Finding and retaining the dominant strategy: The second-price, English and 'sealed offer' English auctions

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 60, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 553-561

  Bernard, John C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Experiments

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746269733     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.020     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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2. Cox J.C., Roberson B., and Smith V.L. Theory and behavior of single object auctions. In: Smith V.L. (Ed). Research in Experimental Economics vol. 2 (1982), JAI Press, Greenwich, CT 1-43
3. Greene W.H. Econometric analysis. Upper Saddle River. 4th ed. (2000), Prentice Hall Inc., NJ
4. Harstad R.M. Dominant strategy adoption and bidders' experience with pricing rules. Experimental Economics 2 (2000) 261-280
5. Kagel J.H., Harstad R.M., and Levin D. Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: a laboratory study. Econometrica 55 (1987) 1275-1304
6. Kagel J.H., and Levin D. Behavior in multi-unit demand auctions: experiments with uniform price and dynamic Vickrey auctions. Econometrica 69 (2001) 413-454
7. Vickrey W. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16 (1961) 8-37
8. Westfall P.H., Tobias R.D., Rom D., Wolfinger R.D., and Hochberg Y. Multiple Comparisons and Multiple Tests Using the SAS System (1999), SAS Institute Inc., Carey, NC