The aftermath of 11 September 2001: Liberty vs. security before the Supreme Court of Canada

International Journal of Refugee Law

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 313-332

  Coutu, Michel ^a   Giroux, Marie Helène ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HUMAN RIGHTS; NATIONAL SECURITY; ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK; POLICY IMPLEMENTATION; POLITICAL CONFLICT; TERRORISM; WAR;

CANADA; NORTH AMERICA;

EID: 33746042985     PISSN: 09538186     EISSN: 14643715     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ijrl/eel013     Document Type: Article

References (94)

1. On this fundamental change of paradigm, see Dieter Grimm, Die Verfassung und die Politik. Einsprüche in Störfällen, Munich, C. H. Beck, 2001, 303 and following. (Professor Grimm is a former judge of the German Constitutional Court).
2. SC, 2001, c. 41.
3. See the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, HR 3162, 107th Congress, 1st Session, Oct. 24, 2001 (US).
4. See the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), [2004] 2 SCR 248, where the majority of the Court upheld section 83.28 of the Criminal Code (RSC 1985, c. C-46) as amended by the Anti-terrorism Act, SC 2001, c. 41. Section 83.28 requires judges to preside over police investigations in matters of terrorism, such investigations being normally the responsibility of the executive branch of the State. According to the dissenting Judges (JJ. Lebel and Fish), Section 83.28 compromises the institutional dimension of judicial independence and should have been declared unconstitutional.
5. See also Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 RCS 332.
6. See the 6th paragraph of the Preamble of the Anti-Terrorism Act: 'WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada, recognizing that terrorism is a matter of national concern that affects the security of the nation, is committed to taking comprehensive measures to protect Canadians against terrorist activity while continuing to respect and promote the values reflected in, and the rights and freedoms guaranteed by, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms'.
7. See Stephen Clarkson, Uncle Sam and Us. Globalization, Neoconservatism and the Canadian State. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2002.
8. Michel Coutu, 'Légitimité et constitution. Les trois types purs de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle', in Droit et Société, 56-57/ 2004, 1-24.
9. Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. II, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968.
10. Roscoe Pound, 'The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence', (1911-12) 25 Harvard Law Review 140-168.
11. E.g.: Hermann Kantorowicz, 'Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft' (1906), in Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie, Karlsruhe, Verlag C. F. Müller, 1962.
12. See François Gény, Science et technique en droit privé positif. Nouvelle contribution à la critique de la méthode juridique, Paris, Librairie de la Société du Recueil Sirey, 1915.
13. Instrumental jurisprudence remains the fundamental aim of legal realists. In a broad sense, we mean by legal realism any current of contemporary legal thought that firmly rejects legal formalism and wants adjudication to be guided, to some degree at least, by concrete enquiries of a sociolegal nature. We therefore include in legal realism, not only the school of thought created around Karl Llewellynn, but also the American 'Sociological Jurisprudence' movement and, first and foremost (from an historical standpoint), the German 'Jurisprudence of Interests' and 'Free Law Movement', as well as French legal thinkers such as Gény and Saleilles, to name but a few. (True, elements of value jurisprudence were not alien to legal realism. See the importance given by R. Pound to Rudolf Stammler and the Neo-kantian school of natural law, or H. Kantorowicz's ambiguous statements about Freirecht as being a new form of Naturrecht, or Saleilles's enthusiastic comments about the renewal of natural law.
14. See Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence, vol. 1, St-Paul, West Publishing Co., 1959, 142-158
15. Hermann Kantorowicz, 'Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft, above n. 10, 13-39
16. Raymond Saleilles, 'École historique et droit naturel' in Revue trimestrielle de droit civil, no. 1, 1902, 80 and following.
17. See also François Gény, Science et technique en droit privé positif. Nouvelle contribution à la critique de la méthode juridique, above n. 11, Part II: 'Élaboration scientifique du droit positif (L'irréductible 'droit naturel')'. However, those elements of the natural law tradition are certainly not the main point here, which remains the search for an objective instrumental jurisprudence of a sociolegal nature.)
18. The reasoning of Powell, J. in University of California Regents v. Bakke 438 US 267 (1978) provides a good illustration of such an instrumental jurisprudence.
19. See also Brown v. Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954).
20. The term 'Jurisprudence of Values' is a translation of the German Wertungjurisprudenz, quite frequently used to describe the standpoint of the German Constitutional Court. See Bodo Pieroth, Bernhard Schlink, Grundrechte. Staatsrecht II, 17th ed., Heidelberg, C. F. Müller Verlag, 2001, 20 and following
21. Olivier Jouanjan, Le principe d'égalité devant la loi en droit allemand, coll. 'Droit public positif, Paris, Economica, 1992, 170 and following
22. Ernst-Wolgang Böckenförde, Wie werden in Deutschland die Grundrechte im Verfassungsrecht interpretiert?, in Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift, vol. 31, no. 20-21, 2004, 598-603. Of course, the complex case-law of the German Constitutional Court should in no way be equated, as a whole, with the ideal-type of 'Value Jurisprudence' portrayed here.
23. Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. I, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, 36 and following, 212 and following.
24. Hans Kelsen, 'Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein?', Die Justiz, vol. 6. 1930-1931, 576-628.
25. Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung, 3rd ed., Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1985.
26. Schmitt's thesis paved the way to the constitutional dictatorship Hindenburg exerted on the basis of article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, which in turn facilitated Hitler's seizure of power.
27. Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftlich Problematik (1934), Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1994, 16 and following.
28. See Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, 3rd ed., Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1979, where Schmitt mentions (51 and following) the 'sociology of legal concepts' (Soziologie juristischer Begriffe). But this 'sociology' has nothing to do with the empirical science exerted by Max Weber.
29. Cf. the illuminating comments of Catherine Colliot-Thélène, 'Carl Schmitt contre Max Weber: Rationalité juridique et rationalité économique', in Carlos-Miguel Herrera, Le droit, le politique, Autour de Max Weber, Hans Kelsen, Carl Schmitt, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1995, 205-227.
30. The judgment of the US Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 US 214 (1944) offers a clear example of the abdication of formal jurisprudence to Governmental decisionism when confronted with an emergency situation.
31. [2001] 1 SCR 283.
32. 1982, c. 11 (UK).
33. [1991] 2 SCR 779.
34. 'As this Court has previously stated, while the decisions of the executive are, of course, subject to judicial review, the jurisdiction of courts to interfere with the executive's exercise of discretion in this area 'must be exercised with the utmost circumspection consistent with the executive's pre-eminent position in matters of external relations'; see Argentina v. Mellino, at 557-58.
35. 'The executive has a much greater expertise than the Court in the area of foreign relations, and is in a better position to evaluate many of the considerations which have been set forth above. I do not think the appellant has discharged the burden of establishing that his rights under the Charter have been violated'. (Kindler, Reasons for Judgment per LaForest, J., 837).
36. Reference Re Ng Extradition (Can.), [1991] 2 SCR 858.
37. Burns, para. 35 (emphasis added).
38. 'We affirm that it is generally for the Minister, not the Court, to assess the weight of competing considerations in extradition policy, but the availability of the death penalty, like death itself, opens up a different dimension. The difficulties and occasional miscarriages of the criminal law are located in an area of human experience that falls squarely within "the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice system": Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra, at 503.
39. It is from this perspective, recognizing the unique finality and irreversibility of the death penalty, that the constitutionality of the Minister's decision falls to be decided' (ibid., para. 38).
40. Eur. TS No. 24, Art. 11.
41. Eur. TS No. 114.
42. 29 ILM 1447.
43. Burns, para. 89.
44. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 RCS 3, para. 4.
45. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada has also been published in 14 IJRL 96 (2002).
46. For an overview of Canadian policy pertaining to refugees when security matters are involved, see James Sloan, 'The Application of Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention in Canada and the United States', 12 IJRL 222-248 (2000).
47. Can. TS 1976, No. 47, Arts. 4 and 7.
48. Can. TS 1987, No. 36, Arts.1, 2(1), 3(1), 16(2), 17 and following.
49. Suresh, para. 75.
50. Suresh, para. 60.
51. Ibid., para. 78.
52. The Court adds: 'A violation of s. 7 will be saved by s. 1 "only in cases arising out of exceptional conditions, such as natural disasters, the outbreak of war, epidemics and the like': See Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra, at 518
53. and New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) a. G. (J.), [1999] 3 SCR 46, at para. 99.'
54. RSC 1985, c. I-2.
55. See Audrey Macklin, 'Mr Suresh and the Evil Twin', in (2002) 20 Refuge 18: 'In the course of the judgment, the Court diminishes the authoritative force of international law by implying that Canada's treaty obligations regarding torture had never been formally incorporated into Canadian law, and thus do not bind Canada',
56. Cf. Suresh, para. 39: 'The court may not reweigh the factors considered by the Minister, but may intervene if the decision is not supported by the evidence or fails to consider the appropriated factors ... This is consistent with the reasoning of this Court in Kindler, supra, at 836-37, where considerable deference was shown to ministerial decisions involving similar considerations in the context of a constitutional revision, that is in the context of a decision where the s.7 interest was engaged'.
57. Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1988] 1 SCR 982.
58. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817.
59. Suresh, para. 39.
60. Burns, para. 38.
61. Kindler, 849.
62. Suresh, para. 122.
63. Suresh, para. 126.
64. Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 SCR 72.
65. This is self-evident when reading of the decisions of the Federal Court. See: Re Ahani, Federal Court, Trial Division, 17 Apr. 1998, FCT DES-4-93 (Denault, J.).
66. Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Federal Court, Trial Division, 23 June 1999, FCT IMM-4204-98 (McGillis, J.).
67. Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Federal Court of Appeal, 18 Jan. 2000, FCA A-413-99, (Décary, Linden and Robertson, JJ.).
68. Ahani, para. 16.
69. Ahani, para. 16.
70. Ahani, para. 17.
71. Ahani, para. 17.
72. Ahani, para. 25.
73. Ahani, para. 26.
74. [2001] UKHL 47.
75. See David Dyzenhaus, 'Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law', (2002) 27 Queen's LJ 445, 506: 'On the other hand, the Court undermined Baker's jurisprudence on substantive review, because the Court followed Lord Hoffman's abject dictum ... that September 11th underlined the need to give ministers an unfettered discretion when it comes to the determination of national security'.
76. Suresh, para. 33.
77. Suresh, para. 87 (emphasis added).
78. [2002] OJ No. 81 (Dambrot, J.).
79. Ahani v. Canada (Attorney-General), cases C37565; M28156; 8 Feb. 2002 (Laskin, Charron and Rosenberg, JJ.).
80. Bulletin of Proceedings, Supreme Court of Canada, 16 May 2002, no. 29058 (Bastarache, Binnie and L'Heureux-Dubé, JJ.).
81. http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Can-summary-eng.
82. ICCPR Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1051/2002: Canada. 15/06/ 2004. CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002, 15 June 2004.
83. See also the communication of the Committee against Torture in the Falcón Rios Case, Communication No. 133/1999: Canada 17/12/2004. CAT/ C/33/D/133/1999, Dec. 17, 2004
84. (also published in 17 IJRL 416-426 (2005)).
85. Ibid., paragraph 8.1.
86. On Canada's lack of respect for the Human Rights Committee's requests for interim measures, see Joanna Harrington, 'Punting Terrorists, Assassins and Other Undesirables: Canada, the Human Rights Committee and Requests for Interim Measures of Protection', (2003) 48 McGill LJ 55, 86: 'By allowing Canada to disregard requests for interim measures from a body such as the Human Rights Committee, the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada have, in essence, gutted the right of individual petition of all utility, since any subsequent finding of a violation will be impossible to remedy with the individual outside Canada's jurisdiction ... Canada is therefore acting in bad faith with respect to its treaty commitments when it engages in acts that have the effect of preventing or frustrating the consideration of a communication by the Committee and rendering the outcome nugatory'.
87. Suresh v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2003 FCT 746, 10 June 2003, Federal Court, Trial Division (Teitelbaum, J.).
88. Michel Coutu, 'La Cour suprême du Canada et la problématique de la légitimité : Une américanisation du droit canadien?', Centre de recherche en droit public, Université de Montréal, Dec., 15, 2002 (working paper).
89. That legitimation is deeply weakened when basic values put forward by the Supreme Court are dissociated from the rules of international human rights law. There is then a real danger of drifting into substantive irrationality, what Max Weber and other legal scholars called at one time (perhaps unjustly) 'Khadi justice'. See, e.g., the reasoning of the majority in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SSC 68, Oct. 28, 2002 and the strong dissent by Gonthier, J., who espoused in part (and not without contradictions) the standpoint of value relativism. In other words, scholarly reference to international law injects a strong element of normative objectivity into value jurisprudence. Without it (or a functional equivalent, like comparative public law), this kind of adjudication easily becomes tainted with pure subjectivity.
90. A. V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., London, Macmillan, 1959, 39.
91. We put aside here considerations about the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998, c.42 and of EC law on the sovereignty of United Kingdom Parliament. On those two matters, see, P. P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, 303 and following, 568 and following.
92. See also Obiera C. Okafor, Pius L. Okoronkwo, 'Re-configuring Non-refoulement? The Suresh Decision, "Security Relativism", and the International Human Rights Imperative', in 15 IJRL 30-67 (2003).
93. Cf. Ulrich BECK, Was ist Globalisierung?, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1997, 73 and following.
94. See Audrey Macklin, 'Mr Suresh and the Evil Twin', above, 21: 'When the Court declares in Suresh that "Parliament's challenge is to draft laws that effectively combat terrorism and conform to the requirements of our Constitution and our international commitments', they omit to add that the judiciary's task is to ensure not only that those laws are constitutional on paper, but also scrutinize the implementation of those laws so that human lives do not fall through the cracks of discretion into a dark space where the law does not reach'.