The effects of issue salience on political decision-making

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 5-13

  Selck, Torsten J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Decision making; Game theory; Issue salience; Structure induced equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646677251     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-006-6790-1     Document Type: Article

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