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Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 93-99

Change at the ECB executive board

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EID: 33746893358     PISSN: 00205346     EISSN: 1613964X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10272-006-0181-8     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (2)

References (21)
  • 3
    • 33746930383 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Restructuring the ECB
    • in: H. Berger, T. Moutos (eds.): Cambridge Mass. MIT Press
    • H. Berger, J. De Haan, R. Inklaar: Restructuring the ECB, in: H. Berger, T. Moutos (eds.): Managing European Union Enlargement, Cambridge Mass. 2004, MIT Press, pp. 29-66.
    • (2004) Managing European Union Enlargement , pp. 29-66
    • Berger, H.1    De Haan, J.2    Inklaar, R.3
  • 5
    • 85168554380 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament
    • For further discussion see also the Briefi ng Papers of February by the members of the Monetary Experts Panel, for example for the Committee on
    • For further discussion see also the Briefi ng Papers of February 2003 by the members of the Monetary Experts Panel, for example P. Bofinger and D. Gros, for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament.
    • (2003)
    • Bofinger, P.1    Gros, D.2
  • 8
    • 33746910336 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reforming the Composition of the ECB Governing Council in View of Enlargement: How Not to Do It!
    • Briefing Paper for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, February
    • D. Gros: Reforming the Composition of the ECB Governing Council in View of Enlargement: How Not to Do It!, Briefing Paper for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, February 2003.
    • (2003)
    • Gros, D.1
  • 9
    • 33746910336 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reforming the Composition of the ECB Governing Council in View of Enlargement: How Not to Do It!
    • Briefing Paper for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, February
    • Ibid.
    • (2003)
    • Gros, D.1
  • 10
    • 33746890311 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Briefing Paper for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, February
    • P. Bofinger: Consequences of the Modification of the Governing Council Rules, Briefing Paper for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, February 2003.
    • (2003) Consequences of the Modification of the Governing Council Rules
    • Bofinger, P.1
  • 17
    • 33746910336 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reforming the Composition of the ECB Governing Council in View of Enlargement: How Not to Do It!
    • Briefi ng Paper for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, February
    • D. Gros, op. cit.
    • (2003)
    • Gros, D.1
  • 19
    • 33646564851 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Are Small Countries too Powerful Within the ECB?
    • H. Berger, J. De Haan: Are Small Countries too Powerful Within the ECB?, in: Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2002, pp. 263-282.
    • (2002) Atlantic Economic Journal , vol.30 , Issue.3 , pp. 263-282
    • Berger, H.1    De Haan, J.2
  • 20
    • 85168550032 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Press Release on "ECB opinion on the appointment of a new member of the Executive Board of the ECB"
    • Cf. European Central Bank: Frankfurt-am-Main, 2 March
    • Cf. European Central Bank: Press Release on "ECB opinion on the appointment of a new member of the Executive Board of the ECB", Frankfurt-am-Main, 2 March 2006.
    • (2006)
  • 21
    • 33744648006 scopus 로고
    • Federal Reserve Act And Other Statutory Provisions Affecting the Federal Reserve System
    • Cf. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Washington DC, August Section 10.1 (1-077) of the Federal Reserve Act reads as follows: "The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") shall be composed of seven members, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,..., for terms of fourteen years except as hereinafter provided,..."
    • Cf. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Federal Reserve Act And Other Statutory Provisions Affecting the Federal Reserve System, Washington DC, August 1990. Section 10.1 (1-077) of the Federal Reserve Act reads as follows: "The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") shall be composed of seven members, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,..., for terms of fourteen years except as hereinafter provided,..."
    • (1990)


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