Extending the testimony problem: Evaluating the truth, scope, and source of cultural information

Child Development

Volumn 77, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 531-538

  Bergstrom, Brian ^a   Moehlmann, Bianca ^a   Boyer, Pascal ^a,b  

^a Ashington University   (United Kingdom)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; CHILD; CHILD DEVELOPMENT; CHILD PARENT RELATION; COMPARATIVE STUDY; CULTURAL FACTOR; EDUCATION; HUMAN; INDIVIDUALITY; INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION; PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY; PRESCHOOL CHILD; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; RELIGION; REVIEW; SOCIALIZATION; THEOLOGY;

ADULT; CHILD; CHILD DEVELOPMENT; CHILD, PRESCHOOL; CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON; HUMANS; INDIVIDUALITY; PARENTING; PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY; RELIGION; RELIGION AND PSYCHOLOGY; SOCIALIZATION; THEOLOGY; TRUTH DISCLOSURE;

EID: 33646687947     PISSN: 00093920     EISSN: 14678624     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00888.x     Document Type: Review

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