Building local institutions and parliamentarianism in post-war Kosovo: A review of joint efforts by the UN and OSCE from 1999-2006

Helsinki Monitor

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 144-159

  Narten, Jens ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POST-WAR; SELF GOVERNMENT; UNITED NATIONS;

EURASIA; EUROPE; KOSOVO; SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO; SOUTHERN EUROPE;

EID: 33746218890     PISSN: 09250972     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/157181406777813554     Document Type: Review

References (49)

1. S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999), United Nations, Resolution 1244, adopted by the Security Council, 4011th meeting.
2. S/1999/779 (12 July 1999), United Nations, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo'.
3. PC.DEC/305 (1 July 1999), OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 305 of the 237th Plenary Meeting, PC Journal No. 237, Agenda item 2.
4. Letter exchanged between Ambassador Kim Traavik, Head of the OSCE Department, and Bernard Miyet, UN Department for Peace-Keeping Operations, 19 July 1999.
5. S/RES/1244, op. cit. paras. 10-11.
6. S/1999/779, op. cit. para. 79, reaffirmed by PC.DEC/3005, no. 2-3.
7. Ibid., paras 80 and 84,
8. reaffirmed by the Letter as of 19 July 1999, op. cit.
9. Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and Wolf-Christian Paes, 'Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army', in: BICC brief, No. 20/2001, p. 17.
10. At the same time, Kosovo experienced reversed ethnic violence and a reign of terror against Serb-speaking minority groups, alleged Kosovo-Albanian collaborators and critical journalists, which led to the expulsion of thousands of IDPs and to political intimidation; see OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 'Kosovo/Kosova. As Seen, As Told, Part II. A Report on the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, June to October 1999', Prishtina.
11. UN Mission in Kosovo, 'JIAS Fact Sheet: Joint Interim Administration Structure'; http://www.unmikonline.org/1styear/jias.htm (7 November 2005). This structure was mirrored at the municipal level with a threefold structure of UN administrators and local administrative councils and boards.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. The IAC agreed on 1 February 2000 on the immediate dissolution of existing parallel structures, which were defined as 'any body not authorized under resolution 1244 that claimed or exercised any form of public authority in Kosovo'; UN Mission in Kosovo, 'JIAS Fact Sheet',
15. op. cit.
16. Mission in Kosovo, 'Parallel Structures in Kosovo'; http://www.osce.org/ documents/mik/2003/10/698_en.pdf (7 November 2005).
17. This unit was later merged with the Municipal Assembly Support Unit and its Central Assembly equivalent; see OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 'Mission Survey'; http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13268.html (7 November 2005).
18. A similar division of labour with respect to voter registration was applied in the following elections in 2001, see OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 'Summary of the Operational Plan: Voter Registration and Election 2001', Department of Election Operations, Prishtina, p. 5.
19. The functions of municipal institutions and their powers transferred from UNMIK are delineated in UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/45 as of 11 August 2000: 'Regulation on Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo'.
20. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 'Boycott at the Municipal Level'; http:// www.osce.org/documents/mik/2003/05/711_en.pdf (7 November 2005).
21. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 'Assessment of Municipal Communities Committees'; http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2004/03/2335_en.pdf (7 November 2005).
22. The appointment of municipal co-directors by the SRSG following the municipal elections in 2000 challenged the principle of the legal authority of democratically elected representatives, since most of the appointed co-directors were given exclusive financial oversight, whereas elected directors were often left with mere decision-making power and lacked financial resources to implement those decisions.
23. Paras. 4.6 and 9.1.45 in combination with chapter 12 of UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9.
24. This also included the recruitment of professional translators, from Albanian into Serbian, and security arrangements for Kosovo-Serb deputies.
25. Report Submitted by UNMIK Pursuant to Article 2.2 of the Agreement Between UNMIK and the Council of Europe Related to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (02 June 2005), Council of Europe Document ACFC(2005)003, p.5. There is currently a lack of accurate demographic data on Kosovo. Consequently, the figure of six per cent must be considered as an estimate. The last commonly accepted census took place in 1981, another was held in 1991. A new census is planned for November 2006.
26. Apart from the ten seats for Kosovo-Serbs, four seats are reserved for Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian representatives, three for Bosniak, two for Turkish, and one for a Gorani representative; see paras. 9.1.3/b of UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9 as of 15 May 2001, 'Regulation on Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo'.
27. Helmut Kramer/Vedran Dzihic, 'Die Kosovo-Bilanz - Scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft?', Vienna, p. 260.
28. Translators were borrowed on a case-by-case basis from UNMIK, while there was also a need for extra office and meeting rooms for parliamentarians and for technical equipment, such as computers or telephone lines, reflecting the lack of necessary parliamentary infrastructure following the first elections.
29. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 'Report on Political Party Annual Financial Reports for the Years 2002 and 2003', Department of Elections - Political Party Registration Office; http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/ 2004/06/3082_en.pdf (7 November 2005).
30. Notably, the initiative did not include the UN pillar of UNMIK, which had expressed political reservations about being co-ordinated by the OMIK.
31. ASI issued a Public Hearing Manual as extra guidance for the Assembly members, see Assembly Support Initiative, 'Assembly of Kosovo Public Hearing Manual', NDI Prishtina; http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2004/ 05/2932_en.pdf (7 November 2005).
32. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 'Central Governance'; http://www.osce.org/kosovo/ 13370.html (7 November 2005).
33. See also Assembly Support Initiative, 'Matrix of ASI Programmes and Activities in 2004'; http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2004/05/ 2931_en.pdf (7 November 2005);
34. and 'ASI Newsletter', No. 18; http://www.osce.org/publications/mik/2005/ 07/15785_431_en.pdf (7 November 2005).
35. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 'Implementation of Kosovo Assembly Laws by the Executive Branch of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government - Review Period: Laws Promulgated in 2002-2003', Prishtina, January 2005, p. 20 ff.; http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/01/4099_en.pdf (7 November 2005).
36. S/RES/1244, op. cit., para. 11/e.
37. The benchmarks comprised functioning democratic institutions: the rule of law, freedom of movement, returns and reintegration, the economy, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade and the Kosovo Protections Corps, see UN Mission in Kosovo, 'Standards before Status', Prishtina, April 2002.
38. David Buerstedde, 'Violence in Kosovo Calls for a Fresh Look at the Mission's Priorities', in: OSCE Yearbook 2004, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), Baden-Baden: Nomos 2005, p. 135-145.
39. UNMIK/PISG, 'Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan', Prishtina, 31 March 2004; http://www.unkmikonline.org/pub/misc/ksip_eng.pdf (7 November 2005).
40. For an overview of the immediate reactions following the outbreak of violence in March 2004 see Franklin de Vrieze, 'Kosovo after the March 2004 Crisis', Helsinki Monitor, vol. 15, no.3, p. 147-159.
41. Eide Report, 'Report on the Situation in Kosovo', on behalf of the UN Secretary-General and submitted to the President of the UN Security Council on 6 August 2004, pp. 3 and 15.
42. After only 100 days in office, Haradinaj had to resign from the prime minister's post after being indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The deputy head of AAK Bajram Kosumi took over as prime minister.
43. The initial recommendation by Eide to give Serbs more authority in areas with a concentrated population was watered down when the Serb municipalities of Gracanica and Partes, which had been foreseen as pilot municipalities, were chosen to merge with neighbouring Albanian-populated villages; ibid. p. 3.
44. Eide Report, 'A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo', on behalf of the UN Secretary-General and submitted to the President of the UN Security Council on 7 October 2005, see 'Terms of Reference'.
45. Members of the negotiation team, including representatives from the Assembly, PISG ministries and political parties, were trained in their negotiation skills by an American law school on behalf of OMIK in October and November 2005, in preparation for the status talks.
46. Ibid., pp. 15 f. With his recommendation to integrate Kosovo into international structures, it can be argued that Eide pre-shaped the vision of 'conditional independence' for Kosovo prior to the commencement of the future status talks.
47. Ibid., pp. 4 ff.
48. In this context, Eide also recommended that parallel structures in Kosovo-Serb enclaves be turned into legitimate entities with decentralized competencies in areas such as the police, judiciary, education, culture, media and the economy and with horizontal links among the Kosovo-Serb municipalities, but without decision-making authority for Belgrade; ibid., p. 12.
49. Ibid., pp. 4 f.