Political Islam and Malaysian democracy

Democratization

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 421-441

  Thirkell White, Ben ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Democracy; Democratization; Historical materialism; Islam; Malaysia

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; DEMOCRATIZATION; ISLAMISM; LIBERALISM; SOCIAL STRUCTURE;

ASIA; EURASIA; MALAYSIA; SOUTHEAST ASIA;

EID: 33744938936     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: 1743890X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510340600579318     Document Type: Article

References (70)

1. In terms of the democratization literature, Malaysia falls squarely in the category of 'democracy with adjectives'. For a review of authoritarian tactics employed, see William Case, 'Malaysia's Resilient Pseudodemocracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2001), pp. 43-57;
2. R. Milne and D. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (London: Routledge, 1999). Freedom House gave it a rating of 5 out of 7 (with 7 as unfree) for both political rights and civil liberties at the turn of the millennium. By 2005, it had apparently improved slightly to two 4 ratings (see http://www.freedomhouse.org). Reasons for emphasizing the importance of ethnic cleavages, rather than authoritarian tactics, are given below.
3. See Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle-East Politics: State Formation and Development (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994);
4. Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (London: I. B. Taurus, 2003);
5. and Hinnebusch (this issue, pp. 373-95).
6. Freédéric Volpi, 'Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 6 (2004), pp. 29-43.
7. J. Putucheary, Ownership and Control in the Malaysian Economy (Singapore: University of Malaya University Press, 1960);
8. K. Ratnam, Communalism and Political Process in Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1965).
9. Edmund Terence Gomez and Kwame Sundaram Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics Patronage and Profits, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
10. It is perhaps worth pointing out that this was also an authoritarian turn - in that opposition was deliberately coopted within the state - but not radically so (relative to President Sukarno's earlier shift to 'guided democracy' in Indonesia, for example). A moderate response may have been possible because opposition revolved around policy issues more than ideology (which drove Indonesian divisions) so accommodation was easier. The incentives provided by the separation between Malay political power and the continuing structural power of Chinese capital may also have been a factor - confiscation of Chinese assets was still likely to be a self-defeating strategy.
11. Gomez and Jomo (note 5).
12. Ibid.
13. Although there were some clashes between Indians and Malays in the Shah Alam district of Selangor, on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, following a family wedding.
14. Gomez and Jomo (note 5).
15. Ibid.;
16. J. Jesudason, Ethnicity and the Economy: The State, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989).
17. Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1995).
18. By way of comparison some figures for the rest of the Muslim world are Jordan US$4,320, Egypt $3,950, Algeria $6,107 and Saudi Arabia $13,226 (figures from United Nations Human Development Programme, Human Development Report, 2005).
19. H. Crouch, Government and Society In Malaysia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
20. J. Jesudason, 'The Syncretic State and the Structuring of Oppositional Politics in Malaysia, in G. Rodan (ed.), Political Opposition in Industrialising Asia (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 128-60.
21. Husin Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1993);
22. Michael Peletz, Islamic Modern: Religious Courts and Cultural Politics in Malaysia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).
23. See John Funston, 'The Politics of Islamic Reassertion: Malaysia', in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Reassertion (New York: St Martin's Press, 1981);
24. Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Press, 1987).
25. Hussain S. Ahmad, 'Muslim Politics and the Discourse on Democracy', in Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik (eds), Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices (Richmond: Curzon, 2002, pp. 74-107).
26. Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B. Taurus, 2002).
27. Farish A. Noor, 'PAS Post-Fadzil Noor: Future Directions and Prospects', Trends in Southeast Asia, TRS 8/02 (Singapore, ISEAS, 2002);
28. Peletz (note 16).
29. For details see Crouch (note 14).
30. Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1997);
31. Ahmad (note 18).
32. Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 175.
33. Mohamad Mahathir, 'Speech at the 3rd International Seminar on Islamic Thoughts', Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1984), pp. 226-31,
34. cited in Khoo (note 12), p. 167.
35. Patricia Sloane, Islam, Modernity and Entrepreneurship among the Malays (New York: St Martins Press, 1999).
36. For interesting anecdotal reports of similar connections between 'modern' resurgence Islam and business, see V. S. Naipaul, Beyond Belief (London: Abacus, 1999).
37. Deputy Prime Minister, Utusan Malaysia, 12 April 1982, cited in Nair (note 22).
38. Ibid.
39. For a fascinating account of the history and workings of the Islamic legal system in Malaysia, see Peletz (note 16).
40. The term assabiyah refers to a variety of tribal or clan allegiances within the Muslim world which are regarded by some Muslims as a distraction from the unity of the faith (for a fuller discussion see, for example, Volpi, note 3).
41. See, for example, M. Jurgensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (San Francisco: University of California Press, 2001).
42. J. Esposito and J. O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996);
43. N. Ghadbian, Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).
44. For much more detail on Malaysian political economy during this period and the new class of political business people that emerged, see Edmund Terence Gomez, Chinese Business in Malaysia: Accumulation, Ascendance, Accommodation (London: Curzon, 1999)
45. and Peter Searle, The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-Seekers or Real Capitalists? (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999).
46. Crouch (note 14);
47. R. S. Milne and D. K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (London: Routledge, 1999).
48. Gomez and Jomo (note 5);
49. K. J. Khoo, 'The Grand Vision: Mahathir and Modernization', in K. W. Loh and J. S. Khan (eds), Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1992).
50. Jesudason (note 15).
51. There are superficial parallels here with Hinnebsuch's description of post-populist authoritarianism in the Middle East (this collection). However, if in the Middle East a narrowing crony state-business coalition reduces the chances of capitalist opposition to the state, in Malaysia it may create the possibility of a new opposition alliance between newly excluded lower middle-classes and more marginalized groups, auguring greater political competition.
52. There is actually some dispute about this. The general perception in Malaysia is that there was a swing towards the Barisan Nasional among Chinese voters who were anxious that a vote for the Barisan Alternatif was effectively a vote for PAS (who would lead any BA government). Khoo Boo Teik argues that this claim is too strong. Rather, Chinese voters did not swing away from the BN as much as the rest of the population. The DAP-MCA split among Chinese voters was in fact roughly the same as in 1995, so one should not jump to any simple conclusions about Chinese distaste for PAS. Khoo Boo Teik, Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and Its Discontents (London and New York: Zed Books, 2003).
53. That was not necessarily particularly obvious from election results. Many of the new members 'returned' to their kampong (home village) to vote, so did not appear as urban voters. This is a strategy PAS has deliberately encouraged. Malaysia's first past the post electoral system provides incentives to concentrate support into a particular region to maximize the number of seats won. This analysis was presented to the author by both PAS leaders and independent journalists in Kuala Lumpur in 2003.
54. John Funston, 'Malaysia: Umno's Search for Relevance', Southeast Asian Affairs 2001 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001);
55. Maznah Mohamad, 'The Unravelling of a "Malay Consensus"', Southeast Asian Affairs 2001 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001).
56. Ibid.
57. Funston (note 39);
58. Farish A. Noor, '"Holy Terror" Revisited', Malaysiakini, Vol. 22, March 2001, available at .
59. Amrita Malhi, 'The Pas-Bn Conflict in Islam and Modernity', in Virginia Hooker and Norami Othman (eds), Malaysia: Islam, Society and Politics (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 236-65.
60. It is important to be very wary of claims made by more excitable members of the terrorism studies community about the prevalence of Al Qaeda-driven terrorism in the region. See R. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002);
61. Z. Abuza, 'Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network', Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2002), pp. 427-65.
62. There is, in fact, very little evidence to support claims that terrorist links are anything more than extremely tenuous (even the Jemaah Islamiya, responsible for the Bali bombings and active in Malaysia, seems less well connected to Al Qaeda than first thought). One implication of this analysis is that security-driven acceptance of authoritarian tactics in dealing with terror is not only based on false perceptions but also risks creating the conditions for greater political radicalization in the medium term (see, for example, D. Wright-Neville, 'Dangerous Dynamics: Activists, Militants and Terrorists in Southeast Asia', The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2004), pp. 27-46.
63. The quotation comes from a question and answer session posted on Malaysiakini, 25 June 2003.
64. Author interview with Nasharuddin bin Mat Isa, PAS's Secretary General, Kuala Lumpur, August 2003.
65. Liew Chin Tong, 'Pas' Islamic State: A Tale of Two Versions (Part 2)', Malaysiakini, 3 December 2003.
66. PAS, 'The Islamic State Document (English Version)'(Kuala Lumpur: PAS, 2003).
67. There were rumours, for example, that Nasharuddin would be pushed out of his role as secretary general because he was 'too close to the professionals' within the party (see 'PAS ulama: We were denied angels' assistance Malaysiakini, 7 May 2004). At the same time, the PAS Baru wing of the party were clearly dismayed about the contents of the document ('PAS' Islamic state memo a bomb, Malaysiakini, 7 November 2003).
68. Something which clearly concerned PAS leaders interviewed in Kuala Lumpur in summer 2003.
69. See, for example, Khoo Boo Teik, 'Malaysian politics in 2004: transitions and elections', Trends in Southeast Asia, Vol. 4 (Singapore, ISEAS, 2004).
70. Volpi (note 3).