Optimal team incentives with CES production

Economics Letters

Volumn 92, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 143-148

  Adams, Christopher P ^a  

^a FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   (United States)

Author keywords

Free riding; Group incentives; Profit sharing

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744508062     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.01.027     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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