Joint actions and group agents

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 18-39

  Pettit, Philip ^a   Schweikard, David ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Collective agents; Group agents; Groups; Joint action; Joint intention

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744535363     PISSN: 00483931     EISSN: 15527441     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0048393105284169     Document Type: Article

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