Respect as esteem: The case of counselling

Res Publica

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 77-95

  Gibson, Susanne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CUMBRIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Appraisal respect; Counselling; Esteem; Kant; Professional ethics; Recognition respect

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745040035     PISSN: 13564765     EISSN: 15728692     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11158-006-0007-3     Document Type: Review

References (62)

1. General Medical Council, 'The Duties of a Doctor Registered with the General Medical Council', Ethical Guidance http://www.gmc-uk.org/standards/ default.htm (accessed 04/09/05);
2. Nursing and Midwifery Council, The NMC Code of Professional Conduct: Standards for Conduct, Performance and Ethics http://www.nmc-org.uk (accessed 04/09/05);
3. British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy, Ethical Framework for Good Practice in Counselling and Psychology, http://www.bacp.co.uk/ printable/ethicalframework.html (accessed 04/09/05).
4. Stephen Darwall 'Two Kinds of Respect', Ethics 88 (1977) 36-49.
5. Robin S. Dillon, 'Care and Respect,' in eds E. Browning Cole and S. Coultrap-McQuin, Explorations in Feminist Ethics: Theory and Practice (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992) 67-81, p. 75.
6. Robin S. Dillon, Explorations in Feminist Ethics: Theory and Practice, Ibid., p. 79.
7. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in ed Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge. Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 355-603, 6:453. p. 572.
8. Kant, The Cambridge. Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, op. cit., 6:450, p. 569;
9. Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 115.
10. Kant, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy, op. cit. 6:448, p. 568.
11. For a detailed analysis of the way in which Kant treats the relationship between love and respect, see Marcia W. Baron, 'Love and Respect in the Doctrine of Virtue,' in ed Mark Timmons, Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 391-407.
12. Dillon uses the term 'care respect' because she is concerned primarily with the insights of the ethic of care, while at the same time placing those insights within a broader field of inquiry.
13. O'Neill, Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, op. cit., p.111.
14. Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 284. For Beauchamp and Childress the obligation of veracity is only prima facie binding, whereas for Kant it is absolute.
15. O'Neill, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit.
16. Kant, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit. 6:452, p. 571;
17. O'Neill, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit., p. 115.
18. NMC, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit., Section 2. Emphasis added.
19. BACP, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit., p. 2.
20. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit., pp. 176ff.
21. Kant, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit., 6:454, p. 572. Kant also claims that while "It is for [other human beings] to decide what they count as belonging to their happiness... it is open to me to refuse them many things that they think will make them happy but that I do not, as long as they have no right to demand them from me as what is theirs"
22. ibid, 6:388, p. 519.
23. Kant, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit., 6:449, p. 568;
24. Baron, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit., p. 406.
25. Dillon, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit., p. 75;
26. O'Neill, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit., p. 116.
27. O'Neill, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit., p. 115.
28. BACP, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, op. cit., pp. 1-3.
29. Strictly speaking, Darwall's account of appraisal respect for persons requires that they be appropriately esteemed on the basis of a specific range of features, namely, those connected with human agency. Since my argument is that appropriate esteem can be understood as respect for the other as an agent, I do not intend to dwell on this point but will take the terms 'appropriate esteem' and 'appraisal respect' to have substantially the same meaning.
30. A. Browne, 'A Conceptual Clarification of Respect,' Journal of Advanced Nursing 18 (1993) 211-217, p. 213.
31. Darwall, Journal of Advanced Nursing, op. cit., p. 45; emphasis added.
32. Darwall, Journal of Advanced Nursing, Ibid., p. 43.
33. Darwall, Journal of Advanced Nursing, Ibid., p. 44.
34. Browne, Journal of Advanced Nursing, op. cit., p. 213.
35. J. Liaschenko, 'Making a Bridge: the Moral Work with Patients We Do Not Like,' Journal of Palliative Care 10/3 (1994) 83-89, p. 88.
36. Ann Gallagher, 'Do Virtues Have a Role in the Practice of Counselling?', in eds Martin Robb, Sheila Barrett, Carol Kamaromy and Anita Rogers, Communication, Relationships and Care: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2004) 198-208;
37. M. Johnston, 'On Becoming Non-judgmental: Some Difficulties for an Ethics of Counselling' Journal of Medical Ethics 25/6 (1999) 487-490;
38. Campbell Purton, 'Unconditional Positive Regard and its Spiritual Implications,' in eds Brian Thorne and Elke Lambers, Person-centred Therapy: A European Perspective (London: Sage, 1998) 23-37;
39. Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy (London: Constable, 1967);
40. Brian Thorne, 'Person-centred Therapy,' in ed Windy Dryden, Handbook of Individual Therapy (London: Sage, 1996) 121-146.
41. For an account of the development of the BACP Framework see R. Ashcroft 'What's the Good of Counselling and Psychotherapy? Developing an Ethical Framework' and T. Bond 'The New Ethical Framework -an Introduction' Counselling and Psychotherapy Journal 12/8 (2001) 10-14. It is not my claim that the analysis suggested in this paper represents the Framework's authors' thinking.
42. Dillon, Counselling and Psychotherapy Journal, op. cit., p. 80.
43. Robin S. Dillon, 'Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect,' Hypatia 7/1 (1992) 52-69, p. 54.
44. Kant, Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, in ed M. J. Gregor, op. cit. 37-108, 4:429, p. 79.
45. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in ed M. J. Gregor, op. cit., 6:462, p. 579.
46. Barron, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., p. 396.
47. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., 6:449, p. 568;
48. Barron, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit. p. 396.
49. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., 6:436, p. 558.
50. Eugene Kennedy and Sara C. Charles, On Becoming a Counsellor, 3rd edition (Dublin: Newleaf, 2001), p. 106.
51. Purton, On Becoming a Counsellor, 3rd Edition, op. cit. p. 25.
52. Dillon, On Becoming a Counsellor, 3rd Edition, op. cit. makes a convincing argument for the inadequacy of a thin conception of recognition self-respect.
53. Gerard Egan, The Skilled Helper: A Problem-Management Approach to Helping, 6th edition (Pacific Grove, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1998), p. 45.
54. Gerard Egan, The Skilled Helper: A Problem-Management Approach to Helping, 6th edition, Ibid. p. 155; p. 157.
55. Kant, The Skilled Helper: A Problem-Management Approach to Helping, 6th Edition, op. cit. 6:449, p. 568.
56. In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant suggests that any act of beneficence results in an irreparable inequality in the relationship between benefactor and benefactee: 'one cannot, by any repayment of a kindness received, rid oneself of the obligation for it, since the recipient can never win away from the benefactor his priority of merit, namely having been the first in benevolence' ibid, 6:455;
57. 'But if one [friend] accepts a favour from the other, then he may well be able to count on equality in love, but not in respect; for he sees himself obviously a step lower in being under obligation without being able to impose obligation in turn' - Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ibid, 6:471, p. 586.
58. Paul Benson, 'Feeling Crazy: Self-Worth and the Social Character of Responsibility,' in eds Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 72-93, p. 80.
59. Paul Benson, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self, Ibid., pp. 88-89.
60. Liaschenko, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self, op. cit., p. 88.
61. Kant, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self, op. cit., 6:463, p. 579.
62. BACP, Kant, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self, op. cit., p. 3.