Who is to blame, the operator or the designer? two stages of human failure in the Chernobyl accident

System Dynamics Review

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 89-112

  Salge, Markus ^a   Milling, Peter M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT; NUCLEAR POWER PLANT;

EID: 33746228537     PISSN: 08837066     EISSN: 10991727     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/sdr.334     Document Type: Article

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