Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 229-252

  Streb, Jorge Miguel ^a  

^a Universidad del CEMA   (Argentina)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745216027     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00202.x     Document Type: Article

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