Empowering local elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Dayton decade

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 53, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 44-58

  Søberg, Marius ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745653937     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216530304     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. Richard Holbrooke, "Was Bosnia Worth It?" Washington Post (July 19. 2005), A21.
2. As of January 31, 2006, Christian Schwarz-Schilling of Germany is the high representative. His predecessors were Carl Bildt (Sweden; 1995-97), Carlos Westendorp (Spain; 1997-99), Wolfgang Petritsch (Austria; 1999-2002) and Paddy Ashdown (UK; 2002-6).
3. Sabrina Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
4. David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 1999).
5. Elizabeth M. Cousens and Charles K. Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
6. Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
7. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 10: Civilian Implementation of Peace Settlement (www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp? content_id=380/).
8. Ibid., Annex 3: Elections.
9. Officially, U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke was very clear on this point, stating, "We are not going to leave behind a force [after this]. . . . If a year doesn't work, two, three, or five years won't do either." Even John Shalikashvili, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at the time, "I cannot imagine circumstances changing in such a way that we would remain in Bosnia [beyond a year]"; cited in Gideon Rose, "The Exit Strategy Delusion," Foreign Affairs 11, no. 1 (January/February 1998).
10. This trend remains strong. For example, according to a 2003 opinion poll, 69 percent of Serbs favored an independent Republika Srpska. Furthermore, 54 percent of Bosnian Croats favored independence (presumably of Croat-majority areas/cantons) or union with Croatia, while 41 percent favored remaining part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Interestingly, Bosnian Croat support for Bosnia and Herzegovina has sharply increased since 1999, at the same time that Croatian governments have publicly renounced territorial claims on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Large numbers of Croats left Bosnia and Herzegovina for Croatia in this period, possibly boosting the pro-Bosnia and Herzegovina numbers, according to data from U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, "Bosnian Political Mood Hits Post-Dayton Low," September 22, 2003, and idem, "Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats Support, Serbs Oppose Unified State," October 2, 2003. For a discussion of the division between national groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina today, see "Paralelni intervju Beriz Belkić i Miodrag Živanović" (Joint Interview with Beriz Belkić and Miodrag Žvanović), Oslobodjenje [Sarajevo] (September 10, 2005).
11. Institutionally, post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina comprises two entities, the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) and the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The latter is further subdivided into ten cantons. Five (Una-Sana, Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Bosnian Podrinje, and Sarajevo) are Muslim-majority cantons; three (Posavina, West Herzegovina, and West Bosnia) are Croat-majority cantons; and two (Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva) are "ethnically mixed." Both entities have municipal-level divisions as well. Also, following arbitration, a special district was established in 1999 for the entire pre-war Brčko Općina, under the exclusive sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which belongs simultaneously to both entities in condominium.
12. Side-stepping the United Nations, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) was set up to direct and sponsor the peace implementation process. The PIC consists of a group of fifty-five countries and organizations. The high representative reports to the PIC steering board.
13. Bonn Peace Implementation Conference, "Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-Sustaining Structures. Conclusions" (December 10, 1997): par. XI (www.oscebih.org/documents/61-eng.pdf).
14. See, for instance, the editorial by Ivan Lovrenović accusing Ashdown of doing more damage to the political profession than all local officials together since the signing of the Dayton agreement, in Dani [Sarajevo] (April 15, 2005): 3; Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, "Travails of the European Raj," Journal of Democracy 14, no. 3 (July 2003): 60-74. See also the European Stability Initiative (www.esiweb.org) and the International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup. org), for opposing assessments of the Bosnian transition.
15. As of June 2005, the OHR employed 103 internationals (forty-three seconded staff and sixty contractors) and 365 national contractors. The OHR is funded through the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). Its budget was €16.9 million for 2005 and is around €14 million for 2006. Contributions to the OHR budget break down as follows: EU: 53 percent, United States: 22 percent, Japan: 10 percent, Russia: 4 percent, Canada: 3.03 percent, Organization of the Islamic Conference: 2.5 percent, others: 5.47 percent.
16. The Mission Implementation Plan (www.ohr.int/ohr-info/ohr-mip/default. asp?content_id=34144/) was launched in January 2003 and is updated yearly to reflect progress made.
17. OHR reports since 1996 are available at www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/ archive.asp?sa=on/.
18. OHR Mission Implementation Plan for 2005, March 7, 2005 (www.ohr.int/ohr-info/ohr-mip/default.asp?content_id=34144/).
19. Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic, 4th ed (Boulder, CO: West-view Press, 2002).
20. A strikingly large number of votes, 25 percent, are reported to have been declared invalid. See V.P. Gagnon, Jr., The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). Further-more, the winner-take-all nature of the election also effectively minimized the seats won by the non-nationalist parties. Thus, as in Croatia, the electoral system gave the nationalist parties a higher proportion of the seats than their share of the vote. Of course, also like in Croatia, the communists, probably under the assumption that it would work in their favor, had implemented the electoral system. See Marius Søberg, "Hrvatska Nakon 1989. Godine.
21. HDZ i Politika Tranzicije" (Croatia After 1989: The HDZ and the Politics of Transition), in Demokratska Tranzicija u Hrvatskoj: Transformacija Vrijednost, Obrazovanje, Mediji (Democratic Transition in Croatia: Transformation of Values, Education, Media), ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matic (Zagreb: Alinea, 2006).
22. Although they maintain strong links, the HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be confused with its namesake (HDZ) in Croatia.
23. Vladimir Goati, "Politiki zivot Bosne i Hercegovine 1989-1991" (Political Life in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1989-1991), in Bosnia i Hercegovina izmedju rata i mira (Bosnia and Herzegovina Between War and Peace), ed. Srdjan Bogosavljević (Belgrade: Institute of Political Science, 1992).
24. Cited in International Crisis Group, "Beyond Ballot Boxes, Municipal Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Sarajevo, September 10, 1997).
25. "SDS-u nudi SNSD-u da zajedno formiraju vlast" (SDS Offers to Establish Power Together with SNSD), Nezavisne Novine [Banja Luka] (December 12, 2005).
26. They also classify the SPRS (Socialist Party of Republika Srpska) as a "ideological" party, rather than nationalist, as is the norm. See Michael Pugh and Margaret Cobble, "Non-Nationalist Voting in Bosnian Municipal Elections: Implications for Democracy and Peacebuilding," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 1 (January 2001): 27-47.
27. Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security 12, no. 3 (winter 1997-98): 101-36.
28. See International Monetary Fund, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2005 Article IV Consultation," IMF Country Report No. 05/199, June 2005 (http://www.imf.org/external/country/BIH/).
29. United Nations Development Programme, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Human Development Report 2002 (UNDP, 2002), p. 54 (http://hdr.undp.org).
30. See International Monetary Fund, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2005 Article IV Consultation."
31. World Bank, "Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Economic Memorandum," Report No. 29500-BA, May 2005 (www.worldbank.org). Labor force participation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was among the lowest also during the SFRY period.
32. The average net wage in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as of June 2005, was $328. The average wage is higher in the Federation than in the Republika Srpska, where it still falls short of the consumer basket (Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bilten, no. 2 [2005]).
33. Updates on key economic indicators are available from the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (www.cbbh.gov.ba).
34. Transparency International, "Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004," December 9, 2004. In the 2004 edition of its annual corruption report, Transparency International ranked Bosnia and Herzegovina in 82nd place, well behind Croatia, but ahead of Serbia and Montenegro and Albania (www.transparency.org).
35. Transparency International, "Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2005."
36. IMF, Staff Report, July 2003, p. 25.
37. Projected growth rates for 2005-2008 are as follows: real GDP for 2006: 5.7 percent; for 2007: 5.4 percent; and for 2008: 5.4 percent. See International Monetary Fund, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2005 Article IV Consultation."
38. Commission of the European Communities, "Report from the Commission to the Council on the Preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union" COM(2003) 692, Brussels (December 18, 2003) (http://europa. eu.int/comm/enlargement/ bosnia_herzegovina/pdf/feasibility%20study_en.pdf).
39. World Bank, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Poverty Assessment," Report No. 25343-BIH, November 21, 2003, p. 7.
40. Vera Divine and Harald Mathisen, "Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005," Chr. Michelsen Institute Report No. 8 (2005) (www.cmi.no/publications/).
41. European Stability Initiative, "Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation" (Berlin and Sarajevo: European Stability Initiative, 2004) (www.esiweb.org).
42. Robert D. Putnam, Susan J. Pharr, and Russell J. Dalton, introduction to Disaffected Democracies, ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 3-33.
43. Ola Listhaug and Bemt Aardal, "Support of Democracy in Europe" (paper presented at the Conference on Democracy in the New Europe, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Dijon, November 13-16, 2003).
44. "Remarks by Principal Deputy High Representative Larry Butler at the Press Conference on Economic Issues. Office of the High Representative," Sarajevo, May 6, 2005 (www.ohr.int).
45. Carl Bildt, "Bosnia Between 1995 and 2014" (speech delivered at the International Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Geneva, October 20, 2005) (www.bildt.net).
46. "Pedi Ešdaun, visoki predstavnik: Možemo sustići SCG" (Paddy Ashdown, High Representative: We Can Catch Up with Serbia and Montenegro), Dnevni Avaz [Sarajevo] (November 13, 2005) (www.avaz.ba).
47. "Uspjeh je i da se razgovara o nadogradnji Ustava" (It Is a Success That One at Least Is Talking About Reconstructing the Constitution), Dnevni Avaz [Sarajevo] (November 15, 2005) (www.avaz.ba).
48. Interview with OHR official (who requested anonymity), Sarajevo, April 2002.
49. Furthermore, the most trusted public figures in the Republika Srpska are Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadzić, indicted war criminals at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In contrast, the ICTY is the most trusted international organization by respondents in the Federation. Public Agenda Survey by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Southeastern Europe program (IDEA/SEE) (http://archive.idea.int/balkans/).
50. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Balkan Public Agenda Focus Group study, Republika Srpska report, 2001 (www.idea.int).
51. Interviews with KFOR officials, Pristina, 2002.
52. "Pedi Ešdaun, visoki predstavnik: Možemo sustići SCO"; "Intervju: Pedi Ešdaun, visoki predstavnik za Bosnia and Herzegovina: Neću da ukinem Republiku Srpsku" (Interview: Paddy Ashdown, High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina: I Have No Intention of Abolishing the Republika Srpska), NIN [Belgrade] (July 15, 2004) (www.nin.co.yu).
53. See, e.g., "Dragan Čavić, predsjednik Republike Srpske: Počeli smo s realno izvodivim promjenama" (Dragan Čavić, President of the Republika Srpska: We Started with Realistically Achievable Changes), Dnevni Avaz [Sarajevo] (November 24, 2005) (www.avaz.ba).
54. Xavier Bougarel, "In the Eye of the Storm," in Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth, ed. David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda (New York: Addison-Wesley Longman, 1997), p. 97.
55. High Representative Paddy Ashdown, "Then and Now: Peace-Building Challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (speech in Dayton, Ohio, November 18, 2005). Ashdown was referring, in part, to the agreement reached in Washington, DC, between Bosnia and Herzegovina party leaders to move forward with constitutional reforms. See "Washington: Lideri se u zajedničkoj izavi obavezali na provo/denje ustavnih reformi" (Washington: Leaders in Common Statement Committed to Implement Constitutional Reforms), Federal News Agency (November 22, 2005) (www.fena.ba). Others play down the effects of reforms, among them former Bosnia and Herzegovina prime minister and SBH chair Haris Silajdžić.
56. See Haris Silajdžićza, "Dnevni avaz: Ništa spektakularno neće se dogoditi u Vašingtonu" (Dnevni Avaz: Nothing Spectacular Will Happen in Washington), Dnevni avaz [Sarajevo] (November 21, 2005).
57. See International Crisis Group, "The Wages of Sin: Confronting