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Volumn 10, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 199-214

On the normative significance of brute facts

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EID: 33646857142     PISSN: 13523252     EISSN: 14698048     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1352325204040224     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (8)

References (7)
  • 2
    • 85022405850 scopus 로고
    • I refer the interested reader to the classic work on this topic E.A. BURTT, THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICAL SCIENCE
    • I will not attempt to document or explain this extremely broad historical fact. I refer the interested reader to the classic work on this topic E.A. BURTT, THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICAL SCIENCE (1924).
    • (1924) I will not attempt to document or explain this extremely broad historical fact
  • 3
    • 84960588046 scopus 로고
    • 18 ANALYSIS As Anscombe uses the term, a fact A is “brute” only relative to another fact B. She leaves it open whether there are facts that are brute relative to any other facts. She also leaves it open whether the relative bruteness of a fact has to do with its being normative or nonnormative, evaluative or nonevaluative. So I am not sure that my use of the term “brute fact” bears any significant resemblance to her use. Nonetheless, the term strikes me as appropriately evocative.
    • G.E.M. Anscombe, On Brute Facts, 18 ANALYSIS 69-72 (1958). As Anscombe uses the term, a fact A is “brute” only relative to another fact B. She leaves it open whether there are facts that are brute relative to any other facts. She also leaves it open whether the relative bruteness of a fact has to do with its being normative or nonnormative, evaluative or nonevaluative. So I am not sure that my use of the term “brute fact” bears any significant resemblance to her use. Nonetheless, the term strikes me as appropriately evocative.
    • (1958) On Brute Facts , pp. 69-72
    • Anscombe, G.E.M.1
  • 7
    • 85022445216 scopus 로고
    • (For an instance of an opposing view, see Pall Ardal, And That's a Promise, 18 PHIL. Q. [].) I do not know of any examples that will serve my dialectical purposes at this point and that are entirely uncontroversial. But I hope and believe that, in order to motivate the present dilemma to the generalization of Greenberg's argument, I need not rely on there being any uncontroversial examples of norms fully determined by the brute facts. It should suffice if I can display the epistemic possibility that there are such examples.
    • Again, although this point about promising seems very plausible to me, I recognize that it is not uncontroversial. (For an instance of an opposing view, see Pall Ardal, And That's a Promise, 18 PHIL. Q. 225-237 [1968].) I do not know of any examples that will serve my dialectical purposes at this point and that are entirely uncontroversial. But I hope and believe that, in order to motivate the present dilemma to the generalization of Greenberg's argument, I need not rely on there being any uncontroversial examples of norms fully determined by the brute facts. It should suffice if I can display the epistemic possibility that there are such examples.
    • (1968) Again, although this point about promising seems very plausible to me, I recognize that it is not uncontroversial , pp. 225-237


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