The interaction of task and asset allocation

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 24, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 887-906

  Corts, Kenneth S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Asset allocation; Optimal linear incentive contract; Task allocation

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; DECISION MAKING; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; PROBLEM SOLVING; RISK ASSESSMENT; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

ASSET ALLOCATION; OPTIMAL LINEAR INCENTIVE CONTRACT; OWNERSHIP; TASK ALLOCATION;

RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

EID: 33746640473     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.01.002     Document Type: Article

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