Underwriting relationships: Information production costs, underwriting fees, and first mover advantage

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 205-229

  Ang, James S ^a   Zhang, Shaojun ^b  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

First mover advantage; Floating rate debt; Information production costs; Underwriting fees; Underwriting relationship

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745614610     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-006-8796-1     Document Type: Article

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