Theoretical aspects of military logistics

Defense and Security Analysis

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 159-177

  Prebilič, Vladimir ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA   (Slovenia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LOGISTICS; MILITARY INTERVENTION; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT;

EID: 33745988537     PISSN: 14751798     EISSN: 14751801     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14751790600764037     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. John A. Lynn; Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, chapter 7.
2. Edward Luttwak, The Endangered American Dream, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993, p. 5.
3. Hans Kettgen, "Gedanken über Logistik in Theorie und Praxis", Wehrkunde, Vol. 7/8 No. 13, 1964, p. 28.
4. Logistik-Etymologische Abteilung Logistischen Mitteilungsblatt, Heft 4, Logistikschule der Bundeswehr, 1967, pp. 33-35.
5. Jerome Peppers, History of United States Military Logistics 1935-1985, Huntsville, Alabama: Logistics Education Foundation, 1988, p. 6.
6. Henry Eccles, Logistic in the National Defense, Harrisburg: Telegraph Press, 1959, p. 2.
7. Trevor Dupuy (ed.), International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, Vol. 5, Washington DC: Brassey's, 1993, p. 1493; and in Vol. 6, 1993, pp. 2573-2577 and 2657-2665.
8. Duncan Ballantine, US Naval Logistic in the Second World War, New York: Princeton University Press, 1988.
9. Ibid., p. 3.
10. Department of Defense, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, Washington: DoD, 1995, pp. V-VI.
11. Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz and Jonimi: Their Interaction, paper presented to the 23rd Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State University, 1993, pp. 1-12, http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm, accessed 8 March 2004.
12. Carl Clausewitz, On War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 14.
13. Ibid., p. 244.
14. Antoine Jomini, The Art of War, New York: Greenwood Press, 1971, pp. 32-46.
15. Clifford Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate - Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 13-14.
16. Larry Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff 1865-1941, New York: New Brunswick Press, 1971, pp. 111-115.
17. Die Logistik der Bundeswehr im neuen Aufgabenspektrum, 1998, p. 22.
18. Johann Allmayer-Beck, Eine geistige Trilogie des 19. Jahrhunderts und ihre Bedeutung für die Gegenwart, Wien: Hrsg. Von der Gesellschaft für Politisch-Strategie Studien, Österreichischen Bundesverlag, 1988, p. 47.
19. George Ebner, Scientific Optimism: Jomini and the US Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 2004, pp. 1-6, http://www.cgsc.army.mil/csi/research/writtinh/Papers%20C600/ Commendebner2.asp, accessed 8 March 2004.
20. Intensity of the combat is understood as the amount of the used military material in a particular period of time. This can be expressed in the form of all kinds of the used ammunition (number of the fired cartridges, used hand grenades and all other projectiles), the use of sanitary material, the loss of weapons and all kinds of deficits in the personal equipment of a soldier.
21. US Department of Defense, 2003, United States Army Transformation Roadmap, Washington DC, 2003, pp. 9-11.
22. Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
23. Alan Gropman (ed.), The Big "L": American Logistics in World War II, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1997, p. 15.
24. Helmut Willke, Systemtheorie: Eine Einführung in die Grundprobleme der Theorie sozialer Systeme, Stuttgart: G. Fischer Verlag, 1993, p. 13.
25. Ibid., p. 26.
26. John Thompson, The Lifeblood of War - Logistic in Armed Conflict, London: Brassey's, 1991, pp. 3-10.
27. Duncan Ballantine, US Naval Logistic in the Second World War, New York: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 28.
28. van Martin Creveld, Supplying War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
29. Cyrus Thorpe, Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation, Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1986, pp. 23-25.
30. Vladimir Prebilič, Logistics of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War, PhD dissertation, Ljubljana University, 2004, p. 89.
31. German land forces were only partly motorized. In spite of the great efforts in this field, the realization of plans fell behind the expected results. This is why the horses had a very important role even in World War II. The German Wehrmacht had 590,000 horses at the beginning of the war and their number increased to 1,200,000 until the end of the war. See Richard Overy, op. cit.
32. Divisions had a very small number of trucks at their disposal and their number was additionally limited according to the type of division (panzer division, infantry division . . .). There were huge differences in the needs of the military material. See Michael Reimer, Lokomotiven für die Ostfront: Menschen und Maschinen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, München: GeraMond Verlag, 1999, p. 28.
33. The transport of the German divisions was based on the trucks with the average load capacity of five tons and it represented around 60 trucks per division. See Reinhard Frank, Lastkraftwagen der Wehrmacht: Deutsche und erbeutete Radfahrzeuge im Einsatz, Technik, Anstrich, Abzeichen, Zubehör - Geschichte und Gliederung der Nachschubtruppen, Podzun-Pallas Verlag, Utting, 1992, p. 20. But their quality was completely inappropriate for the situation on the eastern front.
34. German transport rested on the railway and road traffic, which failed to surmount the distances. The railway transport was completely paralyzed due to the different width of the railway tracks in the Soviet Union and the inappropriate locomotives. See Eugen Kreidler, Die Eisenbahnen im Zweiten Weltkrieg - Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Stuttgart: Muster-Schmidt Verlagsgeselschaft, 2001, p. 98.
35. The trucks did not endure the low temperatures, bad roads and huge distances. Karl Häbner, Von der NSKK Transportabteilung zur Wehrmacht, Berlin: Books on Demand GmbH, 1999, p. 20.
36. Because of the extreme burdening, a huge loss of trucks was noted in all three army groups: The army group north lost 39 percent, the army group center lost 25 percent and the army group south lost 22 percent of all available transport trucks. This means that in the period from 1 November 1941 until 15 March 1942, 75,000 trucks and 180,000 horses were lost. Werner Klee, Gleise für den Krieg: Der Bau von strategischen Bahnen in Deutschland, Eisenbahn im Krieg, Bahn Extra, No. 2, April-May 2002, p. 19.
37. The German railway system was first faced with the unknown task of adapting the different width of the railway tracks on the Russian territory (they had to narrow the width of the tracks from 1524mm to 1435mm). Alfred Knipping, Eisenbahnen zwischen Ostfront und Atlantikwall 1939-1945, Stuttgart: Transpress Verlag, 2002, pp. 22-24.
38. Richard Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 85.
39. Kraus Friedrich Schüler, Logistik im Ruβlandfeldzug: Die Rolle der Eisenbahn bei Planung, Vorbereitung und Durchführung des deutschen Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion bis zur Krise vor Moskau im Winter 1941-1942 (mit einem Vorwort von Andreas Hillgruber), Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 1987, p. 23.
40. Ron Kurtus, Rolling Friction and Automobile Tires, School for Champions, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, www.school-for-schampions.com, 2003, p. 2.
41. Ibid., p. 3.
42. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won, New York: W. Norton and Co., 1997, p. 75.
43. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, London: Orion Books Ltd, 1995, p. 476.
44. Reinhard Kroener, "Die personellen Ressourcen des Dritten Reiches im Spannungsfeld zwischen Wehrmacht, Bürokratie und Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1942", in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg: Organisation und Mobilisierung des Machtbereichs, Buch 5/1, Stuttgart: Deutsche Anstalt Verlag, 1988, p. 678.
45. James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform, New York: University of Kansas Press, 1992, p. 210.
46. Frank Tipton, A History of Modern Germany Since 1815, London: Continuum, 2003, p. 482.
47. Even in Germany, where the Nazi military system supervised all spheres of society, and above all the industrial plants, disproportion of production appeared. Total mobilization of the economy is not possible because it causes tensions in the civilian society and consequently the decline of motivation to participate in war. That is why Hitler was so careful about economic mobilization and he tried not to burden the German civilian population. See Robert J. Kershaw, War Without Garlands, Barbarossa, 1941-2, New York: Sarpendon, 2000, p. 42.