Moral overridingness and moral theory

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 79, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 170-189

  Stroud, Sarah ^a  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745447243     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0114.00056     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. "Are Moral Considerations Overriding?", in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), p. 182.
2. Samuel Scheffler, Human Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 30.
3. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), ch. 2.
4. "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79, 1982, pp. 419-39.
5. Common-sense Morality and Consequentialism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985)
6. Beyond Optimizing (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).
7. Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 102.
8. Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 198
9. Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)
10. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
11. Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
12. Susan Wolf, in Above and Below the Line of Duty, Philosophical Topics 14, 1986, pp. 131-48.
13. general and substantive moral directives (p. 147, n. 1).
14. Richard W. Miller, Moral Differences (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 318.
15. Thomas Nagel, VFN and Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991)
16. Samuel Scheffler, HM and The Rejection of Consequentialism (op. cit.).