What should a correspondence theory be and do?

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 127, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 415-457

  Marino, Patricia ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746156390     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-004-7813-2     Document Type: Article

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