Policy enforcement markets: How bureaucratic redundancy contributes to effective intellectual property implementation in China

Comparative Politics

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2006, Pages

  Mertha, Andrew C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745312144     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20433999     Document Type: Review

References (54)

1. Martin Landau, "Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap," Public Administration Review, 29 (Jury-August 1969), 347-48.
2. Jonathan B. Bendor, Parallel Systems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
3. W.F. Willoughby, Principles of Public Administration (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1927).
4. C. F. Larry Heimann, "Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems," American Political Science Review, 87 (June 1993), 421-35.
5. CAFEI Quality Brands Protection Committee [QBPC] Pamphlet; International Intellectual Property Alliance, "2001 Special 301 Recommendation to the United States Trade Representative," February 16, 2001, p. 26
6. . Recent estimates place counterfeiting losses in China at U.S. $16 billion and copyright-related losses at U.S. $1.5 billion.
7. Interview 98HK03, June 22, 1998.
8. "China Appears to Crack Down on CD Pirating," New York Times. Apr. 7, 1997.
9. For a more rigorous discussion of partial implementation of trade policy, see Andrew C. Mertha and Robert Pahre, "Patently Misleading: Partial Implementation and Bargaining Leverage in Sino-American Negotiations on Intellectual Property Rights," International Organization (forthcoming).
10. The institutional situation could include the overall lack of a viable legal/judicial apparatus and at least one bureaucracy that through inertia lacks the will to enforce its own official mandate or at least one bureaucracy that wishes to expand its own to jurisdiction by enforcing policy that does not officially fall under its official mandate. None of these conditions is particularly uncommon, especially in developing countries.
11. That is to say, in the absence of supply-side competition, side payments would likely give rise to a situation of traditional corruption, rent-seeking, or at the very least indeterminate enforcement outcomes and not to a policy enforcement market.
12. Luo Gan, "Gnanyu Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang'an de shuoming" [Directions Regarding the State Council's Plan for Restructuring Government Organizations], speech given at the First Plenum of the Ninth National People's Congress, March 6, 1998.
13. Since 1998 the number has remained steadily in the mid fifties. Kjeld Erik Børdsgaard, "Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China," The China Quarterly, 170 (June 2002), 361-86.
14. Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 8-9.
15. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins. 1995), pp. 179-83.
16. J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
17. Celestin Monga, The Anthropology of Anger: Civil Society and Democracy in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
18. Barry Naughton, Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995);
19. Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999);
20. David L. Wank, Commodifying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
21. and Margaret M. Pearson, "The Janus Face of Business Associations in China: Socialist Corporatism in Foreign Enterprises, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 31 (January 1994), 25-46.
22. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 14-16.
23. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes, Ibid., p. 14.
24. David M. Lampton, ed., Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987);
25. Lieberthal and Oksenberg; David M. Lampton and Kenneth Lieberthal, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
26. David M. Lampton, '"A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China," in Lampton and Lieberthal, eds., p. 34.
27. Interview 99BJ32, July 29, 1999.
28. The Quality Technical Supervision Bureau can claim jurisdiction over counterfeit goods because they harm or intentionally deceive the consumer, it does not have jurisdiction over trademark-infringing goods.
29. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongyang zhengfu jigou [Central Government Organs of the People's Republic of China 1949-1990] (Economics and Science Publishing House, 1993), pp. 401-2.
30. Interviews 99KM05A/B, June 21, 1999; June 23, 1999.
31. It has been renamed the Quality Technical Supervision Examination and Quarantine General Bureau (Guojia zhiliang jishu jiandu jianyan jianyi zongju) at the national level and the Quality Technical Supervision Bureau at the provincial level and below. Andrew C. Mertha, The Politics of Piracy: Intellectual Property in Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), ch. 5.
32. Interview 99BJ06, March 15, 1999; 99BJ36, August 3, 1999; 99BJ39, August 8, 1999.
33. Interviews 02SH13, July 5, 2002; 02GY02, July 24, 2002; 02GY03, July 25, 2002.
34. See Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," World Politics. 41 (January 1989), 143-67.
35. John Stuart Mill, The Logic of the Moral Sciences (London: Duckworth, 1987), ch. 7;
36. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Malabar: Krieger Publishing Company, 1982), pp. 32-34.
37. Interview 99BJ28, July 27, 1999.
38. Interviews 99CD06, July 1,1999; 02CD03, July 12, 2002.
39. Interview 99BJ35, August 3, 1999;
40. Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and "Thought Work" in Reformed China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 34.
41. Interviews 98CQ06B, August 10, 1998; 99SH13, May 20, 1999; 99CD01, June 25, 1999; 02SH07, June 28, 2002; 02KM02, July 23, 2002; 02CD05, July 12, 2002 ; 02GY02, July 25, 2002; 02BJ07, August 9, 2002.
42. Lynch, After the Propaganda State.
43. One might ask why the copyright bureaucracy does not act more like the Quality Technical Supervision Bureau: a single bureaucracy in charge of a narrow policy portfolio. The answer is that structurally the copyright bureaucracy is more like specific units (such as the Trademark Office) within the Administration for Industry and Commerce than like the Quality Technical Supervision Bureau (which is an independent bureaucracy). More to the point, in the policy enforcement market framework the Copyright Department as the inertial bureaucracy is also more analogous to the Administration for Industry and Commerce Trademark Office than to the Quality Technical Supervision Bureau.
44. If side payments are introduced in the absence of a policy enforcement market environment, there is a greater likelihood that the result would be rent-seeking and corruption, not substantially improved policy enforcement.
45. In fact, it is far easier to document specific demand levels for copyright enforcement. The three rounds of Sino-U.S. intellectual property rights negotiations in the early to mid 1990s were driven by foreign demand for copyright enforcement in China, and foreign copyright-intensive associations have mushroomed on Chinese soil in the past several years. See http://www.iipa.com/countryreports.html;
46. and the Business Software Alliance, http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2004/ 2004SPEC301CHINA.pdf.
47. Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China," Comparative Politics, 31 (January 1999), 167-86.
48. Interviews 98SH03A/D, March 19, 1998, and July 7, 1998; 99BJ38, August 5,1999.
49. The local copyright departments remain suspicious of working with foreign actors, a suspicion that might be mitigated with the introduction of a competing agency. Interview 03BJ03, July 24, 2003.
50. Interviews 99BJ06, March 15, 1999; 99BJ23, July 19, 1999; 99BJ36, August 3, 1999.
51. Interview 99SH11B, May 18, 1999.
52. Interview 99BJ36, August 3, 1999.
53. See Andrew C. Mertha, "Shifting Legal Goalposts: Chinese Bureaucracies, Foreign Actors and the Evolution of China's Anti-Counterfeiting Enforcement Regime," in Stanley Lubman, Kevin O'Brien, and Neu Diamant, eds., Engaging the Law in China: State, Society and Possibilities for Justice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).
54. Andrew C. Mertha and Ka Zeng, "Political Institutions, Local Resistance, and China's Harmonization with International Law," The China Quarterly (forthcoming).