Design of incentive compatible mechanisms for Stackelberg problems

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3828 LNCS, Issue , 2005, Pages 718-727

  Garg, Dinesh ^a   Narahari, Yadati ^a  

^a INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; DECISION MAKING; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; FINANCE; ROUTERS;

GRID COMPUTING; NETWORK ROUTING; SELFISH AGENTS; STACKELBERG PROBLEMS;

PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 33744947786     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11600930_72     Document Type: Conference Paper

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