Davidson on first-person authority and externalism

Inquiry (United Kingdom)

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 121-139

  Bernecker, Sven ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746153965     PISSN: 0020174X     EISSN: 15023923     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00201749608602410     Document Type: Article

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