The neoliberal 'rebirth' of development economics

Monthly Review

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 38-50

  Herrera, Rémy ^a,b,c  

^a CNRS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

^c World Forum for Alternatives ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646894451     PISSN: 00270520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.14452/MR-058-01-2006-05_4     Document Type: Review

References (19)

1. Paul Krugman, "The Fall and Rise of Development Economics" (1993), http://www.wws.princeton.edu/pkrugman/dishpan.html.
2. Paul Krugman, "Increasing Returns and Economic Geography," National Bureau of Economics Research Working Papers 3275 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990).
3. From CEPAL, the Spanish acronym for the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
4. Rémy Herrera, "Good Governance against Good Government," Report for the 60th Session of the UN Commission of Human Rights, E/CN.4/2004/NGO/124 (Geneva, July 2004).
5. International Monetary Fund, Good Governance: The IMF Role (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2003).
6. Alan P. Kirman, "The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory: The Emperor Has No Clothes," Economic Journal 99, no. 395, (1998).
7. George A. Akerlof, "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, no. 4 (November 1976).
8. Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (New York: Free Press, MacMillan, 1975).
9. Hugo F. Sonnenschein, "Do Walras' Identity and Continuity Characterize a Class of Community Excess Demand Functions?," Journal of Economic Theory 6 (1973).
10. For an example of real business cycle theory see Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott 1982 (2004 Nobel prize-winners).
11. The lord would offer collective goods for which no market exists (defense for example) and in counterpart the remuneration of his services takes adequate institutional forms (serfdom, "implicit contract") to prevent any "free riding" behavior on behalf of his subjects. See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
12. The contract of sharecropping, rational and efficient, would be that whose terms ensure to landowners balancing between risks of uncertainty associated with the fluctuations of the receipts from land and labor incentives of sharecroppers. See Joseph Stiglitz, "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping", Review of Economic Studies 41 (1974).
13. Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (New York: Free Press, MacMillan, 1975).
14. Rémy Herrera, "The Hidden Face of Endogenous Growth Theory: Analytical and Ideological Perspectives in the Era of Neoliberal Globalization," Review of Radical Political Economics 38, no. 2 (2006).
15. For example see Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty (London: Penguin Press, 2005).
16. Bjørn Lomborg, ed., Global Crises, Global Solutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
17. Gary S. Becker, "Latin America Owes a Lot to Its 'Chicago Boys,'" Business Week (June 9, 1997).
18. Robert J. Barro, Nothing Is Sacred (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).
19. World Bank, World Development Report 1998-99 (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1999).