The narrative fallacy, the relative plausibility theory, and a theory of the trial

International Commentary on Evidence

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2006, Pages

  Allen, Ronald J ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745280065     PISSN: 15544567     EISSN: 15544567     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10693-006-8738-z     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Doron Menashe & Mutal E. Shamash, The Narrative Fallacy, 3 Int'l Comment.on Evidence no.3 (2005), at www.depress.com/ice/vol3/iss1/art3/.
2. See, e.g., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1965).
3. It is comparative in a sense at the micro level as well. See, e.g., Ronald Allen & Michael Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J.Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2006).
4. W. Lance Bennett and Martha Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture (1981);
5. Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Thoery of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519 (1991).
6. Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U.L. Rev. 401 (1986)
7. Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 Int'l J. Evidence. & Proof 254 (1997).
8. See Robert P. Burns, Fallacies on Fallacies: A Reply, 3 Int'l Comment. on Evidence no. 4, at 3 (2005), "[T]he central fallacy of The Narrative Fallacy is the claim that the less evidence that the parties are free to present, the more protection there will be against over-generalized story-telling. That is exactly backwards."