Counterfactuals as short stories

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 129, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 81-117

  Kim, Seahwa ^a   Maslen, Cei ^b  

^a Seoul National University of Science and Technology   (South Korea)

^b VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746112962     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-005-3022-x     Document Type: Article

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