Captives no longer, but servants still? Contract parliamentarism and the new minority governance in Sweden and New Zealand

Government and Opposition

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 422-449

  Bale, Tim ^a   Bergman, Torbjörn ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33744959598     PISSN: 0017257X     EISSN: 14777053     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2006.00186.x     Document Type: Review

References (40)

1. The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their constructive comments on this article. We are also vety grateful to Magnus Blomgren for his help with the design of Figure 1.
2. The concept of 'contract parliamentarism' was first used in Torbjörn Bergman and Nicholas Aylott, 'Parlamentarism per kontrakt? Blir den svenska innovationen långlivad?', in Riksdagens årsbok 2002/03, Stockholm, Riksdagen, 2003, pp. 4-7.
3. Kaare Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 61-2.
4. See Tim Bale 'Cinderella and her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party Systems', West European Politics, 26: 3 (2003), pp. 67-90.
5. The text of the agreement is on the website of the Liberal Democrat History Group: http://www.liberalhistoty.org.uk/record.jsp?type=page&ID=175&statement %20on%20lib%20lab%20pact.
6. Csaba Nikolenyi, 'Coordination Problem and Grand Coalition: The Puzzle of the Government Formation Game in the Czech Republic, 1998', Communist and Post Communist Studies, 36 (2003), pp. 325-44.
7. The Swedish Greens and the Social Democrats are very close in policy space. Some studies actually place the Greens to the left of the Social Democrats, but in the eyes of the most relevant actors, the party leaderships in the parliamentary parties, the Greens are more of a centre party than are the Social Democrats, see Nicholas Aylott and Torbjörn Bergman, 'Almost in Government, But Not Quite: The Swedish Greens, Bargaining Constraints and the Rise of Contract Parliamentarism', paper presented in panel 6, ECPR joint sessions of workshops, Uppsala, 13-18 April 2004.
8. See Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm (eds), Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
9. In Sweden, the so-called bourgeois bloc is composed of (in descending order of popularity) the conservative Moderata Samlingspartiet, the traditionally liberal (but recently rather populist) Folkpartiet Liberalerna, the Kristdemokraterna and the Centerpartiet. In New Zealand, the equivalent (if slightly more putative) bloc is made up by National (conservative), ACT (neo-liberal) and the self-styled centrist (Christian) United Future and the aggressively populist (but welfarist) New Zealand First.
10. Torbjörn Bergman, 'Formation Rules and Minority Governments', European Journal of Political Research, 23: 1 (1993), pp. 55-66.
11. On New Zealand's 'negative parliamentarianism' in comparative perspective, see Jonathan Boston, Governing Under Proportional Representation: Lessons from Europe, Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, 1998, pp. 23-5.
12. See Flemming Juul Christiansen, 'The Inclusion of Challenger Parties into Legislative Accommodations in Danish Parliamentary Politics', paper presented at the ECPR Conference, Marburg, Germany, 18-21 September 2003.
13. See also Christoffer Green-Pedersen, 'Minority Governments and Party Politics: the Political and Institutional Background to the "Danish Miracle" ', Journal of Public Policy, 21: 1 (2001), pp. 53-70.
14. Torbjörn Bergman, 'Sweden: When Minority Cabinets are the Rule and Majority Coalitions the Exception', in Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm (eds), Coalition Governments in Western Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 192-320.
15. Interview conducted with Åke Pettersson (previously a junior minister and then the general secretary or partisekreterare of the Centre Party) by Bergman on 25 May 1996.
16. Statsrådsberedningen 1998 (The Prime Minister's Office), Pressmeddelande: Samarbete mellan regeringen, vänsterpartiet och miljöpartiet', 5 October 1998.
17. Tim Bale and Christine Dann, 'Is the Grass Really Greener? The Rationale and Reality of Support Party Status: A Case Study', Party Politics, 8: 3 (2002), pp. 349-65.
18. Tim Bale, ' "As You Sow, so Shall You Reap": The New Zealand Greens and the General Election of 2002', Environmental Politics, 12: 2 (2003), pp. 140-4.
19. United were promised a 'Commission for the Family', no legalization of cannabis and a comprehensive drugs strategy, legislative support for victims' rights, and that transport legislation would include provisions for alternative funding options for road building.
20. See New Zealand Cabinet Office Circular NZ CO (02) 11, 3 September 2002, which is helpfully available on the web at http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/circulars/co02/COC_02_11.pdf.
21. Confirmed in NZ Cabinet Office Circular NZ CO (02) 11, 3 September 2002.
22. Jonathan Boston and Stephen Church, 'Government Formation after the 2002 General Election', in Jonathan Boston et al. (eds), New Zealand Votes: The General Election of 2002, Wellington, Victoria University Press, 2003, p. 355.
23. Full text of the agreements is available at http://www.beehive.govt.nz/Documents/Files/NZFirst.pdf and http://www.beehive.govt.nz/Documents/Files/United.pdf.
24. Full text of the agreement is available at http://greens.org.nz/searchdocs/other9314.html.
25. Bergman, 'Formation Rules and Minority Governments'.
26. Bergman and Aylott, 'Parlamentarism per kontrakt?', pp. 4-7.
27. A 'walk-away value' is what a negotiator, such as a party leader, can gain without a new agreement; i.e. what he or she secures by walking away from the bargaining table. See Arthur Lupia and Kaare Strøm, 'Bargaining, Transaction Costs, and Coalition Governance', in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman (eds), Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
28. Nicholas Aylott, Torbjörn Bergman and Jan Jämte, 'Fighting Off the Challengers: The Swedish Social Democrats and their Support Parties or, Why the Greens Could Not Force Themselves into Government!', paper presented at the ECPR Conference, Marburg, 18-21 September 2003, p. 12.
29. See Sören Holmberg, 'Riksdagsvalet 2002: Valu-siffror', Swedish Election Studies Programme (www.valforskningsprogrammet.pol.gu.se), accessed July 2003.
30. Anders Widfeldt, 'Sweden', in Wolfgang Rüdig (ed.), Green Party Members. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, forthcoming.
31. Jon Burchell, ' "Small Steps" or "Great Leaps": How the Swedish Greens are Learning the Lessons of Government Participation', Scandinavian Political Studies, 24, (2001), pp. 239-54.
32. According to media reports the agreement was approved by only 10 votes to five with five abstentions.
33. See Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Jeffrey Karp and Raymond Miller (eds), Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government, Auckland, Auckland University Press;
34. and Tim Bale, 'New Zealand', in Rüdig (ed.), Green Party Members.
35. For example, on Western Europe, see Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm (eds), Coalition Governments in Western Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
36. See Tim Bale and Torbjörn Bergman, 'A Taste of Honey is Worse than None at All? Coping with the Generic Challenges of Support Party Status in Sweden and New Zealand', Party Politics, 12: 2 (2006), pp. 189-209.
37. See Peter Mair, 'The Green Challenge and Political Competition: How Typical is die German Experience?', German Politics, 10 (2001), pp. 99-116
38. and Bale, 'Cinderella and her Ugly Sisters'.
39. On Green Parties in particular, see Patrick Dumont and Hanna Bäck, 'Why so Few, and Why so Late? Green Parties and the Question of Governmental Participation', European Journal of Political Research, forthcoming.
40. See Russell J. Dalton and Steven A. Weldon, 'Public Images of Political Parties: A Necessaiy Evil?', West European Politics, 28: 5 (2005), pp. 931-51.