Mastering "irrational" violence: The relegitimization of French security policy in sub-saharan Africa

Alternatives

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 215-241

  Charbonneau, Bruno ^a  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

France Afrique; France security policy; Mastery of violence; Military cooperation; RECAMP

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746116438     PISSN: 03043754     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030437540603100205     Document Type: Article

References (95)

1. On France's involvement in the genocide, see, among others, Laure Coret and François-Xavier Verschave, eds., L'horreur qui nous prend au visage: L'État fraņais et le gȩnocide au Rwanda, Rapport de la Commission d'enquête citoyenne (Paris: Karthala, 2005);
2. Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, L'inavouable, La France au Rwanda (Paris: Les Arènes, 2004);
3. Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995/1997);
4. Mel McNulty, French Arms, War and Genocide in Rwanda," Crime, Law & Social Change 33, no. 1-2 (March 2000): 105-129.
5. In French military doctrine, prevention aims to tackle conflicts before they escalate and is based on the capability and willingness to intervene rapidly and pre-emptively if necessary. Thus, it also depends on the means of projection being credible.
6. The Loi de programmation is available at: http://www.senat.fr/ dossierleg/pjl02-084.html; and the defense budgets at: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/.
7. On the transformation of the French military in general and in Africa, see Shaun Gregory, "The French Military in Africa: Past and Present," African Affairs 99, no. 396 (July 2000): 435-448;
8. Tony Chafer, "Franco-African Relations: No Longer so Exceptional?" African Affairs 101, no. 404 (July 2002): 343-363;
9. George A. Bloch, "French Military Reform: Lessons for America's Army?" Parameters 30, no. 2 (summer 2000): 33-45.
10. Great examples of such texts are found in Pierre Pascallon, ed., La politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004).
11. In the literature and official documents, RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités africaines au maintien de la paix) is referred to as either a concept or a program and usually as both. RECAMP is a concept that symbolizes the "new" security policy and that comprises various programs of training, military exercise, and so on.
12. Gregory, note 4, p. 442.
13. John Chipman, French Power in Africa (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 12.
14. On the réseaux, the literature has become extensive. Among others, see François-Xavier Verschave, Noir Chirac, Secret et impunité, (Paris: Les Arènes, 2002);
15. François-Xavier Verschave, Noir Silence, Qui arrêtera la Francafrique? (Paris: Les Arènes, 2000);
16. Claude Wauthier, Quatre Présidents et l'Afrique:De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d"Estaing, Mitterrand (Paris: éditions du Seuil, 1995).
17. The CFA franc was pegged to the French franc at a fixed rate. The advent of the euro did not undermine the rules of the Franc zone monetary regime which have been remarkably permanent. The Maastricht Treaty clearly stated that the zone would not be affected for it was the French Treasury and not the Banque de France that guaranteed the convertibility of the CFA franc.
18. The best account of these changes is Chafer, note 4, pp. 343-363.
19. Belkacem Elomari, La coopération militaire française en question, (Lyon: Observatoire des transferts d'armements, 2001).
20. For example, see Pascal Chaigneau, "La France, ex-puissance africaine?";
21. André R. Lewin, "Contre la banalisation des relations francoafricaines";
22. Michel Roussin, "II n'y a pas de désaffection de la France pour l'Afrique";
23. Jean de la Guérivière, "La France Out of Africa? " all in African Geopolitics 3 (summer 2001), http://www.african-geopolitics.org/.
24. A list of French military intervention in Africa between 1945 and 2005 was compiled in the summer of 2005 from documents describing the various interventions that were published on the Collège Interarmées de Défense website. As of this writing however (March 2006), the documents do not seem to be available online anymore, although I have in my possession the printed version of these documents, http://www.college.interarmees.defense.gouv.fr/.
25. Chafer, note 4, p. 362.
26. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?" The National Interest 16 (summer 1989): 3-18.
27. The democratic peace literature is representative of this misleading exercise in foretelling. The literature is extensive. A good starting point remains Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993);
28. Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
29. The classic example is Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2d ed., (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991).
30. Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, "Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergencies," Alternatives 25, no. 2, April-June 2000: 118.
31. Mark Duffield, "Globalization and War Economies: Promoting Order or the Return of History?" The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 23, no. 2 (fall 1999): 25.
32. Interview, Paris, November 2004. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.
33. Interview, Paris, November 2004.
34. Pierre-André Wiltzer, "Sécurité collective et développement en Afrique," Défense nationale 12 (December 2003): 7.
35. Pierre-André Wiltzer, "Sécurité collective et développement en Afrique," in Pascallon, note 5, p. 297.
36. General François de Vaissière, "Coopération militaire avec les pays africains: bilan et perspectives," in Pascallon, note 5, p. 170.
37. Dominique de Villepin, "La nouvelle politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique," IHEDN speech of June 13, 2003, in Pascallon, note 5, p. 385.
38. The best account of the merging of security and development is Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed Books, 2001).
39. Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, "Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security and War," Millennium 30, no. 1 (2001): 41-66.
40. Bloch, note 4, p. 36.
41. General J.-M. Veyrat, "Land Forces Employment," in GOES, "The Land Forces Current Doctrine, 1/2," Objectif Doctrine, no. 39, bilingual edition (Paris: Ministère de la Défense, 2003): 15.
42. The TTA 900 manual is highly technical and not widely distributed. Hence, I use Loup Francart with the collaboration of Jean-Jacques Patry, Maîtriser la violence, une option stratégique, 2d ed. (Paris: Economica, 2002).
43. One can also read Commandement de la Doctrine et de l'Enseignement militaire Supérieur (CDES), L'action des forces terrestres au contact des réalités: une nouvelle approche doctrinale (Paris: CDES, 2000).
44. The "Civilized" do not intervene for purely altruistic reasons, of course. From this worldview, the national interest, however defined, demands at the very least the protection of France from destabilizing elements on its borders.
45. Francart distinguishes civilization from culture by stating that the former is continental and that the latter is regional in nature. Francart, note 31, p. 59.
46. Ibid., pp. 55-87.
47. Ibid., p. 67. My emphases. This formulation is reminiscent of democratic peace theory: If the form of government is the primary root of conflict, to make every state a democracy will solve every conflict. For example, see Russett, note 17.
48. Francart, note 31, pp. 67-71.
49. Ibid., p. 152.
50. Ibid., pp. 151-171.
51. Ibid., p. 171.
52. As Bagayoko-Penone points out, even though many French officers claim that the experiences of the African continent had little to do with it and that it was the experiences of the Balkans that largely inspired the doctrine, the mastery of violence demands a thorough analysis because it is the foundation of the teachings given to African militaries and of French military intervention in Africa. Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone, Afrique: les stratégies française et américaine (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003), p. 286.
53. Francart distinguishes between a variety of violent dynamics: politically engaged and instrumental violence used consciously to arrive at a given objective; insurrectionary violence that develops from social disorder; institutional violence usually aimed at non-democratic governments in response to the above dynamics; Mafia-like violence that grows from political instability and that increases criminal practices; and non-violence that draws from spiritual and moral forces. Francart, note 31, pp. 26-46.
54. Ibid., pp. 351-369.
55. Ibid., pp. 183-226.
56. Ibid., pp. 257-274.
57. Ibid., pp. 288-289.
58. Ibid., pp. 275-312.
59. "There are in fact no masses; there are only ways of seeing people as masses." Raymond Williams cited in Elwis Potier, "Imaginaire du contrôle des foules dans l'armée de terre française," Cultures & Conflits 56 (2005). Article without page numbers is available at http://www.conflits.org/.
60. Francart, note 31, p. 235.
61. Potier, note 47.
62. Francart expands the mastery of information in Loup Francart, La guerre du sens. Pourquoi et comment agir dans les champs psychologiques (Paris: Economica, 2000).
63. See also François Chauvancy, "Les opérations sur l'information," in CUES, "The Land Forces Current Doctrine, 2/2, " Objectif Doctrine, no. 40, bilingual edition, (Paris: Ministère de la Défense, 2003): 44-49.
64. Bagayoko-Penone, note 40, p. 292. In other words, the informal networks of the Franco-African relationship compete for power and influence.
65. Francart, note 31, pp. 340-341.
66. Francart, note 50, chapters 5-8.
67. The principles are: freedom of thought and expression, truthfulness, credibility, distance vis-à-vis the conflict, and adaptability. And yet, he writes: "Also notice that these principles are only principles. They only have a value as guides for action. They cannot be interpreted as rules or laws. Any engagement in action can sometimes necessitate to depart from these principles that are supposed to guide the action." Ibid., p. 68.
68. Francart, note 31, p. 337.
69. Francart, note 50, p. 65.
70. Frano̧ois Chauvancy, note 50, p. 49.
71. Or if one prefers, marketing campaigns and public relations campaigns.
72. Pierre Pascallon, "Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique?" in Pascallon, note 5, p. 30. It should be noted that, formally, traditional military cooperation was "outdated" in the sense that it did not reflect the "realities" of the strategic environment anymore. From the mainstream perspective, the required changes had nothing to do with transforming the instruments of hegemony in order to respond to criticism of neocolonialism, but only with adapting to new external circumstances.
73. Gabriel de Bellescize, "Le maintien de la paix en Afrique: la France et le programme Recamp," Afrique contemporaine 191 (1999): 27. Bellescize was the then-RECAMP ambassador.
74. Gregory, note 4, p. 442.
75. Ibid.
76. On the series of conferences and accords regarding peacekeeping in Africa and related to RECAMP, see Bellescize, note 6, pp. 7-28.
77. Bagayoko-Penone, note 40, pp. 481-484.
78. From here on, unless otherwise noted, my discussion of RECAMP is based on the official document: Etat-major des Armées, PIA 03.121 Concept de renforcement des capacités africaines au maintien de la paix (RE. C.A.M.P.), No 970/DEF/EMA/EMP.l/NP, September 21, 2004.
79. This is what one can find in the official documents that concern RECAMP. However, and oddly enough, when I visited the DCMD in Paris in November 2004, the two officers I spoke with were surprised to learn that French military schools were dispensing peacekeeping training. According to them, these schools do not differentiate between basic military training and peacekeeping just like French military doctrine.
80. It was the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix de Zambakro that was supposed to play this role. It was a Franco-Ivorian project, but the incidents of 2002 closed the school.
81. Training courses are one to three weeks in length. They are provided not by France, but by the staff of the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, which participates in the RECAMP project with the help of the Canadian International Development Agency. The number of officers that can go through the school at Koulikouro in a month is very limited due to the small number of beds and rooms available. Interview with the centre's official in charge of this project, Montreal, August 2005. For information on the Canadian participation, see the official website: http:// www.pdcmps.ca/.
82. Interview, Paris, November 2004.
83. François Lamy, Avis, Défense, Affaires étrangéres, Projet de loi de finances pour 2005, tome 1, Assemblée nationale, no. 1867, October 13, 2004.
84. Bagayoko-Penone, note 40, p. 480.
85. Pierre Messmer, "Géopolitique africaine et interventions militaires," in Pascallon, note 5, p. 41.
86. See also Lt-Colonel Olivier de Cevins, "Pour que Recamp ne rime plus avec décampe," Défense nationale, no. 3 (March 2003): 80-90.
87. Pascallon, "Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique?" in Pascallon, note 5, p. 34. My emphasis.
88. Interview, Paris, November 2004.
89. Guy Azaïs, "La France et les capacités africaines en matière de maintien de la paix," in Pascallon, note 5, pp. 136-141.
90. François de Vaissière, "Coopération militaire avec les pays africains: bilan et perspectives," in Pascallon, note 5, pp. 165-169.
91. Bellescize, note 60, p. 11.
92. See also Jean-Pierre Petit, "La problé matique des conflits en Afrique," in Pascallon, note 5, p. 199;
93. Emmanuel Dupuy, "Le militaire africain, acteur et sujet des relations internationales," in Pascallon, note 5, p. 213;
94. François Gaulme, Intervenir en Afrique? Le dilemme franco-britannique (Paris: Notes de l'Ifri 34, 2001).
95. For examples, see notes 1 and 9 above.