Jihadism in Western Europe after the invasion of Iraq: Tracing motivational influences from the Iraq war on jihadist terrorism in Western Europe

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 323-342

  Nesser, Petter ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN DEFENCE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT FFI   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33744918079     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100600641899     Document Type: Article

References (95)

1. Europe has been haunted by Islamist terrorism in the past; respectively: operations conducted by the militant Shia-Islamist Hizbullah in the 1980s and a terrorist campaign implemented by the Algerian GIA in France from 1994-1996.
2. Petter Nesser, Jihad in Europe (Kjeller: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2004), report 2004/01146.
3. Ibid.
4. It is noteworthy that an increase in the level of terrorism planning activity came after a statement by Al Qaeda's no. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri in October 2002, in which he specifically threatened the U.S.'s European allies. See Oliver Burkeman, "US believes recording is Bin Laden deputy," The Guardian 10 October 2002. Since then, the leaders of Al Qaeda have mentioned and threatened specific Western European countries repeatedly in their public communiqués. This is an important observation considering that incarcerated jihadist terrorists in Europe have voiced strong support for Al Qaeda's ideology of global jihad, and that several of them have encountered Al Qaeda's top leaders. The blessing from the Al Qaeda leadership to conduct terrorist operations on European soil thus had an audience of committed militants receiving the message.
5. Brynjar Lia, Causes of Terrorism (Kjeller: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2005), FFI Research Report No. 2005/04307 forthcoming,
6. and Michael Doran, "Somebody else's civil war," Foreign Affairs 81(1) (January/February 2002), pp. 22-42.
7. See Brynjar Lia and Åshild Kjøk, Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993-2000 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, 2004). Report, 2001/03789.
8. See, for example, Brian Lai, "Explaining terrorism using the framework of opportunity and willingness: An empirical examination of international terrorism," Research Paper, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, April 2004, available at (http://rubagalo.polisci.uiowa.edu/~fredb/workshop/ lai2004-04-18.pdf). Accessed July 2004.
9. See for example. Marc Sageman, "Understanding terror networks" (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004)
10. and Jason Burke, "Al Qaeda, casting the shadow of terror" (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003). Some of the veterans from the jihad in Afghanistan established networks on the Balkans, and initiated jihad in Bosnia in the early 1990s. The analyst Evan F. Kohlman makes the case that these fighters and other Islamist radicals who came to Bosnia from multiple Muslim countries were crucial in the establishment of jihadist networks all over Europe;
11. see Evan Kohlman, Al Qaeda's Jihad in Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2004).
12. Mark Huband, "Hamburg hospital sealed off after bomb warning," Financial Times, 31 December 2003.
13. "Vierter Verdächtiger in Berlin festgenommen," Der Spiegel, 4 December 2004.
14. See, for example, Sebastian Rotella, "A road to Ansar began in Italy," Los Angeles Times, 28 April 2003
15. "Dutch-Iraqi plotted to recruit fighters" Yahoo News, 8 December 2003
16. Elaine Sciolino, "France seizes 11 accused of plotting iraq attacks," New York Times, 27 January 2005.
17. Zarqawi allegedly heads the al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad movement that recently changed its name to "The Al Qaeda organization in the Land of the Two Rivers." He is also known to have coordinated a terrorist cell detected in Germany in April 2002 that planned attacks against Jewish targets in Berlin and Dusseldorf, and it is suspected that he coordinated other terrorist cells active in Italy, the United Kingdom, and France.
18. Craig Whitlock, "In Europe, new force for recruiting radicals: Ansar al-Islam emerges as primary extremist group funneling fighters into Iraq," Washington Post, 18 February 2005
19. Sebastian Rotella, "A road to Ansar began in Italy," Los Angeles Times, 28 April 2003.
20. Nesser, Jihad in Europe.
21. Thomas Hegghammer, lecture given to Oslo Military Society, 25 January 2005.
22. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of using these sources of information, see Nesser, Jihad in Europe, p. 16 ff.
23. See "Al Qaeda training manual," United States Department of Justice, available at (http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm).
24. For the best discussions of the recruitment processes, see Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004)
25. Michael Taarnby, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe (Aarhus: Danish Ministry of Justice, 2005)
26. and Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Umma (London: Hurst, 2004), chapter 7.
27. Ibid.
28. Youth with a fascination for the jihad movement came to London from all over Europe and listened to their sermons. The sermons were held mainly in English, as many of the potential jihad-recruits did not master Arabic.Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza have gone in and out of U.K. prisons. Because they have come under scrutiny, Umar Bakri Muhammad, the leader of al-Muhajirun, has become more important as a promoter of the global jihad in the U.K. radical milieus. See Don Van Natta Jr. and Lowell Bergman, "Insurgency: Militant imams under scrutiny across europe," New York Times, 25 January 2005. However, Bakri does not possess the credibility of the two others, who actually participated in the Afghan jihad. Videos and audiotapes of Qatada's sermons have been distributed to jihadists all over the world, and were found, for example, in the apartment of the Hamburg-cell and the hideouts of the Casablanca and Madrid bombers.
29. See Nesser, Jihad in Europe
30. and Petter Nesser, Jihadist Terrorism in North America-Patterns and Profiles, 2005, working paper.
31. Nesser, Jihad in Europe.
32. Ibid.
33. Giles Tremlett, "Madrid bombers planned more attacks,Video found in flat of dead terrorists gave ultimatum," The Guardian, 9 April 2004.
34. Giles Tremlett, "Cornered, they blew themselves up - but others are still on the run. Police claim ringleaders of Madrid train attack died in suburban shootout," The Guardian, 5 April 2004.
35. Explosions were set off at one train inside the Atocha station, and one train approaching the station (altogether seven bombs). Two bombs exploded on a train at the El Pozo station, and one bomb was set off on board a train at the Santa Eugenia station.
36. Spanish police were tipped off about a suspicious white Renault Kangoo van near the Alcalá de Henares station on the day of the attacks. The van had been stolen in the Madrid suburb Tetuán on 28 February. Inside the van the police found 7 detonators and an audiotape with Quranic recitals.
37. For an open source illustration of the bomb see El Mundo Special coverage of the Madrid attacks, available at (http://www.elmundo.es/ documentos/2004/03/espana/atentados11m/grafico_bolsa.htm).
38. Interview with confidential source, September 2004.
39. Lawrence Wright, "The terror web," The New Yorker, 2 August 2004.
40. Interview with confidential source, September 2004.
41. "Hallan huellas de dos detenidos tras el 11-M en la casa donde se hicieron los explosivos," El Mundo, 28 March 2004.
42. Interview with confidential source, September 2004.
43. Gordon Corera, "Al-Qaeda undimmed by sanctions," BBC News, 27 August 2004.
44. See Ali Anouzla in Rabat, 'Security sources: 'Moroccan combatant group' was behind Spain's bombings. Moroccan called 'Abou-Isa' established it in Afghanistan and now lives in hiding in Britain," al-Sharq al-Awsat, 17 March 2004 via FBIS, and "Spanish police link Madrid bombings with Casablanca attack," El Mundo, 28 September 2004 via FBIS.
45. See, for example, "Three guilty in Afghan terror recruiting," FindLaw.com, 25 June 2004
46. Tracy Wilkinson, "Suspected Madrid bomb plotter held," Los Angeles Times, 9 June 2004
47. "Spanish police link Madrid bombings with Casablanca attack," El Mundo, 28 September 2004 via FBIS. The Casablanca operation was attributed to another group that was established by Moroccan Afghanistan veterans called al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya.
48. Interview with confidential source, September 2004.
49. Mark Townsend et al., "The secret war," The Guardian, 21 March 2004.
50. See for example, Kathryn Haahr-Escolano, "Algerian Salafists and the new face of terrorism in Spain," Jamestown Foundation, 4 November 2004 and Nesser, The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker.
51. This mosque is Spain's largest, and it is Saudi financed. The mosque is known to be strict, but it does not host radical preachers that openly instigate calls to violence.
52. Interview with confidential source, September 2004.
53. "Madrid bombings: The suspects," Agence France Presse, 9 December 2004 via FBIS.
54. Abu Dujana is an alias or a kunya, referring to one of the Prophet's companions, who earned a reputation as a brave warrior in the historical battles of Badr and Uhud. Dujana wore a red headscarf known as the "headband of death" (asbat al-mawt), that was tucked around his helmet when he was fighting. The second part of the kunya, al-Afghani, or "the Afghan" tells us that the person has spent time in Afghanistan during the 1980s and/or the 1990s, see Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, FFI explains Al Qaeda document.
55. "Full text: 'Al-Qaeda' Madrid claim," BBC News, 14 March 2004.
56. "Full text: 'Bin Laden tape,'" BBC News, 15 April 2004.
57. Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, FFI explains Al Qaeda document.
58. ibid.
59. Sebastian Rotella, "A road to Ansar began in Italy."
60. It is alleged that the operation involved other targets in Spain, such as the home field of Madrid, Santiago Bernabeu Stadium. It is also alleged that the main target of the operation was Judge Baltazar Garson who heads the investigations into the Madrid bombings. See Kathryn Haahr-Escolano, "Algerian Salafists and the new face of terrorism in Spain." An insider account of the activities of a GSPC network in Paris also indicated that militants might revenge arrests of jihadists. The infiltrator quoted members of the group saying "The English could make troubles for themselves if they continue to persecute the brothers.
61. " See Mohamed Sifaoui, Inside Al Qaeda (London: Granta Books, 2003, p. 79.
62. Lawrence Wright, "The Terror Web," The New Yorker, 2 August 2004.
63. Mark Townsend et al., "The secret war," The Guardian, 21 March 2004.
64. Nesser, The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Thomas Hegghammer, The Iraqi Hostage Crisis: Abductions in Iraq April-August, 2004 FFI/report-2004/03105.
68. Nesser, The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker.
69. Glenn Frankel, "From civic activist to alleged murderer. Suspect in killing of director turned to radical Islam, officials say," Washington Post, 28 November 2004
70. Toby Sterling, "Changes sway Holland slaying suspect," The Associated Press, 8 November 2004
71. Nesser, The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker.
72. Nesser, The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker.
73. Albert Benschop, "Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold - Jihad in the Netherlands" an excellent chronicle of the Van Gogh killing, is available at http://www.sociosite.org/jihad_nl_en.php#abu_zubair
74. "Hofstad" is another name for the city of The Hague.
75. That is, planning political murders and terrorist bomb attacks, author's note.
76. Craig S. Smith, "Dutch look for Qaeda link after killing of filmmaker," New York Times, 6 November 2004.
77. Ibid.
78. Helmut Hetzel: "Netherlands: Van Gogh attacker was part of terror network," Die Presse, 15 November 2004 via FBIS.
79. Al-Zarqawi is known to have coordinated the activities of at least one active terrorist cell in Western Europe, and he is suspected of coordinating a broader network of Islamist terrorists operating in multiple European countries, but mainly in Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Germany. See Nesser, Jihad in Europe.
80. Craig S. Smith, "Dutch look for Qaeda link after killing of filmmaker."
81. Joao Pedro Fonseca, "Group planned attack in Porto," Diario de Noticias, 15 November 2004, via FBIS.
82. For a transcript of the letter and a closer analysis, see Nesser, The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker.
83. The original Dutch version of Bouyeri's testament entitled "In Bloed Gedoopt" (Baptized in Blood) may be downloaded from www.justitie.nl.
84. Glenn Frankel, "From civic activist to alleged murderer. Suspect in killing of director turned to radical Islam, officials say," Washington Post, 28 November 2004.
85. Nesser, The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker.
86. "Report details Internet jihad recruitment drives of Netherlands terror suspect" (FBIS-title) NRC Handelsblad, 28 January 2005.
87. The word semi-radical defines an Islamist group that voices radical views and supports violence, but seldom or never has been tied to concrete acts of violence. One example is the U.K.-based al-Muhajirun group headed by the cleric Umar Bakri Muhammad.
88. Jörg Victor, "Theo van Gogh murdered on the streets of Amsterdam," World Socialist Web Site, 10 November 2004.
89. Consider the following example: In December 2002 a group of Algerian Islamist militants formerly affiliated with the Algerian militant group GIA, planned an attack against the Russian embassy in Paris in response to Russian operations inside Chechnya. The Algerians are believed to have trained in jihadist camps in Afghanistan, Georgia, and Chechnya and allegedly they fought together with Chechen separatists against Russian forces. To further complicate the picture, the group received support from a network of GSPC members in Paris during the preparations for the attack. (The GSPC is a GIA splinter group and the main remaining insurgent group in Algeria.) According to an insider account of the activities of this GSPC support network, its leader was highly ambivalent to the idea that GSPC should join forces with Al Qaeda, and said that it was more important to focus on the Algerian authorities as the "main enemy." The example shows the complexity and the multiple motivations at play in the jihadist milieus, and dynamics of the "globalization" of jihad.
90. See for example Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks
91. and Jason Burke, Al Qaeda, Casting the Shadow of Terror (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003)
92. Nesser, Jihad in Europe
93. Taarnby, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe.
94. Mark Huband, "Muslim radicals 'head to Europe with Iraq skills'" Financial Times, 17 November 2004.
95. Lecture given by Thomas Hegghammer to Oslo Military Society 25 January 2005.