Admissible agreements among goal-directed agents

Proceedings - 2005 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT'05

Volumn 2005, Issue , 2005, Pages 543-549

  Boella, Guido ^a   Sauro, Luigi ^a   Van Der Torre, Leendert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURIN   (Italy)

^b DELFT UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

ADMISSIBILITY CRITERION; ADMISSIBLE AGREEMENTS; SEARCH SPACE;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 33747011542     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/IAT.2005.27     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (9)

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