Capturing fortress Europe: International collaboration and the joint strike fighter

Survival

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 137-159

  Kapstein, Ethan B ^a,b,c  

^a Department of Sustainable Development

^b French Institute for International Relations   (France)

^c German Marshall Fund of the Untied States ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746452172     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: 14682699     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/survival/46.3.137     Document Type: Article

References (65)

1. A possible exception is provided by the British Aerospace Harrier aircraft, with its unique Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) technology. In this case the United States licensed the technology from BAE, but the plane was produced and substantially redesigned for the US Marine Corps by McDonnell Douglas, and is currently in service as the AV-8B. It is one of the aircraft that the JSF would replace. The US-Japan FSX fighter project, in contrast, involved Japanese purchase of F-16 technology for an aircraft that would only serve the Japan Defense Forces.
2. Defense Science Board, Task Force on Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program (Washington DC: Department of Defense, September 1994), p. ES-7.
3. Ibid., p. 50.
4. A good overview of these developments is provided in Jean-Paul Hebert, La Consolidation de l'Europe de l'Armement Face Au Defi Transatlantique (Paris: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2001).
5. See Dov S. Zakheim, Towards a Fortress Europe? (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2000); note that Zakheim had served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration from 1985 to 1987, and remained a consultant to the Pentagon after leaving for the private sector.
6. See also The Economist, 'Getting it Together?', 20 July 2002.
7. For a statement of that strategy, see Defense Science Board, International Armaments Cooperation in an Era of Coalition Security (Washington DC: Department of Defense, August 1996).
8. See General Accounting Office, Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Cooperative Program Needs Greater Oversight to Ensure Goals are Met (Washington DC: Government Accounting Office, July 2003).
9. See Christopher Bolkcom, Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 14 February 2002)
10. on the STOVL programme, see DARPA, JSF: A DARPA Perspective, downloaded at http://www.darpa.mil/body/legacy/docs/JSFDARPAPerspective.doc.
11. For a thorough analysis of the Bottom-Up Review from a budgetary standpoint see Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky and Kristin Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).
12. John Tirpak, 'Strike Fighter', Air Force vol. 79, no. 10, October 1996, downloaded at www.afa.org/magazine/oct1996/1096stri.asp.
13. Mark Lorell, The US Combat Aircraft Industry, 1990-2000: Structure, Competition, Innovation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003).
14. Thorough introductions to the JSF programme are found in Christopher Bolkcom, Joint Strike Fighter: Background, Status and Issues (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 15 February 2002)
15. and John Birkler, et.al., Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter: Opportunities and Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).
16. Cited in John Tirpak, 'Strike Fighter'.
17. James Fallows, 'Uncle Sam Buys an Airplane', The Atlantic Monthly, June 2002, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/06/fallows.htm.
18. See Defense Science Board, Task Force on Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program.
19. Ibid., p. ES-7.
20. Interviews with Department of Defense officials, June 2003.
21. Defense Science Board, Task Force on Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program, p. 50.
22. Interviews with Department of Defense officials, June 2003.
23. The US and UK had a long history of collaboration on STOVL technology, which officially ended in 1991, only to restart in 1994.
24. Telephone interview with Department of Defense official, 9 March 2004.
25. On British involvement, see UK Ministry of Defence, Defence Procurement Agency, Joint Combat Aircraft, downloaded at http://www.mod.uk/dpa/ projects/jca.htm.
26. Christopher Bolkcom, Joint Strike Fighter: Background, Status and Issues (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 15 February 2002), p. 12.
27. Even though subcontractors are supposed to bid competitively for each part of the project, governments and firms based in foreign partner nations naturally expect to receive their 'fair share' of the JSF programme, according to how much the government has contributed to the CDP and EMD phases.
28. European governments, in contrast, have had significant experience with collaborative armaments programmes; how much the Pentagon has learned from that experience in shaping the JSF project remains unclear. I thank Alex Nicoll for highlighting this point.
29. Renae Merle, 'Norway Threatens to Revoke Support for Strike Fighter', Washington Post, 16 April 2004, p. E3.
30. See Anne Marie Squeo and Daniel Michaels, 'US Changes the Rules in High Stakes Venture of Selling Military Jets', Wall Street Journal 22 July 2002, p. 1.
31. Renae Merle, 'Norway Threatens to Revoke Support for Strike Fighter'.
32. For a useful introduction to the JSF's international dimension see John Birkler, et.al., Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter: Opportunities and Options.
33. See also Christopher Bolkcom, Joint Strike Fighter: Background, Status and Issues.
34. John Birkler, et.al., Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter: Opportunities and Options, p. 16.
35. See Ethan B. Kapstein, 'International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best Solution', Political Science Quarterly, winter 1991/92, p. 661.
36. See Ethan B. Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Security: A Global Perspective (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992).
37. RAND Corporation, Going Global: US Government Policy and the Defense Aerospace Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), p. 67.
38. Defense Science Board, Task Force on Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program, p. 48.
39. European Commission, European Defense - Industrial and Market Issues, report published 11 March 2003, p. 8.
40. One reviewer of this article has argued that European partners are providing some significant technology for JSF, and indeed, as already noted, the initial STOVL design for the AV-8A and AV-8B was British. I thank Alex Nicoll for highlighting this point.
41. See Paul Ferrari, et.al., US Arms Exports (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), p. 95.
42. On the F-16, see Ethan B. Kapstein, 'International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best Solution', p. 665.
43. See Bukhard Schmitt, ed., European Armaments Cooperation: Core Documents (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers no. 59, April 2003).
44. Gordon Adams, 'Fortress America in A Changing Transatlantic Defense Market,' in Burkhard Schmitt, ed., Between Cooperation and Competition: The Transatlantic Defense Market (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers no. 44, January 2001), p. 3.
45. Defense Science Board, International Armaments Collaboration, p. 7.
46. William Keller and Janne E. Nolan, 'Mortgaging Security for Economic Gain: US Arms Policy In An Insecure World,' International Studies Perspectives, vol. 2, 2001, p. 183.
47. Ibid.
48. Peter C. Evans, 'Competing for Foreign Military Contracts: The Financial Connection', unpublished manuscript, MIT Department of Political Science, downloaded from web.mit.edu/ssp/spring03/evans.htm.
49. James Morrow, 'Arms versus Allies: Tradeoffs in the Search for Security,' International Organization, vol. 47, 1993, pp. 207-233.
50. See Ethan B. Kapstein, 'International Collaboration in Armaments Production: A Second-Best Solution', p. 661.
51. Lockheed Martin Press Release, 'Lockheed Martin Team Wins Joint Strike Fighter Competition,' 26 October 2001.
52. Ibid.
53. See Anne Marie Squeo and Daniel Michaels, 'US Changes the Rules in High Stakes Venture of Selling Military Jets', p. 1.
54. John Birkler, et.al., Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter: Opportunities and Options, p. 87.
55. Mark Lorell, The US Combat Aircraft Industry, 1990-2000: Structure, Competition, Innovation.
56. Lockheed Martin Press Release, 'Lockheed Martin Team Wins Joint Strike Fighter Competition', 26 October 2001.
57. General Accounting Office, Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Development Schedule Should Be Changed to Reduce Risks (Washington DC: General Accounting Office, 16 March 2000).
58. See CIA, 'Germany: National Security Situation', http://www.cia.gov/nic/ PDF_GIF_research/defensemkts/germany.pdf
59. and Joseph Fitchett, 'From Bottom to Top of Political Agenda, Eurofighter May Finally Fly', International Herald Tribune, 17 June 1997, p. 13.
60. Christopher Bolkcom, Joint Strike Fighter: Background, Status and Issues (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 15 February 2002).
61. General Accounting Office, Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Cooperative Program Needs Greater Oversight to Ensure Goals are Met (Washington DC: General Accounting Office, July 2003), p. 1.
62. Lincoln Bloomfield, 'Export Control', Remarks to the Aerospace Industries Association of America (AIAA) Conference, Washington DC, 20 February 2002, downloaded at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2002/ 8514.htm.
63. Douglas Barrie, 'Disjointed Strike Fighter', International Defense, vol. 158, no. 20, p. 28.
64. For a formal model of these arguments, see Paul Levine and Ron Smith, 'Arms Export Controls and Proliferation', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol 44, no. 6 December 2000, pp. 885-895.
65. General Accounting Office, Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Cooperative Program Needs Greater Oversight to Ensure Goals are Met), p. 1.