminary development of some of the ideas presented here, see John Martin Fischer, "Review of Saul Smilansky's Free Will and Illusion" Times Literary Supplement (2001), p. 28. As with Strawson, despite my disagreement about the sourcehood condition, I admire Smilansky's book.
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(2001)
Times Literary Supplement
, pp. 28
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Fischer, J.M.1
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39
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Compatibilism: The argument from shallowness
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Saul Smilansky, "Compatibilism: The Argument from Shallowness," Philosophical Studies 115 (2003), pp. 257-282;
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(2003)
Philosophical Studies
, vol.115
, pp. 257-282
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Smilansky, S.1
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42
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0004207980
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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the quote is from Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 136.
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(1986)
The View from Nowhere
, pp. 136
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Nagel, T.1
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51
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Frankfurt-style compatibilism
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S. Buss and L. Overton (eds.). (Cambridge: The MIT Press)
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John Martin Fischer, "Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism," in S. Buss and L. Overton (eds.). Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002), pp. 1-26,
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(2002)
Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt
, pp. 1-26
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Fischer, J.M.1
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52
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79957406741
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G. Watson (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
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reprinted in G. Watson (ed.), Free Will: Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 190-211;
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(2003)
Free Will: Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Second Edition
, pp. 190-211
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53
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Introduction: A framework for moral responsibility
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John Martin Fischer, (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
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and "Introduction: A Framework for Moral Responsibility," in John Martin Fischer, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 1-37.
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(2005)
My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility
, pp. 1-37
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note
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I am very grateful to thorough, thoughtful and insightful comments by Matt Talbert.
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note
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I am honored to have been invited to contribute to this volume in honor of Joel Feinberg. Joel Feinberg was a careful, systematic, and penetrating philosopher. He was also one of the "good guys" of our profession. Molly Bloom says (attributing the remark to Leopold Bloom), "... the sun shines for you..." Joel Feinberg's sun shone for all of us in philosophy. The light will continue to provide illumination, and the warmth of his personality will not be forgotten. In the words of the Beatles: Here comes the sun, here comes the sun, And I say it's all right. Little darling it's been a long cold lonely winter, Little darling it feels like years since it's been here. Here comes the sun, here comes the sun, And I say it's all right. Little darling I feel that ice is slowly melting, Little darling it seems like years since it's been clear. Here comes the sun, here comes the sun, It's all right, it's all right. (Abbey Road)
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