On the core of characteristic function games associated with exchange networks

Social Networks

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 397-426

  Sozański, Tadeusz ^a  

^a JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY   (Poland)

Author keywords

Assignment game; Core; Exchange network; Game in characteristic function form; Game theory; Graph theory; Matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746192167     PISSN: 03788733     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socnet.2005.08.001     Document Type: Article

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