Multiplicative homomorphic e-voting

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3348, Issue , 2004, Pages 61-72

  Peng, Kun ^a   Aditya, Riza ^a   Boyd, Colin ^a   Dawson, Ed ^a   Lee, Byoungcheon ^a,b  

^a QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Australia)

^b Joongbu University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

E-VOTING; PHASE A; PUBLIC VERIFIABILITY; VOTER PRIVACIES; VOTING SCHEMES;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; CRYPTOGRAPHY;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTERS;

EID: 33746345491     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-30556-9_6     Document Type: Article

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