Marginal cases and moral relevance

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 523-539

  Bernstein, Mark ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALZHEIMER DISEASE; ANALYTICAL APPROACH; ANENCEPHALUS; ANIMAL; ANIMAL EXPERIMENT; ANIMAL WELFARE; ARTICLE; BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; ETHICS; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INFANT; MORALITY; PERSONHOOD; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH; PHILOSOPHY; SPECIES DIFFERENCE;

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH;

ALZHEIMER DISEASE; ANENCEPHALY; ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION; ANIMAL WELFARE; ANIMALS; ETHICAL ANALYSIS; HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION; HUMANS; INFANT; MORAL OBLIGATIONS; PERSONHOOD; PHILOSOPHY; SPECIES SPECIFICITY;

EID: 33646564078     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9833.00155     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. The dramatis personae, the vivisector and animal rights activist, should be viewed representatively. The vivisector, in addition to the person who invasively experiments on live animals, is also one who hunts or traps them, exploits them in circuses and rodeos, raises them for their fur, and the like. In brief, the vivisector stands for any person who believes and acts as though there are differences between humans and nonhumans that morally justify such disparate behavior. The animal rights activist need not be one who believes in animal rights. Any person who believes that no justifying differences universally exist between human and nonhuman animals will count as an activist. I use the terms 'vivisector' and 'animal rights activist' not only because their literal extensions are appropriate, but also because vivisectors and animal rights activists provide particularly poignant antagonists and so facilitate entry into the heart of the discussion. 2 Many of those who adopt this tactic are patronized by the scientific community as being ignorant of scientific method. This bluster disregards too many individuals who are quite-maybe too-knowledgeable. Dr. Charles Mayo, for one, of the Mayo Clinic for cancer research, has said, "I know of no achievement through vivisection, no scientific discovery, that could not have been obtained without such barbarism and cruelty. The whole thing is evil" (New York Daily News, March 13, 1961).
2. For an excellent exposition see Ray and Jean Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000).
3. In this article, I consider as candidates for moral relevance only intrinsic properties of animals and humans. Some, especially those who have a contractualist account of morality, may argue that the morally relevant property is relational. I discuss this option in great detail in my On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), chap. 5.
4. David Drebushenko brings up this point in "Sentience and Sensibility: Overcoming the Argument from Marginal Cases" (unpublished).
5. Cf. Stephen R. L. Clark, "Ethical Problems in Animal Welfare," reprinted in Animals and Their Moral Standing (Routledge, 1997), 112-20.
6. The domain of individuals who own a welfare is a hotly debated issue. For an approach that includes, roughly, all and only sentient beings, see my On Moral Considerability.
7. Cf. Daniel Dennett, "Intentional Systems," in Brainstorms (Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford Books, 1978), 3-22.