Symmetry in network congestion games: Pure equilibria and anarchy cost

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3879 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 161-175

  Fotakis, Dimitris ^a   Kontogiannis, Spyros ^b,c   Spirakis, Paul ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE AEGEAN   (Greece)

^b University of Patras and Computer Technology Institute   (Greece)

^c UNIVERSITY OF IOANNINA   (Greece)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATION THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; CONGESTION CONTROL (COMMUNICATION); TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS; TELECOMMUNICATION TRAFFIC;

COORDINATION EFFICIENCY; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; SYMMETRIC NETWORK CONGESTION GAMES; TRAFFIC CONGESTION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33745623166     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11671411_13     Document Type: Conference Paper

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