Hamas's rise as charted in the polls, 1994-2005

Journal of Palestine Studies

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 6-19

  Hilal, Jamil ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT; POLITICAL REFORM;

ASIA; EURASIA; MIDDLE EAST; PALESTINE;

EID: 33745082789     PISSN: 0377919X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/jps.2006.35.3.6     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. "Political Islam" here is defined as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, with Hamas by far the dominant constituent. Though there are other political Islamist groups, they are minuscule and of no statistical importance.
2. The data used to analyze the popular strength of the various Palestinian political movements and their socioeconomic and demographic compositions - both over time and in relation to each other - were organized using Special Program for Social Sciences to cover two periods. The first period (November 1994-April 2000) relied on data collected by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) in Nablus, which conducted surveys up to spring 2000. The second period (November 2000-November 2003) relied on surveys conducted by the Development Studies Program at Birzeit University (DSP) during the second intifada. Note that the surveys gather data on the supporters of the political groups, rather than on their organized memberships.
3. See, for example, Birzeit University, DSP, poll no. 11 of February 2003.
4. A June 2004 poll by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), JMCC poll no. 51, had shown Fatah's support at 26 percent, Hamas's at 22 percent, and Islamic Jihad's at 5 percent. The share of those who did not trust any political or group rose to 28.2 percent, and nearly 12 percent refused to answer.
5. A December 2004 public opinion poll (i.e., conducted soon after Arafat's death) carried out by the JMCC (poll no. 53) found that Fatah was considered the most trustworthy by 41.6 percent of the population over 18 years of age (42.3 percent in WB; 40.5 percent in GS), compared to 20.0 percent for Hamas (17.4 percent in WB; 24.5 percent in GS) and 3.8 percent for Islamic Jihad (2.9 percent in WB; 5.5 percent in GS). Those who said they do not trust any political or religious group totaled 19.7 percent (22.8 percent in WB and 14.3 percent in GS).
6. See DSP poll no. 21 (part two), April 2005; and poll no. 16 (June 2005) conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in Ramallah.
7. Surveys generally included separate categories for independent Islamists and independent nationalists.
8. Hamas and Islamic Jihad draw support from all districts, but during the first three years of the intifada, 56.5 percent of their supporters came from the five districts mentioned above, with the three West Bank districts accounting for a third of their total support, and the two Gaza districts more than a fifth of their total support. Fatah and the left-wing parties got 54 percent of their support from the five districts named. Fatah received higher support in Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqiliya, Salfit, Jericho, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Khan Yunis, while the Islamists received higher support in Jerusalem, Hebron, Gaza City, Dayr al-Balah, and Rafah. Both movements receive more or less equal support in Nablus, Tubas, and Gaza North.
9. According to the general Palestinian census of December 1997 in the WBGS, the urban population constituted 53.1 percent of the population, compared to 31 percent for the rural population and 15.9 percent for the refugee camp dwellers. The same census showed refugees and descendents of refugees (inside and outside camps) forming 41.4 percent of the population. See the Social Monitor no. 7 (Ramallah: Palestinian Economic Research Institute [MAS], April 2004), p. xiii.
10. Data for the second intifada show that the largest share (36 percent) of returnees did not support any of the existing political groups and that only a small percentage (4 percent) supported left-wing groups. There are no data on returnees before the outbreak of the second intifada.
11. For the 1997 survey, see Jamil Hilal, al-Mujtama' al-filastini wa ishkaliyat al-dimukratiya [Palestinian Society and the Problematics of Democracy] (Nablus: CPRS, August 1999). For the 2004 survey, see DSP poll no. 21 (part two), April, 2005.
12. Calculated from surveys conducted by CPRS.
13. The percentages are taken from results of surveys conducted by CPRS, DSP, and PCPSR (polls no. 11 and 15).
14. Invalid votes amounted to 2.86 percent of total cast, while blank ballots constituted another 2.08 percent. See the Central Election Committee Web site at www.elections.ps.
15. See Jamil Hilal, al-Tandhimat wa al-ahzab al-siyasiya al-filastiniya [Palestinian Political Organizations and Parties] (Ramallah: Muwatin-Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, 2006).
16. The left-wing organizations and independent lists gained five and four parliamentary seats respectively, on the proportional system, but none in the constituency majority system. (See the Web site of the Central Election Committee: www.elections.ps.)
17. Note that the pre-intifada surveys covered individuals 18 years old and above, while the post-intifada surveys covered individuals 16 years old and over.
18. This latter decline applies to the Islamists as well, perhaps because of the Palestinian economy's deep recession since 2001.
19. The interviews were conducted by Henrik Lunden, a social anthropologist at Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Norway. Luden can be contacted at henrik.lundenγmi.no.
20. Here, the left-wing list gained 5 seats and two liberal independent lists gained 4 seats. Five other lists-all secularist-did not reach the 2 percent necessary to win any seats (14.2 percent of all valid votes). For election results in detail, see the Central Palestinian Election Committee Web site: www.elections.ps.