The making of a martyr: Chechen suicide terrorism

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 29, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 429-492

  Speckhard, Anne ^a,b   Ahkmedova, Khapta ^c  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER   (United States)

^b FREE UNIVERSITY OF BRUSSELS   (Belgium)

^c CHECHEN STATE UNIVERSITY   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

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EID: 33746652185     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100600698550     Document Type: Article

References (110)

1. This article classifies suicide bombers as anyone who goes so far as to strap on a bomb, drive a vehicle filled with explosives to a target, or who otherwise attempts to detonate an explosive device on an airplane, in a subway or train car, or elsewhere with the aim of dying to kill - irrespective of whether or not the bomber actually died in the attack or was successful in detonating - as that is often not within the bomber's control. The authors take the fact of being to the point of willingly strapping on a bomb or other type of improvised explosive device or driving a vehicle loaded with explosives to a target as enough evidence of seriousness of the intent to suicide and see the end result that is often out of the hands of the bomber as less meaningful than the intent implied by these actions.
2. These numbers are based on the authors' database of attacks attributed to Chechens as of the article's writing in late August 2005. Quantifying the exact numbers of those killed and wounded in attacks, the gender of bombers and so on is difficult as reports vary by government and news source and specifics about the accomplished bombers are not always evident after an attack. In every case the more conservative estimates have been used, as the authors' experience with journalists reporting in and about Chechnya is that they have difficulty getting reports and sometimes rely on rumors. See Tables 1-5 for summaries and empirical analysis regarding suicide terror acts attributed to Chechens.
3. All of the suicide bombers in the sample willingly carried or delivered bombs with the intent of killing themselves in order to kill others, although the events differed. Some carried bombs on their bodies detonating immediately at their target, others waiting while they held hostages-knowing full well their demands would never be met and intending to die by exploding themselves. Others exploded themselves with bombs in trucks and cars or on trains, airplanes, or the metro. Two bombers were designated as would-be bombers, holding them out of the main sample of suicide bombers because they did not willingly carry out their missions. The first one, Zarema Inarkaeva, was given a bomb that she delivered unknowingly that was detonated by remote control. The second would-be bomber (according to the classification scheme) was Zarema Mujukhoeva who carried her bomb to downtown Moscow but abandoned it attempting to flee. It detonated when a Special Forces officer tried to defuse it.
4. It should be emphasized that anyone met who gave serious evidence of considering self recruiting for an act of human bombing was immediately offered psychotherapeutic intervention and that in all cases the authors' were able to steer the person away from continuing to entertain this possibility as a serious course of action.
5. See Edwin S. Shneidman, The Suicidal Mind, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996) in which he discusses the concept of a psychological autopsy following a normal suicide.
6. Although the Madrid train bombings did not involve suicide bombers at the site, later when they were nearly apprehended these terrorists blew themselves up leaving to question whether or not they are categorically suicide bombers or not, depending on how such is defined.
7. Suicide terrorism began with attacks by Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1983. From there the tactic migrated to the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka who began to use it since 1987. The Palestinian Hamas adopted it in 1993, the PKK in Turkey in 1996. Al Qaeda embraced suicide terrorism in the mid-1990s.
8. See Andrew Silke "Retaliating against terrorism" in Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences (Chichester: Wiley, 2003).
9. Scott Atrana, Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. Science, 7 March 2003, vol 299.
10. See Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 61-76.
11. Speckhard, Anne, "Understanding Suicide Terrorism:COuntering Human Bombs and Their Senders" in Topics in Terrorism: Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat" (Volume I) Jason S. Purcell & Joshua D. Weintraub (Atlantic Council Publication Washington, D.C., 2005), pp. 1-21.
12. See Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, (Columbia University Press: New York, 2002).
13. These numbers are based on the database of attacks attributed to Chechens as of the article's writing in August 2005. Quantifying the exact number of attacks, gender of bombers, and so on is difficult as reports vary by government and news source and the gender of accomplished bombers is not always evident after an attack. In every case the more conservative estimates were used, as experience with journalists reporting in and about Chechnya is that they have difficulty getting reports and sometimes rely on rumors.
14. It is difficult to track terrorist activity in Russia as often there are not open reports and there are also frequently differences between media and official reports, especially in the reported numbers killed (official statistics generally give lower death rates).
15. In an interesting twist rebel and main terrorist leader Shamil Basaev claims taking over the planes with suicide terrorists but not bombing them, claiming that the terrorists hijacked the planes for media attention but that the Russians themselves downed the planes simultaneously upon learning of the hijackings. See ABC News Nightline, 28 July, 2005 "Reign of Terror" in which Basayev claims, "They were supposed to hijack the planes and demand an end to the war. And they were not supposed to let them land until there was some response. But they were immediately shot down. Whatever, our hijackers weren't supposed to blow up the planes just like that. And I wonder why both planes exploded at the same time." Basayev, it should be noted, is a well-known Chechen terrorist leader who nearly always paints himself as the victimized innocent while simultaneously claiming responsibility for very heinous terrorist acts. Nevertheless, while the official line from Russia is that the bombers brought the planes down it must be acknowledged that it is increasingly becoming agreed on policy by governments that domestic planes overtaken by suicide terrorists intent on using the plane as a weapon may be downed by military means.
16. See John Reuter, "Chechnya's Suicide Bombers: Desperate, Devout, or Deceived? American Committee for Peace in Chechnya, 16 September 2004, pp. 19-20.
17. See Anne Speckhard, "Soldiers for God: A Study of the Suicide Terrorists in the Moscow Hostage Taking Siege," in The Roots of Terrorism: Contemporary Trends and Traditional Analysis, Oliver McTernan, (Nato Science Series, Brussels, 2004).
18. Anne Speckhard,Nadejda Tarabrina,Valery Krasnov and Khapta Akhmedova, "Research Note: Observations of Suicidal Terrorists in Action," Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(2) (Summer 2004), pp. 305-327.
19. Speckhard, A., Tarabrina, N., Krasnov, V. & Mufel, N. (2005) Posttraumatic and acute stress responses in hostages held by suicidal terrorists in the takeover of a Moscow theater. Traumatology, Volume 11, Issue 1 (March, 2005).
20. A. Speckhard, N. Tarabrina, V. Krasnov, and N. Mufel, "Stockholm Effects and Psychological Responses to Captivity in Hostages Held by Suicidal Terrorists," Traumatology: 11, (2) 2005.
21. (reprinted in S. Wessely and V. Krasnov, eds., Psychological Responses to the New Terrorism: A NATO Russia Dialogue, 2005, IOS Press).
22. See aforementioned articles for a more in-depth discussion of this event from both the point of viewof the hostages and from their observations of the terrorists. In particular the hostages observed that all of the terrorists were willing and ready to die, and expected and prepared for it - linking the bombs together for more easy detonation in one large blast as the siege wore on - and that they remarked often about their willingness and expectation to die as martyrs during the siege.
23. Because the authors are both practicing psychologists it was decided that on coming across anyone seriously considering becoming a suicide terrorist that every clinical effort would be made to dissuade them. In their opinion they were generally successful in offering persuasive therapeutic effect in most of these cases to push the subject into reconsidering. In all of these cases Akhmedova offered free clinical services to help the subjectswork through the traumatic experiences that appeared to be a driving motivation for considering enacting suicide terrorism. One subject who was highly traumatized in childhood and has not made a good recovery is still being monitored.
24. Suicide bombers have been classified as anyone who goes so far as to strap on a bomb, drive a vehicle filled with explosives to a target, or who otherwise attempts to detonate an explosive device on an airplane or elsewhere with the aim of dying to kill, irrespective of whether or not the bomber actually died in the attack or was successful in detonating as that is often not within the bomber's control. The fact of being to the point of strapping on any type of improvised explosive device or driving a vehicle loaded with explosives to a target are taken as enough evidence of seriousness of the intent to suicide, and the end result that is often out of the hands of the bomber is seen as less meaningful than the intent implied by these actions. There is some controversy as to whether or not the Dubrovka bombers were suicide bombers as they did not die by exploding themselves as their plan to do so was interrupted by the Russian special forces gassing and storming the building. Because there is strong confirmation from many family members, close associates, and hostages of these terrorists of their willingness to die by self-explosion and the fact that the women were already in suicide belts their intent and behavior of strapping on bombs is taken as strong enough evidence to classify them as suicide bombers for this analysis. To leave them out of the analysis would, in the authors' opinion, be a mistake as clearly they were intending to carry out their suicide mission if the Russian Special Forces had not thwarted it. This is considered analogous to the many now incarcerated Palestinian bombers who have been thwarted in the last moments before their attempts but who are also closely studied to understand the psychology and psychosocial aspects of suicide bombers.
25. See Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2)(February/March 2003);
26. Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, "Talking to Terrorists," Journal of Psychohistory, (Fall and Anne Speckhard, 2005),
27. "Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders," in Topics in Terrorism: Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat" (Volume I), Jason S. Purcell and Joshua D. Weintraub, eds., (Atlantic Council Publication, Washington, D.C., 2005), pp. 1-21.
28. Ariel Merari, Suicide Terrorism, unpublished manuscript (2003).
29. See Nichole Argo, The Banality of Evil: Understanding and Defusing Today's Human Bombs. Unpublished research proposal 2003. Anne Speckhard Unpublished interviews of Palestinian militants, March 2005.
30. It is important to note that the term Wahhabism has a unique meaning in Russia and Chechnya differing from its wider use elsewhere. Essentially it relates to the Chechen terrorist ideology specifically which is related to the global salafi jihad ideology and the label wahhabist is commonly used to refer to adherents of these militant terrorist ideologies and members of Chechen terrorist groups.WhereasWahhabists in other parts of theworld are peaceful and profoundly orthodox believers who may or may not agree that in some cases violence may be used even against other Muslims to defend the true faith (as in the ends justifies themeans argument),Wahhabism in Chechnya relates specifically to a well-known and well-understood label given by Russians and Chechens to terrorists in this area who are promoting a militant jihadist ideology that allows for and promotes terrorism against civilians, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. The groups themselves do not refer to themselves as Wahhabists but rather as "true believers."
31. For an excellent discussion and definition of the global Salafi jihad, see Marc Sageman Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia:UNiversity of Pennsylvannia Press, 2004).
32. Ibid.
33. There is controversy over the Beslan demands, the terrorists stating that they were given in a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin passed through Ingush leader and negotiator Ruslan Aushev, a letter in which Basaev demanded the recognition of the independence of Chechnya and withdrawal of Russian troops from the republic. In this letter Basayev purportedly offered in exchange to stop all anti-Russian activities in the Caucasus and close all terrorist training camps. Basaev also promised that an independent Chechnya would become a member of the CIS and join the Collective Security Treaty. Later these same demands were placed by the Kavkaz center on their website. Similar demands by the Dubrovka hostage-takers were broadcast in a pre-made video aired over Al. Jazeera.
34. See Another Beslan?, Chechnya, Jonathan Miller interview of Basayev 4 February 2005 in which Basayev, justifying his group's actions, mixes references to international law with ideological statements demonizing his enemy claiming, "We are not separatists; aggression has been committed against us according to international rights and law. Russia committed an act of aggression against world Satanism. Of Christianity and Judaism only the name has remained, and also practically from Islam. Today we're fighting global Satanism that puts forward as its shield American imperialism and Russian chauvinism."
35. See ABC News Nightline, 28 July 2005 Reign of Terror and Another Beslan? Chechnya, Jonathan Miller interview of Basayev 4 February 2005.
36. Ibid.
37. Khahil Shakiki, "The View of Palestinian Society on Suicide Terrorism," Countering Suicide Terrorism (Herzilya, Israel: The International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, The Interdisciplinary Center, 2002).
38. See Nichole Argo, The Banality of Evil: Understanding and Defusing Today's Human Bombs. Unpublished research proposal 2003
39. and Nasra Hassan, "An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to Human Bombs." The New Yorker, 19 November 2001.
40. See John Reuter, "Chechnya's Suicide Bombers: Desperate, Devout, or Deceived?The American Committee for Peace in Chechnya publication (2004), available at "(http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/reports/ SuicideReport/), accessed 1 June 2005, p. 23.
41. Ibid.,pg. 21, where he states, "Havingwitnessed the almost total obliteration of their country in the past decade, the Chechen people have suffered immeasurably. This tiny mountain nation has endured an apocalyptic demographic crisis, with nearly 180,000 Chechens killed and over 300,000 displaced. These unfathomable numbers mean that one in two Chechens were either killed or driven from their homes in the past ten years. Moreover, Chechnya's cities have been reduced to rubble and the extent of the environmental catastrophe is yet to be fully understood. Every single person alive today in Chechnya has been deeply scarred by the bloody conflict raging in their midst."
42. See Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2) (February/March 2003);
43. Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, "Talking to Terrorists," Journal of Psychohistory (Fall and Anne Speckhard, 2005),
44. "Understanding Suicide Terrorism: CounteringHumanBombs and Their Senders," in Topics in Terrorism: Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat" (Volume I) Jason S. Purcell & Joshua D. Weintraub) eds. Atlantic Council Publication, 2005).
45. Ariel Merari, Suicide Terrorism, unpublished manuscript (2003).
46. See Edwin S. Shneidman, The Suicidal Mind, (Oxford University Press, 1996) in which he discusses the concept of a psychological autopsy following a normal suicide. This term was coined by Schiedenmen.
47. See Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2) (February/March 2003);
48. Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, "Talking to Terrorists," Journal of Psychohistory (Fall 2005) and
49. Anne Speckhard "Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders," in Topics in Terrorism: Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat" (Volume I) eds (Jason S. Purcell & Joshua D. Weintraub Atlantic Council Publication 2005).
50. Dmitri Trenin, Aleksei Malashenko, and Anatol Lieven, Russia's Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).
51. Ibid.
52. Stating that corrupt governments or any actors for that matter respond only to force is a common saying throughout the former Soviet Union.
53. Keeping in mind that terror-sponsoring organizations made use of Hinduism (the Aum Shinrykyo in Japan to poison the subways with sarin gas), Christianity (abortion clinic terrorists who bombed clinics and assassinated abortionists), and radical Jewish Zionism (Baruch Goldstein for instance on his shooting spree in a Mosque) each to justify its violent pursuits.
54. J. Dudayev and Y. Zarakhovich, "Terms of War and Peace" Time, 4 March 1996.
55. See Trenin, Malashenko, and Lieven, Russia's Restless Frontier.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p. 77.
58. See also Speckhard & Akhmedova, "Mechanisms of Generating Suicide Terrorism: Trauma and Bereavement as Psychological Vulnerabilities in Human Security - The Chechen Case," in Jill Donnelly, ed. Trauma in Children on the NATO Periphery (Nato Science Series, Brussels, 2004).
59. See also Speckhard & Akhmedova, "Mechanisms of Generating Suicide Terrorism: Trauma and Bereavement as Psychological Vulnerabilities in Human Security - The Chechen Case," in Jill Donnelly, ed. NATO Science Series, Brussels, 2004.
60. Speckhard, Anne & Akhmedova Khapta (2005) "Talking to Terrorists" Journal of Psychohistory, Fall 2005;
61. and Speckhard, Anne. "Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders" in Topics in Terrorism: Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat (Volume 11), eds. Jason S. Purcell & Joshua D. Weintraub, Atlantic Council: Washington, D.C. 2005, pp. 1-21.
62. See Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism." Science, 7 March 2003, Vol. 299. p. 534 for a further discussion of this manipulation of normal genetically derived instincts.
63. Speckhard, Tarabrina, Krasnov, and Akhmedova, "Research Note."
64. See Speckhard, Tarabrina, Krasnov, and Mufel. Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Responses in Hostages Held by Suicidal Terrorists in the Takeover of a Moscow Theater, p. 4.
65. Atran, Genesis of Suicide Terrorism
66. Sageman Understanding Terror Networks.
67. See Trenin, Malashenko, and Lieven, Russia's Restless Frontier.
68. Atran, Genesis of Suicide Terrorism;
69. Ariel Merari, Suicide Terrorism;, unpublished manuscript (2003).
70. Atran, Genesis of Suicide Terrorism;
71. Sageman Understanding Terror Networks.
72. See Hujayra al Arabi "Confessions of a Human Bomb from Palestine," in the Free Arab Voice, in which a young Palestinian female doctor admits that she is readying herself to become a human bomb and argues that she is certainly not doing so from lack of options or being blocked in her choices but out of a grave sense of injustice that she hopes to change as much as she can by sacrificing herself for others in her community.
73. Speckhard, Tarabrina, Krasnov, and Akhmedova, "Research Note."
74. Nasra Hassan, An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to Human Bombs. The New Yorker, (19 November 2001).
75. Aparisim Ghosh, Inside the Mind of a Suicide Bomber Speckhard, Unpublished Palestinian militant interviews with failed bombers (2005).
76. See Anne Speckhard, Beatrice Jacuch and Val Vanrompay, "Taking on the Persona of a Suicide Bomber: A Thought Experiment," Unpublished research article (2005).
77. A. Kronik, R. Akhmerov, and A. Speckhard, "Trauma & Disaster as Life Disrupters: A Computer Assisted Model of Psychotherapy Applied to Adolescent Victims of the Chernobyl Disaster," Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 30(6), (December 1999), pp. 586-599,
78. Norma Berkowitz ed. Anne Speckhard, "Psycho-Social & Physical Outcomes of Technological Disaster: Information as a Traumatic Stressor" in, A Chernobyl Reader, (University of Wisconsin Press 2005).
79. See Speckhard and Akhmedova, "Talking to Terrorists,"
80. and Speckhard and Akhmedova, "Mechanisms of Generating Suicide Terrorism."
81. See Hujayra al'Arabi, "Confessions of a Human Bomb from Palestine."
82. See Quintan Wiktorowicz, Suicide Bombings: Do Beliefs Matter? Unpublished research paper (2004).
83. See R. Janoff-Bulman, Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma (New York: The Free Press, 1992
84. and Speckhard & Akhmedova, "Mechanisms of Generating Suicide Terrorism.
85. Basayev speaking to ABC News Nightline, 28 July 2005, Reign of Terror.
86. SeeMark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religion Violence. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000).
87. K. Akhmedova, (2003) "Fanatism and Revenge Idea of Civilians who had PTSD," Social and Clinical Psychiatry, 12 (3). P. 24-32.
88. Ibid.
89. Razman Kadyrov, Interview on Groznenskoye Televidenie, May 2005.
90. See Anne Speckhard, and Khapta Akhmedova, "Black Widows: The Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists," in Yoram Schweitzer ed. Female Suicide Terrorists Tel Aviv, Israel: (Jaffe Center Publication, 2005).
91. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, (Columbia University Press, 2005);
92. see Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers, (New York: Rodale Books, 2003).
93. Speckhard, unpublished Palestinian interviews.
94. Bloom, Dying to Kill.
95. Reuven Paz, "Spreading Terrorist Ideologies over the Internet: The Explosive Allure of Jihadist Rhetoric." Paper presented to the NATO Advanced Research Workshop - Ideologies of Terrorism: Understanding and Countering the Social, Psychological and Political Underpinnings of Terrorism, 31 January 2005, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.
96. Bloom Dying to Kill.
97. See Victor, Army of Roses.
98. See, for instance, Kim Murphy, "Cult of Reluctant Killers: The 'black widows' of Chechnya - suicide bombers who stalk Russia - are driven by hatred, ideology, coercion and fear. Los Angeles Times 4 February 2004.
99. See Speckhard, Tarabrina, Krasnov, and Akhmedova, "Research Note."
100. See Speckhard, Tarabrina, Krasnov, and Mufel, "Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Responses in Hostages Held by Suicidal Terrorists in the Takeover of a Moscow Theater."
101. Anne Speckhard, "Soldiers for God: A Study of the Suicide Terrorists in the Moscow Hostage Taking Siege," in The Roots of Terrorism: Contemporary Trends and Traditional Analysis,OliverMcTernan, ed. (Nato Science Series, Brussels, 2004);
102. A. Speckhard, N. Tarabrina, V. Krasnov, and N. Mufel, "Stockholm Effects and Psychological Responses to Captivity in Hostages Held by Suicidal Terrorists," in Traumatology: 11 (2) 2005 (reprinted in S. Wessely and V. Krasnov, eds., Psychological Responses to the new Terrorism: A NATO Russia Dialogue, 2005, IOS Press)
103. A. Speckhard, N. Tarabrina, V. Krasnov, and N. Mufel "Stockholm Effects and Psychological Responses to Captivity in Hostages Held by Suicidal Terrorists," in Traumatology: 11 (2) 2005 (reprinted in S. Wessely and V. Krasnov, eds., Psychological Responses to the new Terrorism: A NATO Russia Dialogue, 2005, IOS Press)
104. and Speckhard, and Akhmedova, "Black Widows;" for a more in-depth discussion of this event from both the point of view of the hostages and from their observations of the terrorists. In particular the hostages observed that all of the terrorists were willing and ready to die, and were expected and prepared for it - linking the bombs together for more easy detonation in one large blast as the siege wore on. They also remarked often about their willingness and expectation to die as martyrs during the siege. From their observations it seemed that perhaps the women did not detonate their bombs before the gas overtook them not because they were unable to during the storm, but because they were clearly in roles submissive to their male leaders and were waiting for an order from the men who had gone out of the main hall to fight with the onslaught of Russian storm troopers. Of course no one can know for sure as they died before anyone could ask them.
105. See Sightings "Coke pulled in Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands: Over 100 poisoned." 15 June 1999. Available at (http://www.rense.com/politics2/coke.htm), accessed 4 October 2005.
106. Anne Speckhard, Nadejda Tarabrina, Valery Krasnov, and Khapta Akhmedova, "Research Note: Observations of Suicidal Terrorists in Action," in Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(2) (Summer 2004), p. 317.
107. Ibid., p.318,
108. Basayev speaking to ABC News Nightline, 28 July 2005, Reign of Terror.
109. See Robert Pape, Dying toWin: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism NewYork: Random House, 2005).
110. Speckhard, unpublished Moroccan interviews, May 2005.