Tactical means, strategic ends: Al Qaeda's use of denial and deception

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 367-388

  Jessee, Devin D ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Al Qaeda; Counter terrorism; Deception; Denial; September 11; Terrorism; Terrorist strategy

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745825190     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: 15561836     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546550600751941     Document Type: Article

References (144)

1. See Kim Burger, "Taliban 'Asymmetric' Tactics Hamper US Strikes," Jane's Defense Weekly, 31 October 2001, available through Tufts electronic library database (accessed 16 September 2004);
2. U.S. Department of State, "Background Briefing on Taliban Denial and Deception Techniques," 2 November 2001, available at http://fpc.state.gov/ 7525pf.htm (accessed 15 September 2004);
3. and Gerry J. Gilmore, "Denial and Deception," Defend America, available at http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/a020702a.html (accessed 26 November 2004).
4. For the most recent proof of this strategy, see Zawahiri's Letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (9 July 2005), available in English at http://www.dni.gov/ letter_in_english.pdf (accessed 29 November 2005).
5. See Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: New American Library, 1974).
6. See Thomas R. Mockaitis, "Winning Hearts and Minds in the 'War on Terrorism,' Small Wars and Insurgencies 14, no. 1 (2003): 24-25.
7. Abram Shulsky, "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," in Strategic Denial and Deception, Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz eds. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 15.
8. J. Bowyer Bell, "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Nonstate and Illicit Actors," in Godson and Wirtz, 133.
9. J. Bowyer Bell, "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception: Nonstate and Illicit Actors," Ibid., 133, 135.
10. Ungoverned territories are becoming havens for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. See Douglas Farah and Richard Shultz, "Al Qaeda's Growing Sanctuary," Washington Post 14 July 2004, A19.
11. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Berkeley Books, 2003), 4.
12. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, Ibid., 4, 46.
13. Audio and videotapes with bin Laden referring to the attacks have been aired multiple times since late 2001, but this was the first time bin Laden came out with a direct admission of Al Qaeda's responsibility for the attacks. See Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, "In Video Message, Bin Laden Issues Warning to U.S.," New York Times, 30 October 2004, A1.
14. Faye Bowers, "Al Qaeda's New Tactic: Deception and Denial," Christian Science Monitor, 13 November 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor. com/2003/1113/p02s01-wome.htm (accessed 26 November 2004).
15. Shulsky, 15.
16. Ibid., 16.
17. Bell, 130.
18. Bell, 150.
19. He does write that tactical denial can help foster strategic deception, but he sees such occurrences as the exception rather than the rule, and says nothing of tactical deceptions having strategic results. See Bell, 139.
20. Gunaratna, 13.
21. Take, for example, Al Qaeda's complicity in the Bali bombings, which were conducted by JI. Al Qaeda was directly involved in the planning and financing of that operation. See Jason Tedjasukmana, "Linking bin Laden to Bali," Time 161, no. 4, 27 January 2003, 16.
22. Gunaratna, 281.
23. John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille, Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission (n.d.), 137, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_Statements/911-TerrFin_Monograph.pdf (accessed 26 November 2004).
24. The manual quoted from in this paper was captured at an Al Qaeda safe house in Britain and used during the 1993 WTC bombing trials. It will be referred to as "Al Qaeda Manual" hereafter in the notes. I was given a copy in Richard Shultz's U.S. Terrorism, Intelligence and National Security seminar at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, and all references are from that copy. A similar copy can be found in The Al Qaeda Documents, Vol. 1 (Alexandria, VA: Tempest Publishing, 2002), 5-99.
25. As noticed by Richard Shultz and Ruth Margolies Beitler, "Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al-Qai'da's Operations," Middle East Review of International Affairs 8, no. 2 June 2004: 60.
26. Al Qaeda Manual, 77.
27. Mockaitis, 26.
28. For an interesting-although questionably authoritative-exposition by a Shiite writer who believes Sunnis do in fact believe in the practice, see The Shi'ite Encyclopedia, 'al-Taqiyya/Dissimulation' (n.d.), available at http://www.al-islam.org/encyclopedia/chapterob/ (accessed 14 March 2006).
29. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [hereafter "National Commission"], 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 156, 168. Note: References in the 9/11 Report and other reports associated with the 9/11 Commission (monographs, staff reports, etc.) have generally been omitted in this analysis since they refer to government documents, interviews, etc., which this author does not have access to.
30. 9/11 Commission Report, Ibid., 169.
31. 9/11 Commission Report, 169, Ibid.
32. Thomas R. Eldridge, Susan Ginsburg, Walter T. Hempel II, Janice L. Kephart and Kelly Moore, 9/77 and Terrorist Travel; Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (21 August 2004), 47, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff-statements/911_TerrTrav. Monograph.pdf (accessed 26 November 2004).
33. Al Qaeda Manual, 22-23, 58.
34. Al Qaeda Manual, Ibid., 23.
35. Eldridge et al., 56.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 55.
38. Ibid., 58-59.
39. National Commission, 178.
40. Ibid.
41. 9/11 Commission Staff, "Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers into the United States: Staff Statement No. 1," (n.d.), 2, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff.statements/staff-statement_1.pdf (accessed 26 November 2004).
42. Eldridge et al., 61.
43. Ibid., 60.
44. Ibid.
45. Gunaratna, 75.
46. 9/11 Commission Staff, "Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers," 2.
47. National Commission, 169.
48. Eldridge et al., 60. Interestingly, legitimate Saudi passports can also contain a hidden indicator that the holder may belong to a terrorist organization. Three of the operatives involved in the 1993 WTC bombing traveled on Saudi passports with such an indicator, and three of the 9/11 hijackers had it as well.
49. See Eldridge et al., 46. Apparently AI Qaeda did not know the indicator existed or it surely would have attempted to remove or change it.
50. National Commission, 158.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 240.
53. 9/11 Commission Staff, "Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers," 3-4.
54. Eldridge et al., 8. Since the 9/11 attacks, customs have taken steps to address visa fraud, but with the enormous number of foreigners entering the United States and its allies yearly, current and future Al Qaeda operatives will probably exploit this deception tactic for some time to come.
55. Ibid., 46-47.
56. 9/11 Commission Staff, "Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers," 4.
57. Eldridge et al., 49. Evidence from Hizballah operatives using the same techniques indicates that some American women actually use would-be permanent residents in order to earn a living. In the late 1990s, an American woman - Angela Tsioumas - married Mohamad Youssef Hammoud specifically for the purpose of helping him gain citizenship, and for a price. She noted that as soon as Hammoud no longer needed her, she would marry another would-be immigrant.
58. [Daniel Pipes, "The Hezbollah in America: An Alarming Network," National Review, 28 August 2004, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/ articles/mi_ml282/ is_16-52/ai64341399/print (accessed 16 September 2004.)] There has been no evidence that Al Qaeda used these "marriage facilitators," but the fact they exist and can assist terrorist operatives is nevertheless troubling.
59. Eldridge et al., 47.
60. This is apparently an area where, since 9/11, airports have become more vigilant, at least in America. It is doubtful that a terrorist today would receive less scrutiny simply because he or she traveled in first class than if he or she were to travel further back in the plane. Many foreign airports, however, have not implemented these measures, and Al Qaeda operatives could conceivably still use them to their advantage when traveling overseas.
61. Al Qaeda Manual, 40.
62. Roth, Greenburg and Wille, 17.
63. Ibid., 25.
64. National Commission, 171.
65. Gunaratna, xli;
66. and Roth, Greenburg and Wille, 25-26.
67. AI Qaeda Manual as noted in Gunaratna (note 9), 84 (possibly a different translation than referred to otherwise herein);
68. and William F. Wechsler, "Strangling the Hydra: Targeting Al Qaeda's Finances," in James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose, eds., How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 137, noted in Gunaratna (note 10), 84.
69. Roth, Greenburg and Wille, 22.
70. Cindy Sher and Minda Block, "Outcome of Terror-Financing Case Satisfies Jewish Officials in Chicago," Jewish Telegraphic Agency (12 February 2003), available through Pro-Quest database (accessed 20 September 2004).
71. 9/11 Commission Staff, "Overview of the Enemy: Staff Statement No. 15," (n.d.), 10, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/ staff_statements/staff.statement_15.pdf (accessed 26 November 2004);
72. and Roth, Greenburg and Wille, 20-22.
73. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "Dirty Money," The OECD Observer 242 (Paris: March 2004), 40, available through ProQuest database (accessed 20 September 2004);
74. Lamya Radi, "Leader of Albanians' Group Accuses US Intelligence of Kidnapping 12 Fundamentalists and Handing them Over to the Egyptian Authorities," Haekstep, Al-Quds al-Arabi (2 February 1999), noted in Gunaratna, 177 (note 98);
75. and Gunaratna, 42, 83-84, 87.
76. OECD, 40.
77. Gunaratna, 82-83.
78. Ibid., 42.
79. Roth, Greenburg and Wille, 140.
80. Gunaratna, 84.
81. Roth, Greenburg and Wille, 134-137.
82. Daniel L. Glaser, Testimony Before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism (28 July 2005), available at http://financialservices. house.gov/media/pdf/072805dg.pdf (accessed 27 November 2005).
83. National Commission, 169.
84. Gunaratna, 143.
85. Roth, Greenburg and Wille, 135;
86. and National Commission, 224.
87. Roth, Greenburg and Wille, 135.
88. Ibid., 131.
89. CNN, "CNN Breaking News," CNN.com, 10 September 2003, available at http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0309/10/bn.07.html (accessed 19 October 2004).
90. Al Qaeda Manual, 29.
91. Al Qaeda Manual, Ibid., 54.
92. Timothy L. Thomas, "AI Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of 'Cyberplanning,'" Parameters (Spring 2003): 118, available at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/ Parameters/03spring/thomas.htm (accessed 4 November 2004);
93. and National Commission, 226.
94. "U.S. Alarmed by Use of AI Qaeda Bomb Term," Reuters, 12 February 2003, available at http://www.intelmessages.org/Messages/National. Security/wwwboard/messages.02/ 3824.html (accessed 30 October 2004).
95. Yossi Melman, "Virtual Soldiers in a Holy War," Ha'aretz, 17 September 2002, available at http://www.haaretz.com (not accessed), quoted in Thomas (note 25), 19.
96. Reports differ on whether he used these terms or faculties of "architecture" and "politics" instead of "urban planning" and "engineering." See Melman and National Commission, 248-249.
97. Jack Kelley, "Terror Groups Hide Behind Web Encryption," USA Today, 5 February 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-02- 05-binladen.htm (accessed 19 October 2004).
98. Jack Kelley, "Terror Groups Hide Behind Web Encryption," USA Today, 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-02-05-binladen. htm, Ibid.
99. Gunaratna, 141;
100. and Kelley.
101. Gunaratna, 238;
102. and Kelley. Interestingly, it seems that the encryption technology Al Qaeda was able to procure and use before 9/11, while still difficult to decrypt, was actually somewhat weak on encryption standards, namely because of export restrictions which were in place at the time the programs were purchased.
103. See "Weakened Encryption Lays Bare Al Qaeda Files," New Scientist, 17 January 2002, available at http://www.newscientist.com/news/print. jsp?id = ns99991804 (accessed 30 October 2004).
104. Yashwant Deva, "Tools of Terror: The Art and Science of Steganography," Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, 19 January 2002, available at http://www.ipcs.org/print Article.jsp?kValue = 680 (accessed 19 October 2004).
105. Bruce Schneier, "Terrorists and Steganography," Crypto-Gram Newsletter, 30 September 2001, available at http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram- 0109a.html (accessed 27 November 2004).
106. Nigel Morris-Cotterill, "Use and Abuse of the Internet in Fraud and Money Laundering," International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 13, no. 2 (1999): 217 (paraphrasing what he heard at the 1997 Symposium on Economic Crime in Cambridge, England, although he admits that he cannot remember the original source).
107. However, considering the use of dissimulation discussed above, and the fact that some of the 9/11 hijackers indulged in pornography, this is still a possibility. "Bin Laden's Cybertrail Proves Elusive," USA Today, 20 September 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001/09/20/ attacks-cybertrail.htrn (accessed 19 October 2004);
108. and Kelley.
109. "How Al Qaeda Uses the Internet," ABC News Online, 19 March 2004, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s1069629.htm (accessed 30 October 2004).
110. Eric Lipton and Eric Lichtblau, "Online and Even Near Home, a New Front is Opening in the Global Terror Battle," New York Times, 23 September 2004, A6.
111. "How Al Qaeda Uses the Internet."
112. Thomas, 117.
113. Paul Eedle, "Al Qaeda Takes Fight for 'Hearts and Minds' to the Web," Jane's Intelligence Review (August 2002), report in CNO/IO Newsletter, 5-11 August 2002, noted in Thomas p. 115 (note 9).
114. Andrew Higgins, 'How Al Qaeda Put Internet to Use,' Wall Street Journal (11 November 2002), available at http://msnbc.msn.com/news/833533.asp?cpl = 1 (could not access), accessible through http://www.crime-research.org/news/2002/ 11/Mess1203.htm (accessed 30 October 2004).
115. Al Qaeda Manual, 31.
116. Al Qaeda Manual, Ibid., 39.
117. Thomas, 112.
118. Higgins and Martin Sieff, "Terrorist Is Driven by Hatred for U.S., Israel," Washington Times, 21 August 1998, 1, noted in National Commission, 127 (note 105).
119. Gunaratna, 16.
120. "Bin Laden's Cybertrail Proves Elusive."
121. Michael Elliott, "How Al Qaeda Got Back on the Attack," Time 160, no. 18 (28 October 2002): 26.
122. National Commission, 243-244.
123. Tom McGirk/Kohat, "Al Qaeda's New Hideouts," Time (Asia) 160, no. 3 (29 July 2002), available at http://www.time.com/asia/magazine/printout/0, 13675,501020729-322672,00.html (accessed 27 November 2004).
124. Gunaratna, 96.
125. Al Qaeda Manual, 30.
126. Gunaratna, 138;
127. Shultz and Beitler, 69;
128. and National Commission, 235-236.
129. National Commission, 247, 249.
130. Bell, 150.
131. Cover techniques are interspersed throughout the manual. Some of clearest examples are at Al Qaeda Manual, 53-55.
132. Gunaratna, 79.
133. "Background of Accomplice Detailed," Friday Times, Lahore, 3 April 1995, 3, noted in Gunaratna, xxvii (notes 36 and 39).
134. Gunaratna, 78. Again, Al Qaeda is beginning to find some sanctuary in failed states (see note 8 above).
135. Bell, 160.
136. Gunaratna, 114.
137. Ibn Taymiyyah, The Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihad, available at members. Tripod.com/~Suhayb (not accessed), as quoted in Gunaratna, 113-114 (note 80).
138. Gunaratna, 115.
139. Abdul-Muhsin al-Abbaad, "With Which Intellect and Religion can Suicide Bombings and Destruction be Considered Jihaad?" (n.d.), available at http://www.e-prism.org/ images/Abd_al- Muhsin_bin_Hamad_al_Abbad_Against_suicide_bombings.pdf (accessed 1 February 2006).
140. Muhammad bin Salih al-'Uthaymin, "The Ruling on Attacking the Enemy by Blowing Oneself Up In a Car" (n.d.), available at http://www.e-prism. org/images/ The_Ruling_on_Attacking_the_enemy_by_blowing_oneself_up_in_a_car. pdf, (accessed 1 February 2006).
141. Gunaratna, 115.
142. Bell, 149.
143. Ibid.
144. I thank class discussion in Shultz's seminar for this and many of the insights present in these conclusions (see note 22 above).