The role of political ideology in the structural design of new governance agencies

Public Administration Review

Volumn 66, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 583-595

  Bertelli, Anthony ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745699095     PISSN: 00333352     EISSN: 15406210     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00618.x     Document Type: Review

References (60)

1. Alesina, Alberto, and Nouriel Roubini. 1997. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
2. Algemene Rekenkamer [Nethedands Court of Audit]. 1995. Zelstandige Bestuursorganen en Ministeriële Verantwoordelijkheid. The Hague, Netherlands: SDU.
3. Anderson, J. A. 1984. Regression and Ordered Categorical Variables (With Discussion). Journal of the Royal Statistical Society - Series B 46: 1-30.
4. Andre, Rae. 1985. On Beyond Quango: The Evolution of Business-Government Cooperation in Northern Ireland. Journal of General Management 11(2): 45-61.
5. Andreoni, James, Brian Erard, and Jonathan Feinstein. 1998. Tax Compliance. Journal of Economic Literature 36: 818-60.
6. Baron, David. 1991. A Strategic Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems. American Political Science Review 85: 137-64.
7. Bertelli, Anthony M. 2006a. Delegating to the Quango: Ex Ante and Ex Post Ministerial Constraints. Governance 19(2): 229-49.
8. _ 2006b. Governing the Quango: An Auditing and Cheating Model for Quasi-Governmental Public Authorities. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16: 239-61.
9. Budge, Ian. 2000. Expert Judgments of Party Policy Positions: Uses and Limitations in Political Research. European Journal of Political Research 37: 103-13.
10. Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tanenbaum. 2001. Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945-1998. New York: Oxford University Press.
11. Chun, Young Han, and Hal G. Rainey. 2005. Goal Ambiguity in U.S. Federal Agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15: 1-30.
12. Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count. New York: Cambridge University Press.
13. Elgie, Robert, and Iain McMenamin. 2004. Credible Commitment, Political Uncertainly, or Policy Complexity? Explaining Variations in the Independence of Non-Majoritarian Institutions in France. Working Paper, Dublin City University, School of Law and Government.
14. Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press.
15. Farrell, David M. 2001. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave.
16. Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown.
17. _. 1978. Home Style: House Members in their Districts. Boston: Little, Brown.
18. Flinders, Matthew V. 1999. Quangos: Why Do Governments Love Them? In Quangos, Accountability, and Reform: The Politics of Quasi-Government, edited by Matthew V. Flinders and Martin J. Smith, 26-39. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.
19. Frant, Howard. 1997. Reconsidering the Determinants of Public Authority Use. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 7(4): 571-90.
20. Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2002. Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis. Journal of European Public Policy 9: 873-93.
21. Gladdish, Ken. 1991. Governing Europe from the Centre: Politics and Policy-Making in the Netherlands. London: Hurst & Co.
22. Goodin, R. 1996. The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
23. Greve, Carsten. 1999. Quangos in Denmark and Scandinavia: Trends, Problems, and Perspectives. In Quangos, Accountability, and Reform: The Politics of Quasi-Government, edited by Matthew V. Flinders and Martin J. Smith, 83-108. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.
24. Hausman, Jerry, and Daniel McFadden. 1984. Specification Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model. Econometrica 52: 1219-40.
25. Hill, Michael 1997. Implementation Theory: Yesterday's Issue? Policy and Politics 25(4): 375-85.
26. Hogwood, Brian W. 1995. The "Growth" of Quangos: Evidence and Explanations. Parliamentary Affairs 48(2): 207-25.
27. Huber, John, and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. Deliberate Discretion? New York: Cambridge University Press.
28. Hirst, Paul. 1995. Quangos and Democratic Government. Parliamentary Affairs 48(2): 341-59.
29. Jolley, R. A. 1983. Quangos and Public Finance. Australian Journal of Public Administration 42(1): 104-23.
30. Kaboolian, Linda. 1998. The New Public Management: Challenging the Boundaries of the Management vs. Administration Debate. Public Administration Review 58(3): 189-93.
31. Katz, Richard S. 1980. A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
32. Kent, J. T. 1982. Robust Properties of Likelihood Ratio Tests. Biometrika 69(1): 19-27.
33. Kettl, Donald F. 2000. Public Administration at the Millennium: The State of the Field. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10(1): 7-34.
34. _. 2002. The Transformation of Governance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
35. King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation. American Journal of Political Science 44(2): 341-55.
36. Kydland, Finn, and Edward Prescott. 1977. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85(3): 473-91.
37. Langbein, Laura I. 2000. Ownership, Empowerment, and Productivity: Some Empirical Evidence on the Causes and Consequences of Employee Discretion. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19(3): 427-49.
38. Lynn, Laurence E., Jr. 1998. The New Public Management: How to Transform a Theme into a Legacy. Public Administration Review 58(3): 231-37.
39. Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., Carolyn Heinrich, and Carolyn Hill. 2000. Improving Governance: A New Logic for Empirical Research. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
40. Majone, Giandomenico. 2001. Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance. European Union Politics 2(1): 103-22.
41. Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
42. McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1987. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3(2): 243-77.
43. Milward, H. Brinton, and Keith G. Provan. 2000. Governing the Hollow State. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10(2): 359-79.
44. Moe, Terry M. 1991. Politics and the Theory of Organization. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: 106-29.
45. Nerlove, Marc, and S. J. Press. 1973. Univariate and Multivariate Log-Linear and Logistic Models. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
46. Payne, Teresa, and Chris Skelcher. 1997. Explaining Less Accountability: The Growth of Local Quangos. Public Administration 75(2): 207-24.
47. Persson, Torsten, and Lars E.O. Svensson. 1989. Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104: 325-45.
48. Peters, B. Guy, and Jon Pierre. 2000. Governance, Politics, and the State. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.
49. Pollitt, Christopher, and Geert Bouckaert. 2000. Public Management Reform a Comparative Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press.
50. Rhodes, R. A. W. 1997. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Reflexivity, and Accountability. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press.
51. Salamon, Lester M. 2002. The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction. In The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance, edited by Lester M. Salamon, 1-47. New York: Oxford University Press.
52. Segal, Jeffrey, and Harold Spaeth. 1993. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model. New York: Cambridge University Press.
53. Skelcher, Chris. 1998. The Appointed State: Quasi-Governmental Organizations and Democracy. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
54. Tabellini, Guido, and Alberto Alesina. 1990. Voting on the Budget Deficit. American Economic Review 80: 37-49.
55. Thompson, Fred. 1993. Matching Responsibilities with Tactics: Administrative Controls and Modern Government. Public Administration Review 53(4): 303-18.
56. United Kingdom. House of Commons. 2003. Public Administration - Fourth Report. London: U.K. Parliament. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmpubadm/165/16509.htm, [accessed April 8, 2006].
57. Van Kersbergen, Kees, and Frans Van Waarden. 2004. "Governance" as a Bridge between Disciplines. European Journal of Political Research 43 143-71.
58. Van Thiel, Sandra. 2001. Quangocratization: Trends, Causes, and Consequences. Ph.D. diss., University of Utrecht.
59. _. 2004. Trends in the Public Sector: Why Politicians Prefer Quasi-Autonomous Organizations. Journal of Theoretical Politics 16(2): 175-201.
60. Williamson, Oliver. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.