Towards a theory of oppression

Ratio

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 80-102

  Zutlevics, T L ^a,b  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b FLINDERS UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746604871     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9329.00177     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. See F. Engels, The Origin of the Family (New York: International Publishers, 1972)
2. J. Tormey, 'Exploitation, oppression and self-sacrifice', in C. Gould and M. Wartofsky (eds), Women and Philosophy (New York: Pedigree Books, 1976)
3. M. Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (New York: The Crossing Press, 1983). Whilst both of these theorists offer an interesting account of oppression, they are in my view ultimately unsuccessful in that they fail to entirely distinguish the oppressed from the non-oppressed. Limitations of space preclude me from detailing my specific objections
4. Sandra Bartky is another theorist who analyses oppression. See S. Bartky, 'On psychological oppression', in S. Bishop and M. Weinzweig (eds), Philosophy and Women (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1979). However, as Bartky's analysis concerns a subset of oppressive experiences, namely the psychological, it would be misleading to align her too closely with the projects of Tormey and Frye
5. I. Young, 'Five faces of oppression', Philosophical Forum 19 (1988), p. 270
6. I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 40. Emphasis mine
7. Young, 'Five faces of oppression', p. 271. Emphasis mine
8. In the later version of the paper she drops the term 'disparate', replacing it with the weaker idea of a 'family of concepts'; however, my general point holds. See Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 40
9. M. Walker, Moral Understandings (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 124. Walker does not extensively argue for her claim. Rather, she points to the varying social and psychological circumstances faced by oppressed persons as a reason against viewing oppressed people as a natural kind. However, such variances in psychology and environment do not rule out the possibility of a general account of oppression which usefully applies to all oppressed persons
10. See G. Brock, Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others' Needs (Lanham: Rowmann and Littlefield, 1998) for a useful collection of papers defending the legitimacy of positive rights claims
11. Of course there has to be some analysis of what constitutes a reasonable need. As Gillian Brock points out, needs to some extent vary according to circumstance. See G. Brock, 'Braybrooke on needs', Ethics, 104 (1994)
12. R. Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom (London: Croom Held, 1986), p. 8
13. See also R. Young, 'Autonomy and the "inner self" ', American Philosophical Quarterly, 17 (1980), fn4
14. Young, Personal Autonomy, p. 8
15. Young thus escapes the charge which Watson levelled against dispositional accounts of autonomy, namely, that the idea that 'most people have articulate "conceptions of the good", coherent life-plans, systems of ends, and so on, is of course something of a fiction'. See G. Watson, 'Free agency', in J. Christman (ed), The Inner Citadel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 116
16. Young's position is compatible with Watson's view that we 'all have more or less long-term aims and normative principles that we are willing to defend'. See Watson 'Free agency', p. 116
17. This non-rigid characterisation of a life plan also enables Young to meet Walker's charge that 'individually and robustly planned lives' have no relevance to many people. See Walker, Moral Understandings, 137
18. On this point see also K. Addelson, Impure Thoughts (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994)
19. D. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 80
20. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice, p. 51
21. P. Pettit, 'Negative liberty: liberal and republican', European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1993), p. 17
22. J. Harvey, 'Justice theory and oppression', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1 (1999), p. 190
23. H. Stowe, Uncle Tom's Cabin (New York: Bantham Books, 1851/1981)
24. For example in an Act of July 1806, it was deemed that 'Slaves may be sold by creditors for debts of their owners, in all States but Louisiana, where they cannot be separated from the land'. See W. Goodell, The American Slave Code in Theory and Practice (New York: Arno Press, 1853), p. 50
25. R. Winks, 'Introductory essay', in J. Henson, An Autobiography of the Rev. Josiah Henson (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1881/1969), p. x
26. Cited in J. Blassingame, Slave Testimony (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977)
27. D. Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1996)
28. Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners, p. 106
29. J. Rawls, A theory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 440
30. My point here is of a similar nature to Marilyn Friedman's when she notes, in a discussion of autonomy, that first-order desires can be taken as indicative of a lack of autonomy. See M. Friedman, 'Autonomy and the split-level self, Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1986)
31. See L. Guinier, Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness and Representative Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1994)
32. I am greatly indebted to Ian Ravenscroft for many helpful discussions. Thanks are also due to John Campbell, Chandran Kukathas, Diana Tietjens Meyers, Philip Pettit and an anonymous referee for this journal